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THESIS

**EURO-ISLAM OR ISLAM IN EUROPE:
THE ROLE OF MUSLIMS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS
IN GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE
NETHERLANDS**

by

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June 2011

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Almost twenty million Muslims live in Europe. These Muslims make up diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural communities, many of which are struggling to define their role within Europe's secular societies and the role of their religion in this environment. The concept of Euro-Islam is one option to promote a new European form of Islam that helps Muslim citizens and immigrants integrate into Europe's civic and political fabric. This study shows that the concept of Euro-Islam is still under negotiation and diversity across Muslim communities complicates the negotiation process. Conceptions of Euro-Islam vary from a pure embrace of secularism to new forms of Islamism. The acceptance of core European values, such as democracy, tolerance, and pluralism, are essential prerequisites for acceptance of Euro-Islam by Europeans, but many Muslims view their situation as that of exclusion, characterized by low levels of education, high unemployment, and societal discrimination. They face governments that seek to dialogue with Muslims while simultaneously pursuing increasingly assimilative immigration policies. Muslims in Europe have developed organizational networks to represent their opinions and interests as well as to express their identity. On the one hand, these organizations naturally reflect the diversity of the communities they represent. On the other hand, these organizations are all but representative for all Muslims living in Europe. Therefore, their role in the promotion of Euro-Islam is limited. This thesis proposes a rethinking of current immigration policies, intensified discourse among Muslims over Euro-Islam, and open dialogue between Muslims and others, where secularism does not become an excuse for discrimination and integration is distinguished from assimilation. This policy requires Europeans to rethink their own identity and the role they want religion to play in society.

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**EURO-ISLAM OR ISLAM IN EUROPE:
THE ROLE OF MUSLIMS AND THEIR ORGANIZATIONS IN GERMANY,
GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS**

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ABSTRACT

Almost twenty million Muslims live in Europe. These Muslims make up diverse ethnic, linguistic, and cultural communities, many of which are struggling to define their role within Europe's secular societies and the role of their religion in this environment. The concept of Euro-Islam is one option to promote a new European form of Islam that helps Muslim citizens and immigrants integrate into Europe's civic and political fabric. This study shows that the concept of Euro-Islam is still under negotiation and diversity across Muslim communities complicates the negotiation process. Conceptions of Euro-Islam vary from a pure embrace of secularism to new forms of Islamism. The acceptance of core European values, such as democracy, tolerance, and pluralism, are essential prerequisites for acceptance of Euro-Islam by Europeans, but many Muslims view their situation as that of exclusion, characterized by low levels of education, high unemployment, and societal discrimination. They face governments that seek to dialogue with Muslims while simultaneously pursuing increasingly assimilative immigration policies. Muslims in Europe have developed organizational networks to represent their opinions and interests as well as to express their identity. On the one hand, these organizations naturally reflect the diversity of the communities they represent. On the other hand, these organizations are all but representative for all Muslims living in Europe. Therefore, their role in the promotion of Euro-Islam is limited. This thesis proposes a rethinking of current immigration policies, intensified discourse among Muslims over Euro-Islam, and open dialogue between Muslims and others, where secularism does not become an excuse for discrimination and integration is distinguished from assimilation. This policy requires Europeans to rethink their own identity and the role they want religion to play in society.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AABF	Almanya Alevi Birlikeleri Federasyonau
	(Federation of Alevi Communities in Germany)
AABK	Arrupa Alevi Birlikleri Konfederasyona
	(Confederation of Alevi Communities in Europe)
AKP	Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi
ARD	Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik
	Deutschland (German public TV and Radio Station)
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BMI	Bundesministerium des Inneren
	(Federal Ministry of the Interior)
BMF	British Muslim Forum
CGI	Contactgroep Islam (Contact Groep Islam)
CMO	Contact Moslims Overheid (Contact Organ Muslims and Government)
DCKG	Department of Communities and Local Government
DIK	Deutsche Islam Konferenz (German Islam Conference)
DITIB	Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam
	(Turkish Islamic Union of the Institution of Religion)
ECFR	European Council for Fatwa and Research
EMN	European Muslim Network
EMU	European Muslim Union
e.V.	Eingetragener Verein (Voluntary Association)
FCCC	Faith Communities Consultation Council
FEMYSO	Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations
FIOE	Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe
GMGS	Gesellschaft Muslimischer Geistes- und Socialwissenschaftler
	(Society of Muslim Arts and Social Scientists)
ICRC	Inner-City Religious Council
IF	Islamic Foundation

IFNUK	Interfaith Network for the UK
IGBD	Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland (Islamic Community of Bosniaks in Germany)
IGD	Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland (Islamic Society of Germany)
IGMG	Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs (Islamic Community Milli Görüs)
IGS	Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden in Deutschland (Islamic Society of Shi'a Communities in Germany)
IRD	Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Islamic Council in Germany)
ISB	Islamic Society of Britain
ISBO	Islamic Schools Government Board Organization
ISC	Islamic Sharia Council
ISN	Islamitisch Stichting Nederland (Islamic Foundation Netherlands)
IZH	Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg (Islamic Center Hamburg)
KMAN	Kommitee van Maroccaanse Arbeiders in Nederland (Committee of Moroccan Workers in the Netherlands)
KÖR	Körperschaft des öffentlichen Rechts (Officially Recognized Corporation)
KRMD	Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany)
MAB	Muslim Association of Britain
MCB	Muslim Council of Britain
MINAB	Mosques and Imam Advisory Board
MJD	Muslime Jugend in Deutschland (Muslim Youth in Germany)
MSVD	Muslimische Studentenvereinigung in Deutschland (Muslim Student Association in Germany)
NIO	Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep (Dutch Islamic Broadcasting)
NMO	Nederlandse Moslim Omroep (Dutch Muslim Broadcasting)
OUMA	Omroep Universele Moslim Associatie (Broadcasting Universal Muslim Association)

PBM	Progressive British Muslims
PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
QF	Quilliam Foundation
SICN	Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Nederland
	(Foundation of Islamic Center the Netherlands)
SMC	Sufi Muslim Council
SMON	Stichting Moslim Omroep Nederland
	(Foundation Muslim Broadcasting Netherlands)
STICF	Stichting Turks Islamitisch Culturele Federatie
	(Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation)
UK	United Kingdom
UKACIA	UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs
UKIM	UK Islamic Mission
UMO	Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and Eire
UMMON	Unie van Marokkaanse Mosk Organisaties Nederland
	(Union of Moroccan Mosque Organizations)
VIKZ	Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren
	(Association of Islamic Culture Centers)
VVD	Voklspartij voor Vrijheid en Demokratie
	(People's Party for Freedom and Democracy)
WIM	World Islamic Mission
YMUK	Young Muslims UK
ZMaD	Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland
	(Central Council of Moroccans in Germany)
ZDF	Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen (German Public TV Station)
ZMD	Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland
	(Central Council of Muslims in Germany)

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I.   INTRODUCTION

A.   MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION

You can't ask people to give up their religion; that would be absurd. Religions may be illusions, but these are important and profound illusions. And they will modify as they come into contact with other ideas. This is what an effective multiculturalism is: not a superficial exchange of festivals and food, but a robust and committed exchange of ideas – a conflict that is worth enduring, rather than a war.[1]

Approximately fifteen to twenty million Muslims live in Europe.[2] The perception of Muslims by Western Europeans is often dominated by a fear of Islam as an expanding religion seeking to dominate Europe. A recent opinion poll in Germany, for example, shows that 33% of German, non-Muslim citizens are seriously afraid of an expansion of Islam, while another 39% after all are slightly afraid of such an development.[3] Similar observations can be made in other European countries like Great Britain or the Netherlands. The permanent presence of large Muslim communities, however, is an irreversible fact. Statements by European heads of state, for example by German president Christian Wulff, who stated that Islam has become a part of Germany, indicate that Europeans are aware of this development.[4] The perception of Muslims by non-Muslims in Europe, however, is still dominated by a lack of understanding as well as broad generalizations and stereotyping of Islam. Moreover, differences of Islamic and

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[1] Hanif Kureishi in Sam Cherribi, *In the House of War: Dutch Islam Observed* (Oxford: University Press, 2010), 217.

[2] For the purpose of this thesis, the term Europe refers only to the countries listed in Figure 1 where Muslims are a minority of less than 10%. Due to the fact that some European nations do not collect data on their citizens' religion, more accurate data concerning the Muslim population in Europe are not available. The provided numbers reflect the variety of data as identified in a review of relevant literature. A recent Pew Research Center study estimates that approximately 17 million Muslims live in Western Europe (Pew Research Center, *Muslim Networks and Movements in Western Europe* (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2010), 5).

[3] "Islam in Deutschland bereitet Sorgen," Infratest dimap, accessed November 01, 2010. http://www.infratest-dimap.de/umfragen-analysen/bundesweit/umfragen/aktuell/islam-in-deutschland-bereitet-sorgen/.

[4] "Wulff: Islam gehört zu Deutschland," Der Tagesspiegel (October 03, 2010), accessed May 20, 2011. http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/wulff-islam-gehoert-zu-deutschland/1948760.html.

Islamist organizations are often not understood. However, for their part, Muslims have to contribute to a better relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims as well.

Islamic scholars like Tariq Ramadan and Bassam Tibi, who want to change European perception of Islam and, at the same time, achieve an improved integration of their fellow Muslims into Western European societies, have introduced a concept of *Euro-Islam*. Although the interpretation of Euro-Islam by these scholars differs significantly, the name suggests that Muslims in Europe need to share a common understanding and interpretation of their religion and the role it plays in the secular environment of Western Europe. This would imply that there is an active discourse by Muslims on the national as well as European level, enabling an exchange of their understanding of Islam's role in Europe and their experience as Muslims in this non-Muslim environment. Much more, it assumes Muslims and their organizations will cooperate on the European level to achieve a widely accepted definition of Euro-Islam and to promote this new form of Islam.

The aim of this thesis is to evaluate these underlying assumptions by answering the following research questions: First, what are the main characteristics of Euro-Islam: is it a cohesive, integrating concept or are there different schools of thought? Does Euro-Islam propagate a secular understanding of the role of Islam in Europe, or is it actually as some scholars argue a specific form of Islamism?[5]

To succeed, this new form of Islam will have to be accepted by the majority of Muslims in Europe. Thus, we have to take a closer look at Muslim populations in Europe and ask what Muslims in Europe have in common. Do they share common interests and values that would support the development of a new, cohesive, European form of Islam compatible with modern, secular societies in Western Europe?

Finally, it must be analyzed whether organizations of Muslim communities in Europe could support the propagation of Euro-Islam. Ayatollah Ghaemmaghami, an Iranian scholar and former imam in the German city Hamburg, argues that it is

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[5] Yunis Qandil, "Euro-Islamists and the Struggle for Dominance Within Islam," in *The Other Muslims: Moderate and Secular*, ed. Zeyno Baran (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 55–70.

necessary for Muslims in Europe to organize. Organization, he continues, will enable the Muslim minority to communicate their concerns and interests to European governments, and European law makers would know whom to address and thus could focus on a limited number of representative organizations rather than dealing with an anonymous entity.[6] We therefore have to ask how Muslims in Europe are organized, nationally and internationally. What are the goals and objectives of these organizations, and how supportive are these organizations to the development of a European form of Islam?

An analysis of Muslim communities and organizations in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands shows that Euro-Islam is more of an intellectual construct that is under negotiation rather than something that is embraced by the majority of Muslims in Europe. The ethnic, national, cultural and religious diversity of Muslims in these three countries makes the negotiation process complex. The demographic development and the social status of resident Muslims, however, require some form of change to help them improve their current social position. That this also requires significant changes in policy and public opinion in European countries is another result of this analysis. Thereby, the acceptance of Europeans to have become immigration countries seems to be more important than the theoretical construct of applied immigration policies. It is the struggle over daily issues and the routinely transaction of Muslims with non-Muslims that will form the identity of Muslims in Europe that might, finally, define a European form of Islam.

Muslims themselves have already developed a widespread network of organizations to transport their demands to their governments. Yet, the overall landscape of Muslim organizations is as diverse as the Muslim communities in each country. Overall, the establishment of Euro-Islam as a special form of Islam in Europe— integrative, tolerant, and widely accepted by Muslims, as well as non-Muslims—is possible, but will require time, dedication, and the will of all involved.

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[6] S.A. Hosseini Ghaemmaghami, *Europäischer Islam oder Islam in Europa? Erfahrungen und Ansichten eines Ayatollahs in Europa* (Berlin: Verlag Hans Schiller, 2010), 130.

B.   IMPORTANCE

Today, the Muslim population in Europe is a minority within approximately 500 million Europeans. Several estimates, however, predict a shift in the demographics of Europe. The estimates vary from a 15% to more than 50% Muslim population in Europe by 2050.[7] This development is caused mainly by the differences in birth rates of Muslim and non-Muslim families in Europe.

The growing fear among non-Muslims of an expansion of Islam and growing Islamist influence has to be understood within the context of demographics in combination with several incidents over the last decade. The most alarming incidents have been the attacks of 9/11, the Madrid and London terrorist bombings in 2004 and 2005, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the murder of the Dutch director Theo van Gogh in 2004, and the tumult around the Mohamed cartoons published in a Danish newspaper in 2006.

Country	Est. 2010 Muslim Population	Percentage of Population that is Muslim
Austria	475,000	5.7
Belgium	638,000	6.0
Denmark	226,000	4.1
Finland	42,000	0.8
France	3,574,000	5.7
Germany	4,119,000	5.0
Greece	527,000	4.7
Ireland	43,000	0.9
Italy	1,583,000	2.6
Luxembourg	13,000	2.7
Netherlands	914,000	5.5
Norway	144,000	3.0
Portugal	22,000	0.2
Spain	1,021,000	2.3
Sweden	451,000	4.9
Switzerland	433,000	5.7
United Kingdom	2,869,000	4.6
Total	17,094,000	

Table 1.   Muslims living in Europe [8]

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[7] Michael Radu, *Europe's Ghost: Tolerance, Jihadism, and the Crisis in the West* (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), vi, 39.

[8] Pew Research Center, *Muslim Networks*, 5.

From the Muslim perspective, many feel discriminated against and not accepted by their host nations. This applies especially to second- and third-generation Muslim immigrants, many citizens of the countries they live in. Undoubtedly, they often face societies that do not accept their culture and traditions. Moreover, their chances in the job market in many European countries are worse as compared to those of non-Muslims applying for the same jobs with the same qualifications. Finally, in many European countries Muslims recognize that Christian communities enjoy benefits (tax benefits, access to public schools etc.) provided by the state that Muslim communities currently are denied.

Although the influence of Islamist groups in Europe has so far been limited, the situation and developments described above shape an environment that could lead to a much greater influence of Islamists in Europe. Therefore, the question occurs whether the development of a new form of Islam, namely Euro-Islam, will be merely a form of Islamism, as scholars like Yunis Qandil argue.[9]

To discuss this question, we must define the nature of Islamic or Islamist thought. What does Islamism in Europe really mean? The current attitude of many state officials in Europe, to lump Islamists together and define them indiscriminately as undemocratic and a threat to Europe, seems to be of little help and diminishes the positive influence of many Muslim organizations on the integration of Muslims in Europe. European governments need to identify the goals and objectives of Islamic and Islamist organizations and the rationale for their decision making in order to craft policies to counter radical Islamists or dialog with those that look for peaceful coexistence. Europeans should be aware of the landscape of Islamic and Islamist organizations and the levels of cooperation among them.

C.   CONCEPTUAL CONTEXT

When European politicians discuss the subject of integration, they need to speak from a common understanding. However, the policies European countries apply to

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[9] Qandil, *Euro-Islamists*, 55–70.

accommodate immigrants differ significantly. Thus, a definition of what integration really means and the alternative routes Muslim communities in Europe could take, to define their future presence in Europe, is required. This will ultimately allow the assessment of how supportive these organizations will be to promoting a Euro-Islam that facilitates successful integration.

1.   The Concept of Integration

Chris Lee argues that current sociological theories of integration mostly build upon classical assimilation theory.[10] Scholars of this classical theory define assimilation as "the social process that brings ethnic minorities into the mainstream [of the life of a host nation.]"[11] If we follow this definition, Muslims in Western Europe ultimately would have to give up their own identity. Today, most European countries reject such a policy of assimilation. It is regarded as discriminatory and opposed to the values of liberal democracies. The policies that have been applied since the first significant streams of immigrants to Europe after World War II can be categorized as follows:

- The *assimilation model* according to classical assimilation theory. This model can be best explained by the old saying "when in Rome, do as the Romans do." Assimilation means full compliance with the values and beliefs of the host society accepting that this is the only way it should be done while in Rome. Deviations from mainstream values and beliefs are restricted to the private sphere and the minority is fused with the majority. This makes the preservation of personal values and beliefs extremely difficult, if not impossible. Thus, the assimilation of Muslims in Europe would mean more or less a kind of Christianization or secularization of Islam. Publicly, the majority of European nations reject this model, and the same applies to the Muslims themselves. However, as will be shown, strong tendencies towards assimilation can be observed in Europe. The development of a European form of Islam will not be possible, however, if Europeans follow the approach of assimilation.

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[10] Chris Lee, "Sociological Theories of Immigration: Pathways to Immigration for U.S. Immigrants," *Journal of Human Behavior in the Social Environment* 19 (2009): 732.

[11] Ibid.

- The *ethnic minorities model* institutionalizes space for the preservation of cultural identity and some degree of pluralism. Most supporters of integration promote this approach to immigrant accommodation. Not only does the application of this model allow immigrants to preserve their cultural identity, it also includes real dialogue and an exchange of values and beliefs. This dialogue will result in a core of values that are accepted by all and form the basis for peaceful coexistence, although immigrants might have to give up more than the larger host society. Returning to the old saying, this approach suggests that maybe the Romans can learn from others, who do differently. Although many European countries officially seek to integrate immigrants under the ethnic-minority model, they may struggle with the question of how to accomplish this. The options are assimilation, integration and appeasement based upon exaggerated political correctness. To develop Euro-Islam in the framework of the ethnic minority model would offer the best chances for success.

- The *guest-worker model* foresees only a temporary presence of immigrants in the host nation. Societies that have applied the guest worker model tend to tolerate a certain degree of cultural diversity. Some argue that foreign residents may even be encouraged to maintain their original cultures to facilitate their eventual return.[12] This model evolved in the 1960s when Germany and other Western countries called immigrants into the country to provide labor. Because the arrangement was thought to be temporary, immigrants were left on their own outside of the work environment and allowed to pursuit their values and beliefs so long as it was private. Thus, the Romans did as they always do, and so did the immigrants but privately.

- The concept of *multiculturalism* is interpreted variously. Some view it as a special form of the guest worker model, while others use the term as part of the ethnic-minorities model. Recently, it has become a synonym for cultural relativism which allows the existence of Muslim entities in European societies as independent enclaves. What distinguishes it from the guest-worker model is its spurning of the host nation's

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[12] John Rex, *Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of Multiculturalism and Political Integration* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), 51.

national identity as hegemonial culture.[13] Despite different interpretations by different groups, for the purpose of this thesis, multiculturalism will be understood as cultural relativism, which, in the worst case, can become a form of appeasement to avoid any impression of alleged assimilation. Moreover, in contrast to the guest-worker model, the host society is often more willing to accept the intrusion of foreign values than to preserve its own.

The main difference among these models lie in the degree of dialogue and the exchange of values and believes, as depicted in Figure 1.

To guide the analysis as to whether Euro-Islam can be a vehicle to successful integration, Integration will be defined on the basis of the ethnic-minority model as the process of accommodating immigrating minorities in a host society, enabling them to participate actively in the social, political, cultural, and economic processes of the host society, and allowing them to preserve their cultural and religious identity as Europeans under the laws of the host society, in a process of exchange and dialogue.


Figure 1.   Immigration Models

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[13] Bassam Tibi, *Political Islam, World Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad* (New York: Routledge, 2008), 177–178.

This process of integration is determined by several, often interdependent, factors. Susanne Worbs defines these factors as the existence of social networks to accommodate immigrants, the influence of family relations and marriage, immigrant biographies and future prospects, and their political orientation, religious socialization, attitudes, identities, and use of media.[14] Moreover, the self-image of the host country plays an important role, as Dilmar Hussain points out.[15] He argues that Germany, for example, historically had a notion of blood descent and external threats as basis of national identity. Chris Lee talks about contextual factors such as the policies of the host society, as well as societal values and biases, as influential factors in integration.[16] Thus, integration is not a one-way road but a mutual process that involves migrants and the host society equally.[17]

The definition of the concept of integration and the factors that influence integration establishes a conceptual framework to which the concept of Euro-Islam has to be compared. But success of integration is not guaranteed. The growing number of Muslims in Europe could take different routes, which should be briefly outlined.

2. Possible Routes for Muslims in Europe

Islam and Europe, in general, belong to two different conceptual categories: one refers to religion and the other primarily to geography. However, both are also relevant to the definition of culture and values. Muslims in Europe are no longer just migrants. After the first significant groups came to Western Europe in the 1950s, they stayed; and today, the second, and even third, generations of these former migrants live in every

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[14] Susanne Worbs, "The Second Generation in Germany: Between School and the Labor Market," *International Migration Review* 37, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 1011–1038.

[15] Dilmar Hussain, "The Holy Grail of Muslims in Western Europe: Representation and Their Relationship with the State," in *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East*, ed. John L. Esposito and F. Burgat (New Brunswick: Rutges University Press, 2003), 222.

[16] Lee, "Theories of Immigration," 734.

[17] Mathias Rohe, "Islamismus und Scharia," in *Integration und Islam* (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2006), 120.

European country. Which route these Muslims take is still to be determined. Mathias Rohe defines five possible roles Islam could play in the future of Europe.[18]

The first, but largest group of Muslims is simply accepting the European legal and social framework without any theoretical reflections on that topic. They are more concerned with their economic situation, political participation, education and other issues of daily life than the role their religion should play in the societies of Europe.

The second approach—*the ex-Muslim approach*—makes the choice between secular democracy and adherence to Islam inevitable. Necla Kelek formulates the main proposition of this approach as follows: "For me, Islam as a *Weltanschauung* and a system of values cannot be integrated into the European societies. […] It lacks the institutional, structural and theological prerequisites for that. […]. Islam is not capable of integration, whereas the single Muslim as a citizen is."[19] This approach has to be considered a form of assimilation as described above. Thus, most likely, Muslims in Europe will reject this dramatic approach.

The *exclusivist approach* is as dramatic as the ex-Muslim approach, but its intension is reverse. Representatives of this approach reject European norms and values, demanding the supremacy of Islamic norms as a whole.[20] While the vast majority restrict themselves to argumentative activities, their fundamental rejection of Western values leads to further radicalization. Groups like *Khilavet Devleti*, *Hizb al-Tahrir*, or *Tablighi Jamaat* promote this approach.[21] The consequences of this approach for Europe would be dramatic and change European societies fundamentally. It is a form of multiculturalism that comes in the form of appeasement if Europeans accept it.

Representatives of the *traditionalistic approach* reject exclusivist, or we can also say extremist, ideology and tactics. Traditionalists share a common understanding

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[18] Mathias Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State Under the Rule of Law – and Never the Twain Shall Meet?" in *Islam & Europe: Crises are Challenges*, ed. Marie-Claire Foblets and Jean-Yves Carlier (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 222–230.

[19] Ibid., 223.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

especially of social norms and gender issues. They mostly cooperate with non-Muslims and "are ready to integrate into the given order, but maintain a very traditional position towards gender-related issues and in matters of orthopraxy."[22] The concept of *dar al-'ahd* plays a significant role for the traditionalists since it obliges Muslims to obey the law of the land of residence. This could enable a peaceful coexistence of Muslims in Europe though it would be far from achieving real integration. Integration, as understood by this group as well as by the extremists, is confused, often willingly, with assimilation.[23] Actually, accepting the traditionalistic approach would be a form of multiculturalism falling short of real integration.

Another group, which could be called *integrationists*, calls for substantial integration of Muslims into European societies. Integrationists ask their fellow Muslims to fully respect European values, principles, and laws while maintaining a Muslim identity within the given freedom of religion in Europe.[24] It is an application of the ethnic minorities model of integration in the form of pluralism. This is an approach that meets the definition of integration in the understanding of this thesis. Thus, it is the route Euro-Islam should follow in order to achieve a peaceful coexistence of Muslims and non-Muslims based on acceptance and respect.

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[22] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 225.

[23] Nezar AlSayyad, "Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: On the Discourses of Identity and Culture," in Nezar AlSayyad and Manual Castells, *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 19.

[24] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 226.

Model	Approach	Representatives (Example)
Ex-Muslim	- Far-reaching adaptation to Western norms and values at the expense of own Muslim identity - Secularism	Muslim converts, Anti-Islamic politicians and organizations
Exclusivist	- Fundamental rejection of Western norms and values - Propagation of an Islamist state	Hizb al-Tahrir
Traditionalistic	- Reject exclusivists' radical ideology and tactics - Share core values, especially with regard to social norms and gender issues - Respect legislation of host countries	Muslim Association of Britain
Integrative	- Integration based on dialogue and exchange of values. - Acceptance of core Western values - Secularism	Progressive British Muslims

Table 2.   Possible Routes of Muslims in Europe[25]

D.   METHODS AND SOURCES

To get an answer to the questions above, the term "Euro-Islam" will first be defined by means of a literature review on this subject. Next, a study of Euro-Islam, as defined by two of its most prominent proponents (Tariq Ramadan and Bassam Tibi), will indicate whether there is a common understanding of this term or whether different understandings exist. The findings of this case study will enable a determination as to what form of Euro-Islam will most likely be accepted by European Muslims and non-Muslims. Finally, this analysis will reveal the main characteristics of Euro-Islam and the

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[25] The group of Muslims, who do not reflect on the theory of secularism and the future role of Islam in Europe, has not been listed because they are not represented in Muslim organizations in the understanding of this thesis.

necessary preconditions for its successful establishment. This is the yardstick Muslim communities and organizations will be measured with to predict whether they support the concept of an integrative Euro-Islam.

With up to twenty million Muslims living in Europe, Islamic and Islamist organizations exist in every European country. Their activities and focus run from urban communities to the national and European level. To analyze the objectives and policies of all these organizations would go far beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore, the research question will be answered by applying a comparative case study of Muslim organizations in three European countries: Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, focusing on those organizations assumed most influential.

The three countries studied are well suited for a comparative case study that is representative for Western Europe:

All three host a significant large Muslim population. Approximately 4.3 million Muslims live in Germany (5.3%),[26] 2.9 million in Great Britain (4.6%),[27] and almost one million in the Netherlands (5.8%).[28] All three states are democratic, members of the European Union, and participate, or have participated in military operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, which is of special interest for many Muslims in Europe. So far the common ground.

By contrast, the Muslims in these countries originate from different regions of the world (Turkey, North Africa, the Gulf region, Central Asia, and Southeast-Asia), and the integration policies of these countries are different. Two of the countries (Great Britain and the Netherlands) have a colonial legacy in the Muslim world, with the heritage of Great Britain having a much longer-lasting impact. This composition of the case study allows us to analyze the influence of a variety of factors on the possible development of a coherent form of Euro-Islam.

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[26] Sonja Haug, Stephanie Müssig, and Anja Stichs, *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland* (Nürnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2009), 11.

[27] Pew Research Center, *Muslim Networks*, 5.

[28] FORUM, Institute for Multicultural Affairs, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands: Facts and Figures* (Utrecht: FORUM, Institute for Multicultural Affairs, 2010), 8.

Like most organizations, Islamic and Islamist organizations do not act in isolation; they interact with non-Muslim society in a common environment defined by political, economic, social, technological, environmental, and legal factors. For example, Anouar Boukhars argues that radicalization of Islamists could evolve from a lack of political representation,[29] and Francis Fukuyama points out that globalization driven by the Internet and increased mobility change the face of Islamism.[30] To be successful, organizations have to respond to their environment. The same applies to the implementation of a new concept like Euro-Islam. If Euro-Islam is to allay the fears of Western Europeans and build a bridge between Muslims and non-Muslims, it needs to address the needs of Muslims as well as non-Muslims. Muslim organizations could play a significant role in the promotion of this new concept. Whether they will be able and willing to play this role is the question that has to be answered.

E.   THESIS OVERVIEW

Including this introduction, the thesis contains five chapters.

Chapter II will provide a brief review of the literature on Euro-Islam, definition of the terms "Islamic" and "Islamist," and analysis of the concept of Euro-Islam, as defined by two of the main proponents. The construct of identity, which plays a crucial role in the concept of integration and Euro-Islam, will be described. Findings will serve as the yardstick for our analysis of Muslim populations and organizations in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands.

The Muslim population of these countries is analyzed in Chapter III: Where they come from, their religious roots and the current situation in their host countries. Relationships with the three host countries will be assessed, especially as to how the hosts seek to integrate Muslim communities and how that influences Muslim identity.

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[29] Anouar Boukhars, "Islam, Jihadism, and the Depolitization in France and Germany," *International Political Science Review* 30, no. 3 (2009): 298.

[30] Francis Fukuyama, "Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (April 2006): 11.

Findings will be compared, enabling the evaluation of the chances that Euro-Islam will have to address the needs and concerns of Muslims and be widely accepted by Muslims and non-Muslims.

Chapter IV addresses Muslim organizations in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands to identify their objectives and agendas, how these organizations are influenced, and whether they are integrated into a wider network. This analysis will permit to identify the role Muslim organizations can play in the promotion of Euro-Islam.

Finally, Chapter V summarizes the findings of the previous chapters. Moreover, recommendations will be made to the direction Euro-Islam should take to achieve better integration while enabling Muslims to retain an identity as European citizens believing in Islam. Finally, the factors European governments should take into account to adjust their integration policies will be highlighted.

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II. EURO-ISLAM: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

Euro-Islam is still a contested concept under development. At its core, however, it seeks to support an integrative process to be "more inclusive of religious-ethnic minorities, to maintain law and order, to avoid radicalization and to make sure that Muslims are properly familiarized with and incorporated in the ethos of the European countries in which they live."[31] This form of Euro-Islam seeks to maintain a Muslim identity that must be developed in the specific context of secular Western Europe. The acceptance of core European values, like democracy, tolerance and pluralism, are nonnegotiable prerequisites for acceptance of Euro-Islam by Europeans.

Figure 2.   Pillars of Euro-Islam

The fact that Euro-Islam is still a contested concept requires further research in the current process of reaching a definition. Before an analysis of the concept of Euro-Islam and its pillars—as depicted in Figure 2—can be conducted, it is first necessary to define Islamism and the differences between Islamist and Islamic organizations. This distinction is necessary to analyze whether the different representatives of Euro-Islam actually mean Euro-Islamism when they talk about this concept. It is also necessary to

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[31] Sara Silvestri, "Moderate Islamist Groups in Europe: The Muslim Brothers," to appear in *Political Islam*, ed. K. Hroub (London: Saqi books), 49, accessed November 10, 2010. http://www.sara.silvestri.

analyze Muslim organizations and their aim and objectives. Afterwards, the concept of identity, which plays an important role in the concept of Euro-Islam, will be addressed. Based on these definitions the concept of Euro-Islam and its different schools of thought will be analyzed.

A.   WHAT IS "ISLAMIC" AND WHAT IS "ISLAMIST?"

As stated in the introduction, the differences between Islamist and Islamic are often not understood by Western politicians, the media and the public. According to Mohammed Ayoob, Islamism or political Islam has to be understood as "a political ideology rather than religion or theology."[32] Islam as a religion serves as an instrument to achieve political objectives. What is characteristic of Islamism is that its proponents borrow from Islamic traditions, the *Qur'an* and the *hadith*, while simultaneously separating them from the social, economic, cultural, and political context they were developed or written in.[33] What all Islamist groups have in common, Robbert Woltering points out, is "the desire to 'Islamize' society" and a "conviction that sooner or later the realm of politics will have to be altered fundamentally."[34] Bassam Tibi, among others, argues that Islamists seek to establish Islamic rule and a competitive model of globalization. Moreover, he argues, Islamists blame the downfall of Islam on Europe. Therefore, the Islamization of Europe through immigration would be a rational, logic goal to overcome the weakness Islam finds itself in.[35] Another important concept of Islamism is the unity of Islam, describing a global *umma* of believing Muslims where all spheres of society are entirely permeated by Islam.[36] Islamism, however, does not necessarily imply the use of violence. Islamists may engage in violent activities but also in political discourse and dialogue.

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[32] Mohammed Ayoob, *The many Faces of political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World* (Michigan: Michigan University Press, 2008), 2.

[33] Ibid., 3.

[34] Robbert A. F. L. Woltering, "The Roots of Islamist Popularity," *Third World Quarterly* 23, no.6 (2002): 1133.

[35] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 171.

[36] Eberhard Troeger, "Islam oder Islamismus? Argumente zu seiner Beurteilung," *Institut für Islamfragen,* special edition no.5 (2005): 3.

Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, an organization or ideology will be called *Islamist* if it seeks to gain political influence or control so as to apply principles based on the Qur'an and the hadith to all spheres of life and to base jurisdiction on *shari'a* law. The promotion of a global umma and the universality of Islam are additional characteristics of organizations and ideologies that will be defined as Islamist. Members of Islamist organizations see themselves, first and foremost, as Muslims. They share a Muslim identity rather than an identity as Europeans believing in Islam.

Islamic organizations, in contrast, are those organizations whose members are influenced by Islamic values but who draw a clear line between religion and other spheres of life. The identity of these Muslims is influenced by their spiritual relationship with God and the obligations that sustain this relationship (prayers, spiritual rituals etc.). Islamic organizations, in the understanding of this thesis, are understood to be secular.

Where organizations are addressed in more general terms or if their orientation remains unclear, the term *Muslim organization* will be used.

B.   THE ROLE OF IDENTITY

Another important construct is that notion of identity. "The term identity typically refers to social labels given to individuals as members of a group. This may be self-designated or assigned to individuals themselves or by others."[37] E. H. Erikson defines identity as "a subjective sense of an invigorating sameness and continuity."[38] By definition, sharing an identity declares an individual to be an element of a larger group with whom he identifies through religion, ethnicity, or nationality. Scholars like Kathryn Woodward argue that identity is increasingly built upon multiple factors—nationality, ethnicity, social class, or gender to name a few. Some of these factors may even contradict themselves. Often, Grossberg points out, the logic of difference, individuality and temporality form an individual's identity.[39] Elham Manea argues that identity is a

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[37] AlSayyad, *Muslim Europe*, 17.

[38] Erik H. Erikson, "The Concept of Identity in Race Relations: Notes and Queries," *Daedalus* 95, no. 1, The Negro American – 2 (Winter, 1966): 147.

[39] AlSayyad, *Muslim Europe*, 17.

construct of fantasy where we choose some components of our identity and ignore others even knowing that our choice is often not truly rational.[40] Moreover, a person's identity is not fixed. It changes according to the living environment, opportunities to work and education, as well as length of residence in a foreign environment.[41]

Among others, Saira Yamin has analyzed factors that contribute to identify and cites ten that are highly influential.[42] For the concept of Euro-Islam religion, of course, is of special importance. Yamin argues that religion as a component of identity will play the most important role "in conditions that politically and economically discriminate against and marginalize religious communities"[43] and encourage members of these communities to base their identity especially on their religion. In her study of the relationship between religious identity and the causes of religious violence, she defines fourteen elements that determine the causal relationship between religious identity and group violence. Not surprisingly, these elements are similar to those factors we have previously defined as important to the integration process.

Identity in Europe, however, is still dominated by ethnicity.[44] Once a foreigner, always a foreigner. That is the brief conclusion of Elham Manea when it comes to the role of ethnicity in the perception of identity in Germany.[45] By contrast, Muslims'

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[40] Elham Manea, *Ich will nicht mehr schweigen: Der Islam, der Westen und die Menschenrechte* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 2009), ibook-Version.

[41] Nahid Afrose Kabir, *Young British Muslims: Identity, Culture, Politics and the Media* (Edingburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 200.

[42] Saira Yamin, "Understanding Religious Identity and the Causes of Religious Violence," *South Asian Journal of Peace Building* 1, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 7.

[43] Ibid. The fourteen elements, she has identified, are historical grievances or trauma, economic disparity, skewed political participation, collective religious history, the role of religious leadership, religious sites or territory, religious texts and traditions, religious pseudo speciation, media portrayal, negative communication, insecurity, mistrust and suspicion, demographic factors, internal and external alliances.

[44] Bassam Tibi, "Muslim Migrants in Europe: Between Euro-Islam and Ghettoization," in Nezar AlSayyad and Manual Castells, *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 32.

[45] Manea, *Ich will nicht mehr schweigen*.

identity, Tibi points out, is an identity of persons from different cultures who share the same faith.[46] This is one of the challenges that have to be overcome to successfully promote Euro-Islam.

C. EURO-ISLAM: THE CURRENT STATUS OF SCHOLARLY DISCOURSE

> *I argue against polarization and suggest a Euro-Islam as a strategy for peace within Europe to replace the exclusion which is inflicted by Europeans on Muslims and which contributes to their defensive response of self-ethnicization.*[47]

This statement by the Syrian professor Bassam Tibi puts the main objectives of the concept of Euro-Islam in a nutshell. However, the idea of Euro-Islam is rather new and a clear, widely accepted definition of this term does not exist. More important, it is still disputed whether something like Euro-Islam actually exists. Before the different interpretations of Euro-Islam by Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan—influential, although contradictory, promoters of Euro-Islam—will be analyzed, a brief review of the existing literature on Euro-Islam and Islam in Europe will shed some light on the persisting opinions on the value of Euro-Islam.

Islam in Europe has been a topic of scholarly interest for several decades.[48] The literature relevant to this thesis is endless, and the subjects covered highly diverse. A full representation, thus, will not be made, as it would add little value in answering the overarching question of what the role of Muslim organizations in the promotion of Euro-Islam will be.

The relevant literature can be divided into several groups, with the orientation of authors varying from Western populists to Islamist radicals to serious scholars of religion and political science. One group—taking a hard-liner position—asks for an end

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[46] Tibi, "Muslim Migrants," 37.

[47] Tibi, *Political Islam,* 189.

[44] Jocelyne Cesari, "Islam in the West: From Immigration to Global Islam," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 8 (2009): 149.

of tolerance and dialogue through government sponsored conferences.[49] Others follow a more moderate path, but still reject any tendency towards Islamization. Ayann Hirsi Ali and Afshin Ellian, for example, state that "citizenship of a democratic state means living by the laws of the country" which is a fundamental prerequisite if any democracy is to exist. Moreover, Ellian argues "the fruits of the European enlightenment must be defended, with force if necessary." Necla Kelek's understanding of Islam, as a *Weltanschauung* and a system of values that cannot be integrated into the European societies (whereas single Muslims, as citizens, can be),[50] is another example of this type of strong resistance to the growing influence of Islamism in Europe. What all of these scholars have in common, is a call for a Muslim enlightenment.[51]

A second group of scholars gives detailed analysis and provides recommendations for Muslim communities in Europe to define their future role. Representatives of this group are Bassam Tibi, Tariq Ramadan, and Ayatollah S. A. Hosseini Ghaemmaghami. These Muslims approach the concept of Euro-Islam from different perspectives. Bassam Tibi offers the perspective of a secular Muslim scholar. Ramadan and Ghaemmaghami, by contrast, view Islam as a comprehensive religion covering all aspects of life.

Another group of scholars, including Lawrence Rosen,[52] Michael Radu,[53] and Oliver Roy,[54] share the conclusion that, for now, we are talking about Muslims in Europe rather than European Muslims; but they more or less leave open what the future of Muslims will or should look like. Roy argues that Muslims in Europe currently try to individualize and reconstruct their identities along differing patterns, which undermines the idea of Euro-Islam or a homogenous Muslim community in Europe. Sara Silvestri

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[49] Udo Ulfkotte, *SOS Abendland: Die schleichende Islamisierung Europas* (Rottenburg: Kopp Verlag, 2010), 367–368.

[50] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 223.

[51] Ian Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam: Liberal Europe, Islam and the Limits of Tolerance* (New York: Penguin Books, 2007), 29.

[52] Lawrence Rosen, *The Culture of Islam: Changing Aspects of Contemporary Muslim Life* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006), 156.

[53] Radu, *Europe's Ghost*, 27.

[54] Oliver Roy in Rosen, *The Culture of Islam*, 155.

points out that, initially, any attempt to negotiate issues and the rights of Muslims in Europe usually triggered interference from diplomatic representatives of Muslim countries. Therefore, she argues, Muslims in Europe had no chance to express their concerns and claims.[55] Monda, as an extreme example, argues "there is no such thing as Islam." She argues that there would be a core set of ideas and principles which is known as Islam, and referred to by all Muslims, but that Islam cannot be called a concept, faith or ideology that has "inherent qualities that result in general consequences and determine what all Muslims think and feel." In her perception, "Islam only exists as the sum of all Muslims."[56] This understanding of Islam may be disgraceful to Muslims, but needs to be highlighted to describe the environment a future Euro-Islam would evolve in.

However, Roy, among others, does not reject the idea of Euro-Islam in total. In his opinion the evolution of Euro-Islam is an endogenous process of concrete interaction between European Muslims and non-Muslim societies. What the result of this process might be, he leaves open: radicalism, liberalism, or humanism?[57] Jytte Klausen comes to the same conclusion when she argues that it is very much under negotiation what Euro-Islam will look like and that it is not certain what the outcome, ten years from now, might be.[58]

Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, Euro-Islam will be understood as the process of developing Islam in a European context, and not as a status that has already been achieved.

This brief literature review should be sufficient to indicate that the concept of Euro-Islam is very much under negotiation. What is important to note, as Ayatollah Ghaemmaghami points out, is that drive to develop a specific form of European Islam is

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[55] Sara Silvestri, "Public Policies towards Muslims and the Institutionalization of 'Moderate Islam' in Europe: Some critical Reflections," in *Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou (New York: Routledge, 2010), 47.

[56] Anshuman A. Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices* (Oxford: Greenwood World Publishing, 2008), 183.

[57] Oliver Roy, "Euro-Islam: The Jihad within?" *The National Interest* (Spring 2003): 73.

[58] Jytte Klausen, *The Islamic Challenge: Politics and Religion in Western Europe* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 97.

only demonstrated by a religious, intellectual elite, while the acceptance of the majority of Muslims is missing.[59] The analysis of Muslim communities in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands in Chapter III will give an answer as to whether Ghaemmaghani is right. For the time being, we will focus on two prominent representatives of Euro-Islam. Their definition of this concept will provide a guide through the subsequent analysis of Muslim communities and organizations in this case study.

D.   THE EURO-ISLAM OF BASSAM TIBI

For Bassam Tibi, Euro-Islam is presently just a vision that has not become reality.[60] He offers criticicism that it is inflationary to speak of a European Islam, which is far from being a reality and only a concept embraced by some enlightened Muslims in Europe.[61] So far, he agrees with Rosen, Radu, Roy, and even Ghaemmaghani.

Tibi focuses his interpretation of Euro-Islam on the persistent commonalities between Muslim and non-Muslim European civilizations and follows an overall secular approach.[62] His Euro-Islam is characterized by "cultural modernity" and a degree of tolerance that "goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to Abrahamitic believers."[63] Tibi also rejects the notion of Europe as *da'wah*, which obliges Muslims to spread Islam among the population.[64] At the same time, he rejects the notion of *dar al-Islam* (the house of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (the house of war).[65] Tibi argues that it is no sign of moderation if scholars like Tariq Ramadan speak of Europe as *dar al-Islam* or *dar al-Shahada* (the house of Islamic belief), but rather, a hint to Islamization.[66] What Tibi

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[59] Ghaemmaghami, *Europäischer Islam*, 119.

[60] Bassam Tibi, "Der Euro-Islam als Brücke zwischen Islam und Europa," www.perlentaucher.de, accessed November 10, 2010. http://www.perlentaucher.de/artikel/3764.html.

[61] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 180.

[62] Ibid., 208.

[63] Tibi, "Muslim Migrants," 37.

[64] Ibid., 43.

[65] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 228.

[66] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 176.

calls for is not monoculture or multiculturalism but a plurality of cultures. Monoculturalism, he argues, leads to assimilation and discrimination while multiculturalism is based on cultural relativism or even nihilism.[67]

Tibi argues that the necessity for change is a condition sine qua non for successful integration of Muslims in Europe. He clearly states that the Europeanization of Islam can only be accomplished if "change and religious reforms are admitted by Muslims."[68] This reform has to be managed by the Muslims in Europe themselves. The installation of imams by Muslim governments, like Iran or Saudi Arabia, in European mosques is therefore a major obstacle to the development of a specific Euro-Islam.[69]

But Tibi aims his critique also at the Europeans themselves. With reference to the Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who lived in the fourteenth century, Tibi complains of a lack of commitment of Europeans to their "civilizational core values"[70] which should inspire Islamic thinking. His desire to incorporate European values into Islamic thought is based on the precedent of the Hellenization of Islam between the ninth and the twelfth centuries, which, in his view, "gave birth to medieval Islamic rationalism."[71] Cultural diversity, he continues, needs limits, which are to be defined in a discourse between Europeans and immigrants over common, basic values.[72] Identity plays a major role in this understanding of Euro-Islam, whereas identity in Europe is often based on ethnicity rather than values. While migrants have to change, he also asks for a "de-ethnization of European identity" which, for him, "is a prerequisite for the feasibility of Euro-Islam."[73]

Euro-Islam, Tibi explains, should by no means be an adjustment to Christian values, but it should also be clear that *jihad* and shari'a are not alternatives to European

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[67] Tibi, "Muslim Migrants," 45.

[68] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 189.

[69] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 227.

[70] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 158.

[71] Ibid., 157.

[72] Ibid.

[73] Tibi, "Muslim Migrants," 32.

law.[74] The most pertinent strategy for him is politics of integration that differ from both multi-culturalism and assimilation.[75] Tibi's Euro-Islam is based on five pillars: (1) democracy according to Western understanding, (2) secularism and rejection of shari'a, (3) individual human rights, (4) tolerance in the modern understanding of this term, and (5) recognition of pluralism in a civil society.[76] The clear implication for Tibi is that there is only one law for all. That means no shari'a law in Europe for Islamic minorities in any area of law, including family law.[77]

Not all scholars who support Tibi's idea of Euro-Islam reject the notion of shari'a as fundamentally as Tibi does. It has to be emphasized that shari'a cannot be reduced solely to the stoning of women or death penalties for those who convert from Islam. This is the prevailing image, Westerners have of shari'a. But shari'a in many ways defines core elements of Islam that a believing Muslim, whether secular or Islamist, cannot reject.[78]

Rohe states that the "shari'a is far from being a legal textbook. In fact, it is a highly complex system of rules for deriving and applying Islamic norms in a particular context in time and space."[79] It heavily relies on interpretation and conclusion. Reason plays an important role in this process of interpretation and conclusion, with ritual obligations alone exempted to the application of reason. Nevertheless, in contrast to shari'a, European law is set up positivistic.[80] The Bosnian Muslim Ernes Karic interprets the shari'a as a set of rules with moral goals and a state, which provides a sufficient social structure and aims for social and economic justice or promotes human

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[74] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 189–190.

[75] Ibid., 191.

[76] Ralph Ghadban, *Tariq Ramadan und die Islamisierung Europas* (Berlin: Verlag Hans Schiler, 2006), 8.

[77] Astrid B. Boening, *Euro-Islam: A Constructivist Idea or a Concept of the English School?* (Coral Gables: Miami-Florida European Union Center, 2007), 4.

[78] Irfan Al-Alawi et al., *A Guide to Shariah Law and Islamist Ideology in Western Europe 2007-2009* (London: Centre for Islamic Pluralism, 2009), ii.

[79] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 217.

[80] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 179.

rights, as Islamic.[81] Thus, the future concept of Euro-Islam has to take the different notions of shari'a into account. However, its role has to be restricted to a secondary role.

Nevertheless, with his definition of Euro-Islam, Tibi is very much in line with the definition of other scholars who have picked up his ideas. Eric Brown, for example, hopes that European Muslims will develop a solution to radicalism, one that combines religious fidelity with an allegiance to the principles, institutions, and sovereignty of liberal democratic governments.[82] Ian Buruma argues that the only chance for a peaceful future is for European Islam to accommodate itself to liberal democracy.[83] Moreover, Aydin, Halm, and Sen support Tibi's thesis that the development of Euro-Islam is a process and emphasize the importance of the five pillars of Euro-Islam as defined by Tibi.[84]

Elham Manea is another representative of this school of thought. Although she does not use the term "Euro-Islam," her notion of the future of Islam in Europe is similar Bassam Tibi's. As far as integration is concerned, she demands that violations of human rights be clearly announced and sees integration as the responsibility of the integrating society as well as the integrated group. In her understanding, Islam, or religion, is not the essential obstacle to integration but it can become a problem if immigrants insist on the application of shari'a law or if religion is used to keep immigrants apart from the host society. Finally, she views equal opportunities for immigrants, fairness, openness, and rhetorical clarity, as further prerequisites for successful integration.[85] She argues correctly that no religion has been receptive to new ideas and values from the very beginning. For example, no religion initially treated men and women as equal; this openness came over time and was a result of struggle. A "humanist Islam," as she calls it, has to reflect upon the historical and social context, traditions, and broader

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[81] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 227.

[82] Eric Brown, "After the Ramadan Affair: New Trends in Islamism in the West," *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology* (2005): 7–8.

[83] Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam*, 326.

[84] Hayrettin Aydin, Dirk Halm and Faruk Sen, *Euro-Islam: Das neue Islamverständnis der Muslime in der Migration* (Essen: Renner Institut, 2003), 25.

[85] Manea, *Ich will nicht mehr schweigen*.

Weltanschauung of the people.[86] Her concept of a humanist Islam consists of four elements: a humanist identity, rational religion based on the freedom to choose, open mindness, and gender equality.[87]

In summary, Tibi's concept of Euro-Islam is far from being Islamist. Elements of Euro-Islam as characteristics for the school of thought that has evolved around him are:

- Clear commitment to democracy and human rights in a Western understanding

- Secularism

- Restriction to the relevance of shari'a to rituals of religious service

- Tolerance towards other religions

- Religion as a matter of free choice

- Recognition of pluralism and a rejection of assimilation and multiculturalism

- Identity based upon common values rather than ethnicity and nationality

- Reduction of foreign influence by Muslim countries

- Initiation of a Muslim discourse on the role of Islam in Europe

- Equal opportunities for Muslims and non-Muslims

- Gender equality

E.   TARIQ RAMADAN'S DEFINITION OF EURO-ISLAM

While Bassam Tibi is well known, especially in Germany, Tariq Ramadan has emerged as one of the most listened to and respected figures among young Muslims in French- and English-speaking Europe. Among Western scholars, some of Ramadan's positions and statements are highly controversial. The number of publications by Tariq Ramadan almost equals the number about him, which are mainly critical. Eric Brown, for example, calls Ramadan a "ubiquitous Swiss Islamist intellectual and political

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[86] Manea, *Ich will nicht mehr schweigen*.

[87] Ibid.

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activist."[88] He argues that Ramadan embodies the internal contradictions within mainstream Islamism today. For Ralph Ghadban, Ramadan's Euro-Islam is a step towards the Islamization of Europe.[89] He argues that Ramadan's understanding of integration is to integrate Europeans into a global umma, and not to integrate Muslims into European society. Ghadban bases his assessment on several contradictory and ambiguous statements by Ramadan.[90] Caroline Fourest concludes in her book "Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan," that Ramadan is not a person who seeks a real modernization of Islam.[91] Bassam Tibi, finally, considers Ramadan a "rival within Islam in Europe."[92]

Others assert that the reluctance to engage with Ramadan's ideas, independent of his intention, is just "a lack of ideas on how to deal with migration and integration."[93] Sarah Wildman argues that Ramadan offers "Muslims a path of integration" and "a way to feel at home in Western democracies that allows for the full expression of Islam."[94] To quote another well known-scholar, Oliver Roy points out that Ramadan has been excessively demonized. In his opinion, he is not the "evil guy" many think.[95] But what is Ramadan's position on the preconditions of Euro-Islam, defined above, and why has he been so heavily criticized?

Tariq Ramadan bases his approach to Euro-Islam on a detailed interpretation of the Qur'an and *sunna* within the context of Western European societies. In his book "Western Muslims and the Future of Islam" Ramadan explains his understanding of

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[88] Brown, "After the Ramadan Affair," 10.

[89] Ghadban, *Tariq Ramadan*, 162.

[90] Ibid., 38–47.

[91] Caroline Fourest, *Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan* (New York: Encounter Books, 2008), 233.

[92] Tibi, *Political Islam*, 156.

[93] Sergio Marx, "Tariq Ramadan: a liberal reformer or a radical theoretician?" accessed April 28, 2011. http://futurechallenges.org/web/guest/learn/migration/article/-/articles/Tariq+Ramadan%3A+a+liberal+reformer+or+a+radical+theoretician%3F.

[94] Sarah Wildman, "Muslim Scholar Tariq Ramadan: Radical or Reformer?" accessed April 28, 2011. http://www.politicsdaily.com/2010/04/17/muslim-scholar-tariq-ramadan-radical-or-reformer/.

[95] Ibid.

Euro-Islam, although he does not use this *terminus technicus*.[96] Despite the obvious differences within the Muslim world, Ramadan talks about "the universe of Islam" which is defined by "the oneness of the points of reference and the diversity of their lived manifestations." For him, there is one Islam.[97] The road to that oneness is a "struggle, a jihad that goes without saying, but for principles, not against people, and if the people around one, willingly or unwillingly, forget the principles, the struggle consists in reminding them of those principles and making them apply them."[98] This wording can be interpreted in different ways. What remains clear is that Ramadan sees the need to remind Muslims in Europe of their faith, which is not a bad thing *per se*.

Ramadan calls upon his fellow Muslims to stop understanding themselves as a minority.[99] From his writings three guiding principles for Muslims in Europe can be derived: (1) the Islamic sources allow Muslims to live in the West; (2) Muslims are under the authority of an agreement whose terms must be respected as long as the terms do not force Muslims to act against their conscience; and (3) if a clear conflict of terms of reference occurs, a specific study should be carried out by Muslim jurists to formulate a legal opinion (*fatwa*).[100] Here, Ramadan points out that Europe, in general, is a benign environment for Muslims. Moreover, he asks fellow Muslims to respect the rules of the societies they live in. Where Muslims should see a conflict of Islamic obligations and the rules of society, new ways should be found. This falls within the definition of Euro-Islam as stated above. The only question is how Ramadan defines the new ways.

Ramadan tries to base the legitimacy of reform on the basis of Islamic writings interpreted in the contemporary context of Muslims living in a non-Muslim environment.[101] For him m*aslaha*, *ijtihad* and *fatwas* are the basic tools to link the

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[96] Tariq Ramadan, *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 3–5.

[97] Ibid., 9.

[98] Ibid., 225.

[99] Ibid., 6.

[100] Ibid.

[101] Tariq Ramadan, *Radikale Reform: Die Botschaft des Islam für die moderne Gesellschaft,* trans. Kathrin Möller and Anne Vonderstein (München: Diederichs Verlag, 2009), ibook-Version.

universal principles of Islam to social realities that change over time.[102] Ramadan considers all aspects of society, including religion, science, philosophy and ethics, education, economics and ecology.[103] He even seeks to find new ways derived from Islamic writings to approach medicine, contraception, abortion, euthanasia, organ transplantation, AIDS, arts, entertainment and the media.[104] He calls to end to discrimination against women at work and at home and asks women to become more actively involved in changing their role in society.[105] His call for a moratorium on stoning and physical penalties in 2005 led to harsh criticism in the Arab world. He also looks for intellectual, political, and financial independence from Muslim countries,[106] which would very much favor the development of a new, independent form of Euro-Islam.

Also Ramadan's statements on the role of shari'a give no evidence of radical intentions. Ramadan does not reject shari'a in total, like Tibi does, but is one of many Muslim scholars who argue that shari'a provides guidance on all aspects of human existence. He acknowledges that shari'a raises serious concerns in the Western world.[107] Nevertheless, for him, "shari'a is not only the expression of the universal principles of Islam but the framework and the thinking that makes for their actualization in human history."[108] He clearly refers to the different meanings of shari'a and points out that shari'a is "the work of human intellect."[109] Therefore, it is not written in stone, and

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[102] Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, 37-48. Mashala is defined as the preservation of the objective of the law, essentially religious, life, intellectual, lineal, and property objectives. Ramadan defines *ijtihad* as "the total expenditure of effort made by a jurist in order to infer, with a degree of probability, the rules of shari'a from their detailed evidence in the sources."A *fatwa*, finally, is defined as "reply to a legal question given by an mufti in the form of words, action, or approval. […] It must be founded on the sources and on the juridical inferences and extractions arrived at by the *mujtahidin*. [….] It must also be formulated in the light of the context of life, the environment, and the specific situation that justifies its being made."

[103] Ramadan, *Radikale Reform*, ibook-Version.

[104] Ibid.

[105] Ibid.

[106] Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, 6.

[107] Ibid., 31.

[108] Ibid., 32.

[109] Ibid., 34.

Muslims are required to reflect on what is written. In contrast to Tibi's radical rejection of shari'a, Ramadan's interpretation is more in line with other scholars, as described above.

The question arises why so many scholars question Ramadan's intentions. In his analysis, Ramadan repeatedly refers to al Qaradawi and the *European Council for Fatwas and Research* (ECFR), which indicates a possible connection to the Muslim Brotherhood.[110] This might not be surprising taking into account that Tariq Ramadan is the grandson of Hassan al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and may indicate that Ramadan's understanding of Euro-Islam is more Islamist than it appears at first glance.

When he states that the true universality of Islam consists in the "principle of integrating the good, from wherever it may come, which has made it possible for Muslims to settle in, and make it their own"[111], it seems Ramadan actually reverses the concept of integration and makes integration of a minority fully dependent on putting their priorities first. This looks like an understanding of integration as a process wherein only what suites one's own purpose is acceptable. Ramadan's subsequent definition of a two-step approach adds even more doubts to his understanding of integration. First, he argues that we must distinguish which dimensions of Western life are already "Islamically based" and can be "truly" called their (Muslims) own. In the second stage, a "systematic work of selection" has to be undergone in order to "delineate from within the West the limits of the public good and to identify the margins available for maneuver between the situations in which we are free to act in accordance with our conscience and the more rare situations where we (the Muslims) must find possible legal adaptation through *ijtihad* and *fatwa*."[112] These statements underline Gadbahn's analysis that Ramadan's understanding of integration would seem to be the integration of Europeans into a global umma, and not the integration of Muslims into European society. Although

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[110] Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, 53. For an analysis of Al-Qaradawi's influence on the Muslim Brotherhood see Hossam Tamam, *A Reading into Al-Qaradawi-Muslim Brotherhood Relation*, accessed April 04, 2011. http://www.islamismscope.net/lang/en/284.html.

[111] Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, 54.

[112] Ibid.

this understanding of integration does not totally contradict the meaning of integration in the framework of the ethnic minority model, it puts a question mark behind Ramadan's understanding.

While these positions alone do not meet our definition of Islamism, Ramadan's positions in the field of politics and economics make it clear that Ramadan follows a political and, therefore, Islamist agenda. If we look only at Ramadan's opinion of democracy, the differences in Ramadan's and Tibi's Euro-Islam become even clearer. Ramadan refers to the differences in the democratic models of Europe and the U.S. and argues that each society (including a Muslim one) should be free to find a model of democracy that is most appropriate to its history, culture, and collective psychology.[113] Generally, this is a very reasonable proposition. If Ramadan applies it to the definition of democracy in Muslim countries—for example in the Middle East—Ramadan is absolutely right. If he seeks to propagate a specific Islamic understanding of democracy applicable to Muslims living in Europe, it seems his commitment to the model of European democracy is questionable. His argument that a Muslim society should be free to find its own model of democracy seems to neglect the fact that European society is not Muslim. His charge that modern democracies fail to respect their own values and that reform of these societies is necessary [114] cannot be fully denied. If he uses this observation to call for a change in Western democracy, however, he puts himself in a confrontational position. On the other side, Europeans should not ignore Ramadan's propositions. A dialogue between Muslims and Europeans could also engage in discussions about values in a broader sense.

But Ramadan's ideas of economic changes sound ambivalent, too. He condemns neo-liberal economics as a system that has brought injustice, death, and destruction to the people.[115] Moreover, politics and religion, in his opinion, cannot be totally

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[113] Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, 235.

[114] Ramadan, *Radikale Reform*, ibook-Version.

[115] Ibid.

separated. The question is to know what the relationship and interdependence between religion and politics should be. However, he points out that, even in Islam, there is a difference between politics and religion.[116]

Ramadan's call to establish a broad national and international movement to bundle all forces for a critical resistance, the proposal to develop alternative sources of media, and to mobilize all available resources for a "campaign" in the name of higher values are further examples of his ambivalent position.[117] With statements like "we cannot extol democracy for ourselves and silently allow our governments to deal with the most sinister dictators. We cannot want peace and denounce violence and at the same time stand passive before the most fearful and deadly terror of an economic order that is responsible for the deaths of forty thousand people every day,"[118] he, on one side, correctly assesses the failures of the West. On the other side, he draws conclusions that offend many in the West.

In summary, we can conclude that Ramadan's approach is not Islamic in accordance with the definition of this term in the framework of this thesis. It has Islamist elements but also calls upon the reformation and renewal of Islam in a specific European context. Although his call for change by Muslims in Europe and more independence from the Muslim world are in line with Tibi's definition of Euro-Islam, a look at the characteristic elements of Tibi's Euro-Islam, as defined above, shows that Ramadan has clearly chosen a different path than what his position is, finally, remains unclear.

Nevertheless, Ramadan's call for increasing the importance of Muslim organizations in Europe is supported by many other scholars. Ayatollah Ghaemmaghami, for example, argues that it is necessary for Muslims in Europe to organize to enable Muslims to communicate their concerns and interests to European governments. European lawmakers would have the benefit of knowing whom to address and could focus their attention on a limited number of representative organizations

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[116] Ramadan, *Radikale Reform*, ibook-Version.

[117] Ibid.

[118] Ramadan, *Western Muslims*, 111.

rather than deal with an anonymous entity.[119] Thus, the establishment of a cooperative landscape of Muslim organizations is a component that has to be added to the characteristics and prerequisites for a successful Euro-Islam.

F.   CONCLUSION

This excursus into the current discourse on the concept of Euro-Islam clearly shows that this concept is still under development and its outcome unclear. The school of thought that has evolved around Bassam Tibi seems to be more promising and less threatening to secular societies, at least from the European perspective. For Muslims, by contrast, some elements of Tibi's concept of Euro-Islam might be too far reaching.

Tariq Ramadan's concept describes a form of Euro-Islam that might be more acceptable to Muslims but rejected by most Europeans. Nevertheless, for a Euro-Islam to be acceptable by both groups, Ramadan's proposals should perhaps not be rejected by Europeans out of hand. He seeks for a reform of Islam, too. If Euro-Islam is to really stipulate a dialogue and discourse over values, Ramadan's ideas cannot just be put aside. To ignore him would endanger the credibility of the process of developing a widely accepted form of Euro-Islam. More important, his propositions have to be challenged instead of ignoring them.

If Euro-Islam seeks to build a bridge between Muslims in Europe and their host societies, the following elements have to be viewed as essential prerequisites for successful development of Euro-Islam:

- Clear commitment to democracy and human rights in a Western understanding

- Secularism

- Restriction to the relevance of the shari'a to rituals of religious service

- Tolerance towards other religions

- Religion as a matter of free choice

- Recognition of pluralism and a rejection of assimilation and multiculturalism

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[119] Ghaemmaghami, *Europäischer Islam*, 130.

- Identity based upon common values rather than ethnicity and nationality

- Reduction of foreign influence by Muslim countries

- Initiation of a Muslim discourse on the role of Islam in Europe, facilitated by Muslim organizations

- Equal opportunities for Muslims and non-Muslims

- Gender equality

How far current Muslim communities and organizations can go in supporting a peaceful coexistence characterized by respect and tolerance and in making it become a reality is the subject of the following analysis.

III. THE MUSLIM POPULATION IN GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS

Euro-Islam seeks to build a bridge between Muslims in Europe and the societies they live in. The outcome of this process will be determined by a variety of factors, as described in Chapter I, but centers around the key role of identity, as laid out in Chapter II. To analyze the potential success of Euro-Islam, one has to look at both Muslims and their host societies. The factors that will be examined in analyzing Muslim communities and interactions in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands can be grouped into three spheres:[120]

- The "personal trajectory" of individual Muslims, which is described by their individual experiences and aspirations. By investigating where Muslims come from, what their national and religious roots are, and what their situation looks like today, this thesis seeks to address the sphere of personal trajectories.

- The "domestic context" in which Muslims live, which influences their mindset and opportunities for participation. The domestic context includes the options for role definition and participation that society offers Muslims and is mainly defined by the integration and immigration policies of the state and its relationship with the church. Opportunities for Muslims to preserve core cultural and religious values as elements of their identity—for example through education—are of high importance.

- The "social-class dimension," which includes social mobility, school performance, political awareness, and participation in society. This will be subject to analysis by looking at how Muslim communities develop demographically and what their social status looks like. Of course, this dimension is closely linked to the personal trajectories of individual Muslims and will, therefore, be analyzed in concert.

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[120] Silvestri, "Public Policies towards Muslims," 55.

Finally, "ideas, impressions, and encounters from the past have considerable impact on apprehension and understanding in the present."[121] Thus, an analysis of the Muslim presence in the countries studied has to start in the past.

A high degree of diversity among Muslims is evident in the three countries, stemming from differences in ethnicity, nationality, and ideology. Initially, the Muslim presence in Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands was assumed to be temporary. The policies that were applied to accommodate these "guests," however, differed. While Britain and the Netherlands accommodated their guest workers and provided opportunities to maintain their cultural and religious identity, the German approach was to leave them on their own. So long as all viewed the presence of Muslim guest workers as temporary, the role of identity and the demand for integration were not an issue. With the presence of Muslims becoming permanent, and demographic development making this presence more visible, different perceptions and ideas about the Muslim presence collided. With Germany being the extreme case, all three countries were unprepared to accommodate their new citizens. Today, Muslim communities are mainly characterized by poor education, higher unemployment and the sense of being excluded and discriminated against. Over the last decade, these governments have increased their dialogue with Muslim communities, but their policies have become more assimilative than integrative.

As a consequence, young Muslims often appeal to religion to define an identity that differentiates them from the rest of society—a society they perceive as discriminatory. Ethnicity and nationality also play a role in this formation of identity. The preconditions for promoting Euro-Islam are, therefore, rather unfavorable, as identity is based less on values that Muslims and others may share, but on ethnicity, nationality (or ancestral nationality), and religion; and the high diversity among Muslims makes mutual understanding even more complicated. Moreover, imams in local mosques still come from abroad and espouse specific foreign national ideologies, or foreign Islamist movements. The specific needs of Muslims living in the context of

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[121] Sophie Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.

secular European societies are often not understood by these imams. All this is not promising for the future of Euro-Islam. What is surprising, however, is that, despite different approaches to accommodating their Muslim communities over a long time, the situations these communities and their residential countries find themselves in are almost identical.

A.   GERMANY

With more than four million Muslims living in Germany, this group is one of the largest in Western Europe. The identity of these Muslims has been shaped by changes in the immigration policies of the German state and the space and opportunities that German legislation now provides for preserving Muslim religion and culture as core elements of their identity. Demographic developments have made Islam more and more visible to the public, and Muslims feel more confident in making their religion visible. However, the exclusion and discrimination perceived especially by young Muslims hinders the development of an identity based on shared values. For disaffected Muslims, Islam provides a distinct identity and a feeling of belonging. Foreign governments, especially Turkey, influence their expatriates, emphasizing the impression that many Muslims prefer an identity of being different. However, initiatives like the German Islam Conference (*Deutsche Islam Konferenz*, DIK) and progress in fields such as religious education in public schools and Islamic courses for future imans in German universities signal a change in the state's attitude and gives hope for Euro-Islam.

1.   Muslims in Germany: Where Do They Come from and How Does Their Life Look Today?

Today approximately 15.3 million migrants live in Germany, of whom 7.3 million came as guest workers or asylum seekers. The rest came as re-settlers, mainly from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.[122]

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[122] Daniel Faas, "Muslims in Germany: From Guest Workers to Citizens?" in Triandafyllidou, *Muslims in 21st Century Europe*, 68.

Out of the approximately 7.3 million guest workers and asylum seekers, 4.3 million are Muslims, almost half of whom have German citizenship.[123] The great majority comes from Turkey, but as Figure 3 shows, the Muslim community is far from homogenous. Here it is important to note that the German Turks are equally divided into ethnic Turks and Kurds. Most of the Muslims living in Germany are Sunni (74%), 7% are Schi'a, and 13% Alevi,[124] who play a distinct role among Muslims in Germany. Alevi emphasize their difference from other Turkish immigrants and consider themselves more modern and open-minded.[125]

Figure 3.   Origin of Muslims in Germany[126]

What are the consequences of this ethnic and religious distribution for the development of a widely accepted Euro-Islam? The high degree of national, ethnic, cultural, and religious heterogeneity, reinforced by differences in language, do not make the development of Euro-Islam impossible, but the effort to overcome all these differences will be significantly higher than with a more homogenous group. The potential higher influence of Turkish immigrants is, to a certain extent, limited, due to

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[123] Haug, Müssig and Stichs, *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland*, 11.

[124] Ibid., 13–14.

[125] Elise Massicard, "Alevi Communities in Western Europe: Identity and Religious Strategies," in *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 2*, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 579.

[126] Based on data in Haug, Müssig and Stichs, *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland*, 11.

the subdivisions mentioned above. What makes the role of Muslims of Turkish background important is the strong influence of the Turkish government. Appearances by the Turkish president Erdogan in front of thousands of Turks in German sports arenas undermine a Euro-Islam that is based on a context-specific identity and weaken the chances of successful integration.[127] Thus, the starting point for development of Euro-Islam with regard to Germany draws a mixed picture.

Today, 98% of Muslims in Germany live in Western Germany. The largest communities can be found in the major German cities, especially Berlin, Hamburg, Cologne, and Frankfurt. In contrast to many other European countries, a sizeable Muslim community lives in rural areas.[128]

Within the cities, however, Muslims are not broadly intermingled with the German population. More often, they live in urban districts where they sometimes have become the majority. Within these districts, for example, in Berlin Neukölln and Kreuzberg, religious, cultural, economic, and often political networks have evolved. These districts are often characterized by high levels of unemployment and poverty. The unemployment rate for all legally resident immigrants (16.9%) in February 2009 was more than double that of German citizens (7.8%) with Turks suffering the most.[129]

The distribution of Muslims among age groups is of special important because, as will be shown later, the identity of older Muslims in Germany differs significantly from that of the younger generation. The average Muslim living in Germany is 30 years old, and the group of children and adolescents not older than 25 is disproportionally large.[130] This latter group is still in an initial phase of defining their identity. Therefore, they are much more responsive to their environment. These young men and women

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[127] At a public event in Düsseldorf, Turkish President Erdogan called Turkey the protector of all Turks—in Turkey as well as in Germany. Moreover, he called to teach Turkish children in Germany Turkish language first and German afterwards. Finally, he asked for the installation of a network of Turkish schools in Germany. "Erdogan Rede erzürnt deutsche Politiker," Die Welt (February 28, 2011), accessed May 10, 2011. http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article12665248/Erdogans-Rede-erzuernt-deutsche-Politiker.html.

[128] Faas, *Muslims in Germany*, 59.

[129] Ibid., 61.

[130] Radu, *Europe's Ghost*, 102–103.

perform significantly worse in school and in the job market than other youth groups.[131] Their poor education directly influences their chances of employment and participating in society in general. If these problems are not addressed, there is a danger that the feeling of exclusion and discrimination can become permanent.

But, it would be stereotyping to point only to the limitations of Muslim social mobility. There is also a significant group that actively contributes to the German economy and society. Politicians, like Cem Özdemir—the chairman of the German Green Party—or Aygül Özkan—the first Muslim minister of a federal state—are among prominent examples. Several members of the German federal parliament (*Bundestag*) and state parliaments (*Landtage*) are Muslim, and involvement in town councils and other regional or communal political institutions is even higher.

For the development of Euro-Islam, the socio-demographic situation of Muslims in Germany marks another factor with mixed influence. On one side, the fact that youth make up a significant portion of the Muslim population offers opportunity to invest in the future. The identity of these young Muslims plays a very important role and will be analyzed later. On the other side, the concentration of Muslims in specific districts with closed communities is an obstacle. This concentration can hamper any discussion with non-Muslims over the role of Islam. Moreover, the poor performance of young Muslims in school and on the labor market limits their opportunities for active participation in society.

2. Muslims in Germany and Their Relationship With the State

The relationship between religious groups and the state is one of the most influential factors in the integration of these groups into broader society, especially when they are in the minority. The relationship between the state and religion, as defined by Koningsveld, can be threefold: a complete fusion of state and religion; a total separation of the two parties; or a union, which can mean official recognition by the

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[131] Haug, Müssig and Stichs, *Muslimisches Leben in Deutschland*, 210–221.

state, an official state religion, or partial recognition.[132] In Germany, the relationship between religion and state is of the first form: separation. The most important regulation with regard to religious affairs is Article 4 of the German constitution, which grants freedom of belief and obliges the state to ensure this right.[133]

However, certain privileges may only be enjoyed if religious communities meet certain criteria. Those that meet these criteria get the status of an "officially recognized religious corporation" (*Körperschaft des Öffentlichen Rechts, KÖR*). KÖRs are allowed to conduct religious education in public schools[134] and are entitled to governmental subsidies and representation in the media or governmental institutions like the military. Moreover, they enjoy a tax-benefits scheme whereby the state collects and distributes a special tax (*Kirchensteuer*). To become a KÖR, a religious community needs to meet membership numbers and a program that gives assurance of its permanence.[135] Additionally, organizational structure is required and the goals and objectives of the organization have to be in full compliance with German basic law. So far, only Christian churches and Judaism have gained the legal status of such a recognized faith.[136]

Islam, as a whole, has so far been denied the status of KÖR. Thus, Muslim organizations mainly rely on public registration as a voluntary association (*eingetragener Verein*, e.V.) which is more easy to achieve but does not provide the benefits and prestige of a KÖR.[137] The denial of KÖR status is a major point of contention for Muslims in Germany, and rightly so. The specific nature of Islam as a religion without central authority and, therefore, lacking a hierarchical structure like that of Christian churches cannot be a permanent barrier to access to the state-sponsored

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[132] Hussain, *The Holy Grail*, 218.

[133] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 216.

[134] German Basic Law, Article 7 (3).

[135] At least thirty years of existence, and a minimum of 0.1% representation of the German population. Rohe, "Germany," in *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 2*, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 218.

[136] Hussain, *The Holy Grail*, 232.

[137] Rohe, "Germany," 218.

benefits other religions enjoy. If Euro-Islam is to increase integration, legal barriers that discriminate against certain religions based on organization have to be removed.

a. Phases of Immigration and German Immigration Policies

The immigration of Muslims to Germany was the consequence of a labor shortage in Germany in the 1960s and the subsequent reunification of families of guest workers on German soil. These guest workers were, on average, poorly educated, from rural areas, and recruited for semi- or unskilled jobs in the heavy industry and construction sectors. This influx of migrants was initially considered temporary. Based on agreements between the Turkish and German governments in 1961, Turkish immigrants were sought for a period of two years. Bilateral agreements with Morocco (1963) and Tunisia (1965) followed. The majority of Germans expected their guest workers to assimilate, but both assumptions—the temporary nature of the visit and their assimilation—turned out wrong.[138] The Swiss writer Max Frisch, asked about the issue of immigrants in Western Europe, said, "We were looking for workers, and we got people."[139] This quote perfectly demonstrates the erroneous predictions not only of Germans, but also of many other western Europeans in the 1960s and explains why, in the beginning, Germany was not prepared to integrate its guest workers. More important, Germans sought to leave them separate from German society. Thus, the Germans followed the guest-worker model, described above.

The attitude of Germans towards their guest workers changed over time. While it sometimes turned out in favor of the Muslims in Germany, often it had the opposite effect. Labor unions, for example, initially resisted the incorporation of guest workers. With increasing numbers and common interests, however, migrants were welcomed. As Lubeck argues, the labor interests brought about the first form of migrant

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[138] Radu, Europe's Ghost, 38–39.

[139] "Wir riefen Arbeitskräfte, es kamen Menschen," Stern.online, (January 01, 2005), accessed November 12, 2010. http://stern.de/politik/deutschland/zuwanderungsgesetz-wir-riefen-arbeitskraefte-es-kamen-menschen-534427.html.

political participation in Germany.[140] A shift in a less positive direction occurred in 1973, with the oil crisis and the subsequent economic crisis, when guest workers were seen as a threat to jobs and a burden to the welfare state.[141] Thus, the influx of guest workers came to an end, but their numbers were replaced by family members, especially wives and children, who sought to join their husbands and fathers. In 1983, the German government tried to reverse the development and even promoted the return of guest workers to their home countries by granting a return premium.[142]

Consequently, Germany handled the issue of very restrictive citizenship. Until 1999, Article 116 of the German constitution defined citizens as persons who hold German citizenship, a spouse or descendant of persons who were settled in the German Reich, or a refugee with German ethnicity.[143] Thus, citizenship was exclusively granted based upon ethnicity or descent from German blood relatives. After some incremental changes, the definition of citizenship changed fundamentally in 2000. German citizenship can now also be gained by birth in Germany, if at least one parent has been resident in Germany for a minimum of eight years with an unlimited residence permit.[144] These changes indicate that Germany is adjusting to its role as a country characterized by immigration.

Today, public opinion with regard to Muslims in Germany is divided into two main parties, one of them anti-Islamic and the other is rather "philo-Islamic," as Bassam Tibi calls it.[145] This division is a dispute between those who reject foreign influence on German culture and propogate "Islamophobia," on the one side, and multiculturalists on the other side. Stereotypes and the historical legacy of Islamic-Europeans conflicts have led a large group of Europeans, including Germans, to

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[140] Paul Lubeck, "The Challenge of Islamic Networks and Citizenship Claims: Europe's painful Adjustment to Globalization," in Nezar AlSayyad and Manual Castells, *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 81.

[141] Faas, "Muslims in Germany," 61.

[142] Ibid., 63.

[143] Ibid.

[144] Ibid., 64

[145] Tibi, "Muslim Migrants," 40.

continue to view Islam as a threat and a problem.[146] These stereotypes became stronger after the Rushdie affair, 9/11, and the war in Afghanistan. The fact that foreigners are overrepresented among receivers of state welfare, which is repeatedly brought up in the German media, adds to resentment against foreigners, especially Muslims.[147]

As a result of increasing Islamophobia, the growing number of immigrants staying permanently in Germany, and a subsequent discussion over the so-called *Leitkultur*, the German government made additional amendments to citizenship legislation in 2007. Language tests and, as of 2008, tests on the candidates' knowledge of the cultural, political, and historical background of Germany were implemented. Applicants who pass the test gain a right to citizenship after six or seven years, depending on their achievements in Germany. The application of the test, however, varies in the different federal states.[148]

Germany is searching for its own way to successfully deal with immigration and integration. In 2006 the German government launched an initiative, the DIK that included the five biggest Muslim organizations in Germany, individual Muslim scholars, and the German Ministry of the Interior as well as representatives from the state and local level. This conference seeks to coordinate the dialogue of Muslims with the government and to achieve increased participation of Muslims as citizens in Germany. Among the fifteen Muslim representatives, a significant number is composed of secular scholars of Islam, which led to complaints by the Muslim organizations involved over a perceived minority position or underrepresentation compared to the secular individual Muslims.[149] Moreover, everybody who was not invited to the conference challenged its composition. This dispute over the composition of the DIK has finally led to a withdrawal of one of the largest Muslim organizations, which will be explained in Chapter IV.

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[146] J. L. Esposito, "Islam and Re-Islamization in Global Perspective," in *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East*, ed. J.L. Esposito and F. Burgat (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 12.

[147] Tibi, "Muslim Migrants," 35.

[148] Faas, "Muslims in Germany," 65.

[149] Rohe, "Germany," 218.

In summary, the German state provides limited space and opportunities for Muslims to preserve their cultural and religious identity as an element of public life. It is considered appropriate for Muslims to push these aspects into private or smaller local entities outside the wider scope of society. For the prospect of Euro-Islam, this is a significant shortfall, as Muslims will feel discriminated against and excluded, with the consequences to their development. Besides these general integration and immigration policies, three additional aspects of Muslim life are of special interest: the opportunities for religious education, the role of religious leaders, and the role of the media.

b.   *Education*

According to Article 7 of the German constitution, religious education is a compulsory subject in public schools, to be taught in cooperation between the state and religious communities. The religious community, however, has to be a recognized faith (KÖR). Thus, religious education comparable to that offered for Christian children has been a longstanding aim of Muslim organizations, and the legal status of Islam communities as KÖR has been a major issue.

Due to the fact that education is the responsibility of the federal states, the regulation and the status of Islamic classes varies throughout Germany. Discussions and ideas around such courses reach back to the 1970s.[150] North Rhine–Westphalia started a project in 1986 in which Islam was the subject of a curriculum for Turkish students in their mother language.[151] Some other states followed North Rhine–Westphalia, and currently Islamic classes are taught in nine states in different forms. None of these programs, however, has achieved the status defined by Article 7. There are just a few exceptions. The constitution of Berlin and Bremen do not account for religious education in accordance with Article 7. The exception is defined in Article 141

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[150] Mark Chalil Bodenstein, "Islamischer Religionsunterricht im Schulversuch," Deutsche Islam Konferenz, (February 16, 2009), accessed April 22, 2011. http://www.dik.de.

[151] Michael Kiefer, "Islamische Studien an deutschen Universitäten – Zielsetzungen, offene Fragen und Perspektiven," in *Das Parlament*, no. 13–14, March 28, 2011. http://www.bundestag.de/dasparlament/2011/13-14/Beilage/006.html .

of the constitution.[152] Moreover, since 2008, the Alevi communities in North Rhine–Westphalia, Hesse, and Bavaria have been granted the right to conduct religious education in compliance with Article 7 of the constitution.[153] In 2009, some hundred communal Shi'a organizations founded an umbrella organization, the *Dachverband Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden Deutschlands*, with the self-perception as a religious community that meets the requirements of a recognized faith. This organization may soon be granted the privilege of providing religious education in the schools. As Miachel Kiefer argues, the desire to conduct classes on Islam in German schools might lead to a kind of building of confessions.[154] In 2009, the DIK generally agreed to implement Islamic classes in the German language, and the conference of ministers for education was tasked to develop such. This, however, is still missing.[155]

Despite the issue of the legal status of KÖR, progress has been achieved in the field of religious education. This is good news for the promotion of Euro-Islam. If religious education is carried out away from the privacy and the restricted zones of madrassahs and mosques, the importance of religion for Muslims becomes more visible and can support the necessary discourse over its role in society. Moreover, the perception of discrimination can be significantly reduced. But who are the ones responsible for the religious education of Muslims outside public schools?

c.   The Role of Imams

Approximately 2,500 imams are found in the mosques and Muslim communities in Germany. Their social and educational background differs significantly. While graduates from universities in Turkey and the Middle East are at the upper end of the scale, others have been trained in courses run by Muslim organizations in Germany or are even autodidacts. Some have the status of a state employee, like those employed by the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution of Religion (*Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam*

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[152] Bodenstein, "Islamischer Religionsunterricht."

[153] Rohe, "Germany," 222.

[154] Kiefer, "Islamische Studien."

[155] Bodenstein, "Islamischer Religionsunterricht."

e.V., DITIB), an organization of Turkish Muslims that is funded by the Turkish government. Others stay only temporarily as tourists who have to leave after three months. An increasing number, however, was born in Germany, has German citizenship, and leaves Germany to study in Turkey or the Middle East.[156]

Significant developments in imam education are underway in Germany. Based on recommendations of the parliamentary research service, the German government decided in February 2011 to sponsor the implementation of Islamic courses at five German universities, assigning several million Euros to fund these programs. The first courses are supposed to start in autumn 2011. What the German government seeks is improved integration. The new form of imam they are looking for should fulfill multiple responsibilities—not only the traditional obligations of prayers, but also as teachers, pastors, commissioners for extremism, partners in dialogue with non-Muslims, special representatives for integration, advisors, etc.[157] The decision to launch these programs, however, immediately raised questions in the German public over its legality. The objective of these courses, as indicated by the German minister for education Schavan, is to avoid radical Islamists' influence on the education of imams in Germany. But it is questioned whether state sponsorship does not violate the legal obligation of neutrality in questions of religion. Moreover, it is argued, this decision would open the door for other religions like Hinduism and Buddhism to get state funding, too.[158]

But critique did not come from the German public only. Muslim organizations are skeptical about the mingling of religious responsibilities and integration. Nevertheless, the fact that these programs have been established and are funded by the government, are a significant achievement towards the status of KÖR. However, some Muslim organizations want more. They want to get a vote on the matriculation of candidates and the syllabus.[159]

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[156] Rauf Ceylan, "Wer predigt den Islam in Deutschlan?" Deutsche Islam Konferenz (November 06, 2009), accessed April 22, 2011. http://www.dik.de.

[157] Kiefer, "Islamische Studien."

[158] "Der Staat und die Imame," Frankfurter Allgemeine FAZ.NET (March 24, 2011), accessed April 22, 2011. http://www.faz.net.

[159] Kiefer, "Islamische Studien."

Moreover, the implementation of these programs raises other, even more substantial questions. Who will be the instructing professors and what is their authority and expertise? Who will be their future employers after graduation? Do Muslims adhere to their authority and accept them? These are just a few questions that require answers.

For the future of Euro-Islam, the role of imams in Germany is a mixed picture. The attempts to educate imams in Germany can accelerate the development of Euro-Islam if these new imams really form a new generation who seek to interpret Islam in their specific context. This, to a large extent, will be dependent on the syllabus of the responsible universities, as well as their academic staff. The fact that more and more imams in Germany have been born in the country is another supportive factor. However, the strong influence of imams coming from abroad, without knowledge of German language and society, could limit the chances of Euro-Islam, especially if these imams are sponsored by foreign governments or organizations.

d.   The Influence of the Media

Media in Western societies are, in general, highly influential and powerful. The coverage of Islam by the German media focuses on issues of violence rather than broad coverage. Kai Hafez points out that almost every second Islam-related article or commentary mentions terrorism, violence in the family, or violence against members of other religions.[160] This coverage is counterproductive to achieving further integration of Islam as an accepted religion. But how do Muslims themselves seek to utilize the media for their purposes?

Both public TV channels and radio stations, ZDF and ARD, broadcast shows especially for Muslims, as well as for a broader audience on issues of Islam and Muslim life in Germany. These shows are run by Muslims and much more balanced

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[160] Kai Hafez, "Das Medienbild des Islam in Deutschland," Deutsche Islam Konferenz (November 9, 2006), 1–2, accessed November 10, 2010. http://www.dik.de.

than the wider media landscape.[161] Especially the ZDF has launched an intensive campaign to provide unbiased information on Muslims and Islam in Germany.

But there is also a variety of real Muslim media. Especially Turkish newspapers, radio stations, and satellite TV target a Turkish audience in Germany. The biggest Turkish newspapers, *Milliyet*, *Sabah*, *Zamam*, *Türkiye* and *Hürriyet* have their own offices and printing facilities in Germany. While articles on politics and the economy are coming from Turkey, some pages are dedicated to news by journalists in Germany. These newspapers are close to the Turkish party AKP[162] (*Sabah*), the *Gülen* movement (*Zamam*), or owned by the conservative media holding *Ihlas*. The messages of these Turkish media are sometimes ambivalent, but they have more a nationalist and much less an Islamist touch. Kai Hafez even argues that their influence is less significant than thought. Often Turkish media are chosen for cultural and language reasons, rather than to emphasize the separation and development of a parallel society.[163]

In summary, the relationship of Muslims with the German state is ambivalent as to the potential to develop a European form of Islam, as the Muslim community in Germany is diverse. It took a long time for Germany to accept the permanent presence of Muslims. The fact that Islam still suffers significant legislative disadvantages compared to Christian churches, the ambivalent role of the German media, and the less-than benign attitude of large parts of the German public, may over time, become an obstacle to the development of Euro-Islam. On the other side, the establishment of a forum for dialogue and engagement in the education of imams are positive signs. As far as Muslims themselves are concerned, the influence of foreign media and imams could distract them from the need to shape the future of Islam in Germany by German Muslims themselves.

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[161] Canan Topcu, "Sendungen von Muslimen in Deutschland," Deutsche Islam Konferenz (January 12, 2009), accessed April 22, 2011. http://www.dik.de.

[162] AKP: Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi; the party of Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan.

[163] Topcu, "Sendungen von Muslimen in Deutschland."

3. The Identity of Muslims in Germany

In an opinion poll in 2006, 66% of Muslim German citizens considered themselves primarily Muslims rather than German citizens.[164] Other polls show another interesting development. According to a survey of the Islamic Archive in 2002, 82% of Muslims in Germany want to stay in the country.[165] With the number of Muslims in Germany growing, Muslims have been encouraged to identify themselves more and more with their Islamic roots and to promote their traditions. Islam has become increasingly visible in the public square.[166] Therefore, an identity, ostensibly based on religion, seems to play a major role for Muslims in Germany.

The development or redevelopment of a Muslim identity has encouraged many Muslims to follow behaviors rooted in tribal tradition and an individual or group interpretation of the Qur'an. Where Muslims confidently promote these traditions, they often encourage Germans in their biases and prejudices about Islam.[167] Other evidence that Muslims now promote their Muslim identity with more self-confidence and, at the same time, provoke partial resistance from their host society is the increasing number of mosques, which are moving from the backyards of housing areas in Berlin or Cologne to more visible places. The visible expression of Muslim identity, however, is a recent phenomenon. It evolved over time, with significant differences among the different generations of Muslims in Germany.

The countries of origin of the first Muslim immigrants in the 1960s were predominantly Muslim societies. First-generation immigrants usually did not make a psychological break with the culture of their birth and tried to transfer traditional

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[164] Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Muslims in Europe: Economic Worries Top Concerns about Religious and Cultural Identity. Few Signs of Backslash from Western Europeans* (Washington: Pew Research Center, 2006).

[165] Cherribi, *In the House of War*, 52.

[166] Ibid.,194.

[167] In Germany, prejudices about Islam are often related to arranged marriages and honor crimes. Arranged marriages make up half of the total within the Turkish community (Radu, Europe's Ghosts, 66). As far as "honor" killings are concerned, forty-five murders were known between 1996 an 2004 (Radu, Europe'S Ghosts, 69).

practices to Germany.[168] In a traditional Muslim society, an individual's identity is given by his parents and social environment, including tribe and kin, the local imam, or even the political structure of the state. Identity, therefore, is not a matter of personal choice, but defined by conformity to a set of externally determined social rules. The rules are highly localized in accordance with the traditions, customs, and practices of a specific place.[169] After immigration, the experience of life as a minority in the context of political, cultural, and religious pluralism imposed a challenge to early immigrants when their broader environment no longer supported their identity. Muslim practice was forced into the privacy of the home and the local community. Religion mainly served as a response to the loss of past common references and established social bonds.[170] The contact with the new environment led to a behavior of self-preservation and the formation of group identity.[171] This conservatism and a lack of pressure from the German government to adapt to the new environment emphasized this development. Many scholars argue that an overemphasis on political correctness has encouraged Muslim immigrants to segregate themselves from the rest of society.[172] For the first generation of immigrants, identity was a significant obstacle to integration. However, due to their initial status as temporary guest workers, that seemed not to be an issue.

More than the older generation, the younger is struggling with the question of whether to adapt itself to the realities of their new homeland, return to their roots and the traditions of their parents, or find their own way.[173] Locally born Muslims treat Islam more as a social or cultural tradition than as a demanding faith.[174] As the cultural legacy associated with the country of origin diminishes, younger Muslims conceive of their religion less in terms of family and tradition and more in terms of individual belief. This

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[168] Fukuyama, "Identity, Immigration, and Liberal Democracy," 11.

[169] Ibid., 10.

[170] Riva Kastoryano, "Religion and Incorporation: Islam in France and Germany," *International Migration Review* 38, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 1237.

[171] Radu, *Europe's Ghosts*, 53.

[172] Ibid., 101.

[173] Esposito, "Islam and Re-Islamization," 13.

[174] Radu, *Europe's Ghost*, 86.

attitude often is dominated by a kind of shopping mentality: they choose which tenets of their religion they will recognize and which they will ignore.[175] Jocelyn Cesari describes their relationship with Islam as a source of ethical and moral values without direct influence on their social and public behavior.[176] For them, identity becomes a matter of choice. But what are the reasons that this new generation seems to form their identity on the basis of Islam?

Many of the younger Muslims find themselves caught between two worlds. On the one hand, they often have limited knowledge of their fathers' home countries. German Turks visiting Turkey, for example, are despised as *allemanci* (the Germanizeds).[177] On the other hand, they are greatly limited in their opportunities in Germany.[178] Here, they often believe that they are victims of particular forms of discrimination because they are Muslims and, therefore, express their concern in terms of cultural or religious "identities of origin."[179]

Finally, family strategies often dominate individual life plans. Thus, individuals acquire a marginal identity and positioning in relation to both cultures of reference. Second-generation Turkish adolescents face a reference-group problem. Where they assert the validity of their own individual perspectives, they find themselves rejected by their minority communities and subject to pressures to conform to German culture and society.[180] For them, Islam serves as a source of solidarity and a unifying bond, as it did for their parents.

To analyze Muslim identity in Germany purely in terms of different age groups would be simplistic. Besides the well-known, general theological diversity and decentralization of Islam around the globe, in Europe, Muslims are additionally

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[175] Jocelyn Cesari, "Muslim Minorities in Europe: The silent Revolution," in *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East*, ed. J.L. Esposito and F. Burgat (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 260.

[176] Ibid., 262.

[177] Tibi, "Muslim Migrants," 36.

[178] L. Rosen, *The Culture of Islam*, 154.

[179] Kastoryano, "Religion and Incorporation," 1238.

[180] Faas, "Muslims in Germany," 70.

ethnically splintered, as described above. The country of origin and ethnicity are essential factors influencing the formation of identities.[181] Ethnic Turkish immigrants, for example, tend to maintain traditional attitudes vis-à-vis Kurds, Arabs, and Iranians. They avoid mixing with Muslims from other countries. This tendency, of course, is encouraged by language differences. Radu points out that Muslim communities in Europe are increasingly caught between their common characteristics (religion, social pathologies, and perceived discrimination) and their ethnic, sectarian, and social differences.[182] The clashes between Turkish and Kurdish groups in Germany in the 1990s emphasized the meaning of ethnic identity, which often seems dominant over religious identity. In general, the Turkish population in Germany is highly heterogeneous. This heterogeneity is reflected along different lines, namely ethnicity (Turks and Kurds), origin (rural or urban), religion (Sunni, Shi'a, or Alevi), the degree of modernity as well as religiosity, and finally their status (German or Turkish citizenship).[183]

In conclusion, the Muslim identity provides compensation for perceived discrimination in Germany, and Islam, in some respect, serves as "religious citizenship."[184] However, while legal citizenship in Germany nowadays might be easier to gain, the acceptance of Muslim immigrants by the German host society is a different matter. National identity in Germany, as in many other countries of Europe, still remains more blood- and soil based, accessible only to those ethnic groups who initially populated the land.[185] Moreover, national identity has always been socially constructed, "revolving around history, symbols, heroes, and the stories that a community tells about itself."[186] Unfortunately, many Europeans, including Germans, still link the crossroads of European history and Islamic history with the siege of Vienna and the Crusades, emphasizing a war-prone relation.

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[181] Cesari, "Muslim Minorities," 253.

[182] Radu, *Europe's Ghosts*, 90–91.

[183] Manea, *Ich will nicht mehr schweigen.*

[184] Cherribi, *In the House of War*, 209.

[185] Fukuyama, "Identity, Immigration and Liberal Democracies," 14.

[186] Ibid., 17.

With regard to the development of Euro-Islam, the fact that the majority of Muslims in Germany are young and still have not found their role in society offers opportunities to start something new that is embraced by the youth and can improve their situation. This, again, highlights the importance of improving the relationship between Muslims and the state to overcome the deficiencies described above. While this gives hope, German society must be aware that young Muslims are at a crossroad. Whether they will choose the way into society, to a large extent, is also influenced by the attitudes and policies of German society and politics. It is time that Germany accept the presence of Islam as a fact.

B.   GREAT BRITAIN

The ethnic, national, and religious background of the majority of Muslims living in Great Britain is different from that in Germany. The challenges for the promotion of Euro-Islam, however, are similar. Muslims in Britain face the same situation of social deprivation. Concentration of Muslims living in specific urban districts is even stronger in the United Kingdom (UK) than in Germany. Muslims share a feeling of discrimination and often the discrimination is real. But the British chose a different approach in the beginning. While Germany followed the guest-worker model, the British early on applied a model of multiculturalism and were eager to offer their immigrants space to maintain their cultural and religious individuality. Moreover, the British have no concept of officially recognized faiths. Despite the Church of England's being a state church, Muslim communities enjoy rights that Muslims in Germany do not enjoy, like Islamic schools funded by the state. The fact that the outcome, nevertheless, is similar in Germany and the UK raises the question whether immigration policies really matter.

1.   The Way of Muslims Into Great Britain and Their Situation Today

According to the last official census in Great Britain, approximately 1.6 million Muslims lived in the country in 2001. According to a study of the Pew Research Center

in 2010, approximately 2.869 million Muslims live in Great Britain,[187] which makes Islam the second largest religion in Britain.[188] Today, almost one-half of these Muslims are British-born[189] and the majority are British citizens.[190]

The largest ethnic groups of Muslims living in Great Britain are Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Indian, and other Asian ethnicities.[191] But nationality is no guarantee for homogeneity within these groups. While Bangladeshis are the most homogeneous ethnic group, Pakistani communities identify themselves much more with the specific region they come from, like Punjab or the Afghan border.[192]

Figure 4.   Origin of Muslims in Great Britain[193]

Due to the fact that Muslims in Britain are largely coming from South Asia, most of them follow Sunni strains of Islam. Two groups are of special importance amongst the Sunni Muslims in Great Britain, namely the Deobandi and Barelwi, both of them

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[187] Pew Research Center, *Muslim Networks*, 5.

[188] Sean McLoughlin and Tahir Abbas, "United Kingdom," in *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe Volume 2*, ed. Jorgen S. Nielesen et al., (Leiden: Koninglijke Brill NV, 2010), 545–546.

[189] Paul Gallis et al., "Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries," *CRS Report for Congress*, (November 18, 2005): 10.

[190] Lubeck, "Challenge of Islamic Networks," 80.

[191] Lorenzo Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood in the West* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 115; Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 49.

[192] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 120.

[193] Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood*, 49.

originating from colonial India. In the early days of Muslim migration to Britain, Deobandis became influential. The original Deobandi ethos of protecting and preserving religion, which was so characteristic of Deobandi ideology in colonial India, attracted Muslims in Britain who sought to protect their religious identity.[194]While Deobandis show a higher ability to institutionalizing, numerical support in Britain is much stronger for the Barelwi ideology. It is estimated that about 50% of all British Muslims hold a general Barelwi worldview.[195] One of the major characteristics of the Barelwi school of thought is a particular devotion towards the Prophet Muhammad. Thus, they were at the forefront of protests against Salman Rushdie's novel *The Satanic Verses* in 1988. But they lacked the organizational structure of the Deobandis, and therefore were not able to institutionally profit from the protests.[196]

As in Germany, the ethnic, religious, and national background of Muslims in Great Britain shows the same diverse nature. The implications for the future of Euro-Islam, in this respect, are the same. The Pakistanis's emphasis on specific regions within the country just adds another level of diversity.

Today, the demographics of Muslims in Great Britain show a trend that is very similar to developments in Germany. Birth rates are significantly higher and the Muslim population, on average, is much younger. The average age of Muslims in Britain is twenty-eight, thirteen years below the national average. Compared to white children (25%), rates of child poverty are especially high for Pakistanis (60%) and Bangladeshis (72%).[197] This high rate of poverty translates directly into a lack of education, with approximately one third of British Muslims of working age having no qualifications.[198] Thus, in 2004, Muslims in the UK had the highest male unemployment rate, at 13%,

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[194] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 87.

[195] Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood*, 94.

[196] Giliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 97.

[197] Sughra Ahmed, *Seen and Not Heard: Voices of Young British Muslims* (Leicestershire: Policy Research Centre Islamic Foundation, 2009), 9.

[198] "Why do too many Muslims leave school unqualified?" Guardian, accessed April 02, 2011. http://blogs.guardian.co.uk/mortarboard/2008/04/why_do_too_many_muslims_leave.html in Ulfkotte, *S.O.S. Abendland*, 99.

compared to 4% of Christian men. The unemployment rate of Muslim women at 18% was about four times the rate for Christian and Jewish women.[199]

Their economic inactivity is shaped by a number of determining factors, especially gender and age. Indian Muslims are twice as likely to be unemployed as Indian Hindus, and more Indian Muslims than Pakistani Muslims are likely to have full-time jobs. Compared to men of other faiths, Muslim men are more likely to be employed in spheres with little career progression, such as taxi driving and restaurant work. Of course, to explain the employment situation of Muslims in Britain solely as a result of religious factors would be absolutely misleading.[200] Some call the situation Muslims find themselves in an "ethnic penalty."[201] While immigrants were drawn into Britain in times of economic prosperity, like many minorities, they were the first "victims" of economic crisis. Overall, however, the bad economic situation many Muslims face in Britain is a matter of structural deficiencies.

Figure 5.   Muslim Population in British Cities.[202]

One important structural factor is a concentration of Muslims in particular urban districts where they constitute a local majority and dominate the neighborhood.[203] This

[199] Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 49.

[200] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 124–127.

[201] Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 53.

[202] Based on data in McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 545-546.

[203] Tariq Modood and Nasar Meer, "Britain: Contemporary Developments in Cases of Muslim-State Engagement," in *Muslims in 21ˢᵗ Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou (New York: Routledge, 2010), 88.

concentration has been caused mainly by three factors. First, Muslims have settled in those British towns and cities where there was a need for labor and, therefore, the best prospects for employment.[204] Second, their concentration in particular streets and neighborhoods has been reinforced over time by the desire to live close to extended family members or community facilities such as mosques.[205] Finally, reluctance of real estate owners to sell or rent their premises to immigrants additionally forced them, especially Muslims, into certain urban districts—another example of the ethnic penalty.

However, there are also multiple examples of successful integration of Muslims in Britain. Just the fact that several mayors in London have been Muslims and that Muslims are members of parliament in the House of Commons and the House of Lords shows that Muslims are willing to actively participate in the social and political life in Great Britain.

As stated above, the demographic development and social status of Muslims in Germany and Great Britain, is, on average, absolutely comparable. Although the degree of concentration of Muslims in certain districts of British cities is higher than that in Germany, implications for the development of Euro-Islam can be considered identical.

2.   Muslims in Great Britain and Their Relationship With the State

Compared to Germany, the role of the church is different in Britain. The Church of England, as its name suggests, is a state church. Thus, the relationship between church and state has always been strong.[206] On the other side, as will be shown, recognition of faith as a means to gain certain privileges is unknown in Britain, which offers Muslims more opportunities than in Germany.

From the early significant migration of Muslims to Britain onwards, the British approach to integration preferred multiculturalism to assimilation, allowing immigrants

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[204] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 119.

[205] Ibid., 123.

[206] Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, "European Islam or Islamic Europe: The Secular State for Negotiationg Pluralism," in *Islam and Europe: Crises are Challenges*, ed. Marie-Claire Foblets and Jea-Yves Carlier (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2010), 89.

to maintain cultural identities and customs. However, linguistic pluralism and an expansion of religious schools were explicitly rejected in the beginning. It was only later that the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB)[207] brought up the issue of Muslim schools and Islamic education.[208]

The immigration of Muslims to Great Britain occurred in phases. The phase from 1945 to the 1970s was the most significant, taking the scale of Muslim migration to Britain into account, and had the strongest implications for society. But this was not the beginning of Muslim settlements on the island. Unskilled Muslim laborers came to Britain as part of the colonial enterprise, and in the 19th century a distinctive Anglo-Muslim community had begun to emerge.[209] The development of this community was mainly caused by the need to run the empire, which demanded teachers of Eastern languages and culture to educate politicians, military, scholars, and entrepreneurs.[210]

After World War II, the influx of Muslims into Britain accelerated. First, Muslims who had served in the British military were demobilized in Britain and some did not return to their home countries.[211] Then the economic growth and need for labor dragged migrants from the Muslim world to Britain. These were usually male, often single, and "they suffered hardship in living and working conditions on the assumption that they were only transient settlers."[212]

This stream of Muslim immigrants continued into the 1960s and was also enforced by several developments in the Muslim world, like increasing decolonization and the creation of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947, which caused significant numbers of refugees. Moreover, educational ambitions drew Muslim students to Great Britain.

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[207] Muslim organization that will be analyzed in Chapter IV.

[208] Modood and Meer, "Britain," 79–80.

[209] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 1.

[210] Ibid., 26.

[211] Ibid., 44.

[212] Ibid., 45.

The construct of the commonwealth and the British Nationality Act of 1948 facilitated the pull of Muslim immigrants to Britain after World War II. Commonwealth citizens could vote and stand as candidates in local and national elections, and children born in Britain acquired citizenship by birth.[213] This added to the attractiveness of migration to Britain. But strong domestic resistance forced the government to change immigration policies. The Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, which was later amended as the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1968, passed measures to restrict the entry and settlement of non-white people. Subsequently, the Immigration Act of 1971 totally changed the legal basis for immigration of Muslims from the Commonwealth to Britain. Before the 1971 Act came, immigrants from Commonwealth countries could settle in Britain under a voucher system. Afterwards they had to enter the country on the basis of work-permits. Immigration to Britain was subsequently limited, through continuously more restrictive immigration laws. Thus, already in the late 1960s and 1970s, women and children, especially from South Asia, became the largest group of immigrants, and permanent family settlement began to replace temporary male residence. In 1964, women and children represented two-thirds of all incoming migrants from Pakistan.[214]

With the first substantial wave of Muslims migrating to Britain coming to a halt, a new phase of Muslim immigration began in the 1970s, which was not so much driven by economic motives. This phase included persons who may have been anything from refugees to international traders to highly skilled professionals, and who stemmed mainly from Turkey and the Middle East. Their educational background was diverse, but often predominantly middle class and professional. Later, London as a cosmopolitan center also attracted members of the rich and professional classes of the Middle East.[215]

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[213] McLoughlin and Abbas, *United Kingdom*, 547.

[214] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain,* 46–49.

[215] Tariq Modood, "The Place of Muslims in British Secular Multiculturalism," in *Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam: Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization*, ed. Nezar AlSayyad and Manual Castells (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2002), 113.

Finally, asylum-seekers from Algeria, Bosnia, Somalia, and Kurdistan came to Britain during the last two decades of the twentieth century.[216]

With a growing number of immigrants, discrimination in Great Britain became a major issue, which the government thought to counter with the enactment of the Race Relations Act of 1976.[217] This anti-discrimination legislation established the basis of multiculturalism. However, the protection of minorities on the basis of this legislation was based upon ethnicity. As members of "ethnic" groups, Jews and Sikhs were offered protection by the law, but not Muslims, given the multiethnic and transnational nature of their faith.[218] This has become a major point of complaint for Muslims in Britain and an issue that still has not been resolved.

Over time, multiculturalism has increasingly come under critique. Especially after the northern British riots in the summer of 2001, involving young Muslims of Pakistani origin, 9/11, and the 7/7 bombings, but already starting with the Rushdie affair and the development of large Muslim communities as enclaves in British cities, multiculturalism was criticized. Critics argued that multiculturalism has helped segregation of Muslim communities in the UK and division within British society. Kenan Malik, among others, argues that "multiculturalism as a political ideology has helped to create a tribal Britain with no political or moral center, where many groups assert their identity through a sense of victimhood and grievance,"[219] which will be analyzed later in more depth.

Despite this harsh criticism of multiculturalism, a survey by the BBC after the July 2005 London bombings showed that 62% of the general public and 87% of Muslims still held favorable vies of multiculturalism. At the same time, 58% of those asked thought that people who immigrate to Britain should adopt their values and

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[216] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 50–51.

[217] Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 31.

[218] McLoughlin, "From Race to Faith Relations, the Local to the National Level: The State and Muslim Organisations in Britain," in *Muslim Organisations and the State: European Perspectives*, ed. Axel Kreienbrink and Mark Bodenstein (Nürnberg: Bundeamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, 2008), 124.

[219] Kenan Malik, "Multiculturalism has fanned the Flames of Islamic Extremism," *The Times* (London), July 16, 2005, in Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*, 13.

traditions and the way of life. Only 28% of Muslims agreed with this statement.[220] This survey shows that there seems to be a major difference in the understanding of the concept of multiculturalism by Muslims and others in the UK.

This strongly corresponds with a BBC survey suggesting there is more assimilation in the public's understanding of multiculturalism than most would like to admit. With the statement by the current British prime minister, David Cameron, that multiculturalism has failed,[221] there now seems to be an official renunciation of this concept, and where British immigration and integration policies will go is under negotiation. Already the incidents described above had initiated a series of legislative changes. In 2004, a new citizenship ceremony for Britain and an oath of allegiance, as well as language tests, were implemented. Often these regulations came as anti-terrorism acts, like the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2000, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Bill of 2001 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act of 2005.[222]

However, dialogue still plays an important role in the relationship between the British government and Muslim communities. But it is centered around counterterrorism. The idea that successful integration of Muslims can only be achieved through dialogue has been identified in Britain much earlier than in Germany. What both countries have in common is their demand for Muslims to speak with one voice. In Great Britain, as in Germany, Muslims tried to meet this demand by founding umbrella organizations. Their role in the dialogue will be analyzed in Chapter IV.

The Inner-City Religious Council (ICRC) was the first government-sponsored forum for multi-faith representation and consultation on a national level and was founded in 1992 by the Department of Environment, the Church of England, and the Interfaith Network for the UK (IFNUK). This council funded projects in religious communities as a part of urban regeneration. Today the Department of Communities and

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[220] "Analysis: UK at ease with Islam?" BBC News, (August 10, 2005), in Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*, 12–13.

[221] "State multiculturalism has failed, says David Cameron," BBC, accessed April 20, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-12371994.

[222] McLoughlin, "From Race to Faith Relations," 126–127.

Local Government is maintaining the dialogue with the Faith Communities Consultative Council (FCCC) as the successor of the ICRC.[223] IFNUK is an organization promoting interfaith dialogue. It was founded in 1987 and represents several Muslim organizations in Britain: the British Muslim Forum (BMF), MCB, the Mosques and Imam Advisor Body (MINAB), Islamic cultural centers, *Jamiat-e-Ulama* Britain, the World Islamic Mission, and the Islamic Foundation.[224] Meanwhile, several other institutions and forums have been implemented.[225]

The fact that many government initiatives are run under the Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) program sometimes limits the effectiveness of these initiatives and their outreach. Government-sponsored dialogue, brand-marked as anti-terrorism initiatives, might be of limited use in promoting a new understanding of Islam in the form of Euro-Islam. The change in government policies has brought British immigration policy on a course that is very similar to Germany's. Whether this has consequences for the identity of Muslims in the UK has to be assessed later. Historically, however, the state offered Muslim communities more space to define their own role in society. As in the case of Germany, the three areas of education, the role of imams, and the influence of the media will be analyzed for further insight into the relationship of the British state and Muslims living in Britain.

a. Education and Muslim Schools

In contrast to Germany, in Great Britain any religious organization has the right to create private schools and, while obliged to meet certain requirements and standards, can also receive the status of a "voluntary aided school." Voluntary aided schools have to conform to a state-issued curriculum and to be open to all students. So far, only a few Islamic schools have achieved this status.[226] The establishment of Muslim schools was not initially foreseen in the concept of British multiculturalism.

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[223] McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 548

[224] Ibid., 559.

[225] Gallis et al., *Muslims in Europe*, 15; Ahmed, *Seen and Not Heard*, 10–11.

[226] Jocelyne Cesari, *When Islam and Democracy meet: Muslims in Europe and the United States* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), 73.

Only as the number of Muslim children grew significantly in the 1960s did Muslims begin to campaign for recognition of their particular needs and preferences, from changes in school uniforms and meals to single-sex classrooms and the end of swimming classes. The curricula themselves remained untouched.[227]

Currently, there are 115 fee-paying Muslim schools in Britain and seven state-funded schools. Approximately 3% of Muslim children in Britain are educated in fee-paying, independent Muslim schools. These privately funded Islamic schools are regularly inspected by the government.[228] Less than 0.5% of Muslim children are educated in state-funded Muslim schools.[229] Additionally, supplementary schools are often based in mosques, madrasas or private homes. Besides homework support and social projects, their main role has been teaching the basics of Islam, including Arabic. Many Muslim children in Britain between the ages of five and fourteen years spend up to two hours a day at their local mosque or other form of supplementary school.[230] This is of some importance for the development of Euro-Islam. If supplementary education is held privately, it is difficult to ensure standards and qualified personnel. In recent years, a number of concerns have been expressed by Muslim educationalists about home-based religious education with regard to the teaching and learning methods and the qualifications of teachers and imams.[231]

In comparison to the German education system, the British approach offers more opportunities to maintain a Muslim identity. These opportunities are not only limited to religious classes in public schools, but even enable Muslims to run their own Islamic schools. A potential danger of a parallel education system, the disregarding of core values of British society, is ameliorated through permanent inspections and an obligatory core curriculum that applies to all schools in Britain. In this respect, Britain has put Islam almost at the same level as Christianity.

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[227] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 149–150.

[228] McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 553.

[229] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 151.

[230] Ibid., 153.

[231] Ibid., 154.

b.   *The Role of Imams*

As in Germany, imams in British mosques are predominantly foreigners. In 2007, 83.7% of imams in Britain were of South Asian origin and 8.5% were from other countries. Only 8.1% were born and educated in Britain. As Gilliat-Ray points out, these numbers confirm, "mosques remain in the control of first-generation migrants, who continue to prefer the services of imported rather than homegrown imams." [232] However, nearly half of British imams, she discovered, are under forty years of age. Nearly a quarter has been in Britain for over ten years, while 31.3% have been in Britain for six- to and ten years. The largest group arrived within the past five years.[233]

Imams play an important role, especially, with regard to their influence on the young. As in Germany, government officials would like to see imams become community leaders, addressing not only religious topics, but also social, educational, and political issues,[234] and to serve as interlocutors between Muslim and other communities.[235]

The competence and education of imams has, therefore, become a matter of debate and public policy, with the government playing an increasingly active role.[236] One element in this process of open debate, and also a partner for the government in its intention to influence the role of imams in Britain, is the Mosques and Imam Advisory Board (MINAB), established in 2009. The MINAB is a self-regulatory body representing many Muslim constituencies, such as the MCB, Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and the British Muslim Forum (BMF).[237] The body seeks to be an independent, non-sectarian entity acting as a national voice for imams, to facilitate accreditation, provide training and guidance, and promote best practices. In the setting

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[232] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 167.

[233] Ibid.

[234] Ibid.

[235] Ibid., 168.

[236] Ibid., 175.

[237] McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 552.

up of the MINAB, the home office provided financial support,[238] which continues under PVE funding. This financial dependence on the government has raised skepticism by some British Muslim organizations of the government's intentions, which are perceived as having an agenda.[239] Moreover, it cannot be ruled out that the members of the MINAB represent their organizations' opinions and attitudes. What influence these organizations might have will be subject to analysis in Chapter IV.

If we look at the establishment of Euro-Islam, the increasing focus on the education of imams is of high importance. Taking their role as multiplier into account, it is essential that a common understanding of the role of Islam in Britain be promoted among this group. The demographic increase in Muslims is an important factor, with the majority coming from youth whose identity is still under development, and who could be positively influenced by imams. The major influence of imams from abroad could hamper this discourse, as it does in Germany.

c.   The Influence of the Media

More so than in other European countries, tabloid newspapers, like *The Sun*, are powerful institutions in the landscape of British media. They are at the forefront in "othering" Muslims in Britain.[240] It is especially the influence of this medium that has fed Islamophobia in Britain and has caused young Muslims especially to view the British media as hostile to Islam, with tabloids emphasizing stereotypes and negative images of this religion.[241]

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[238] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 206–207.

[239] Ibid., 175.

[240] Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 200.

[241] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices*, 24.

In return, foreign and national Muslim media shape Muslims' opinions about contemporary issues. [242] According to recent research, Muslims prefer "to learn about national and international current affairs from a distinctive Islamic perspective."[243]

Important media for Muslims in Britain are the *Muslim News*, the *Muslim Weekly* and the *Islam Channel*, as well as local radio stations and websites such as www.IslamOnline.net or www.mpacuk.org. Increasingly, the websites of Muslim organizations and blogs mold the opinion of Muslims, especially the young.

A detailed analysis of these media is beyond the scope of this thesis, but Muslims in Great Britain have established a more British-based media landscape than have Muslims in Germany. This could be good news for the development of a new form of Islam, because these media can play an important role in discussions over the future role of Islam in Europe. This discourse in the Muslim media may be less influenced by foreign governments and organizations than it might be in the Muslim media in Germany. Unfortunately, some of these media have come under critique. The Islam Channel, for example, was accused of breaking the broadcasting code after broadcasting a program that advocated marital rape and violence against women, and this was not the only time the channel was condemned for breaking broadcasting guidelines.[244]

In summary, the situation in Great Britain shows obvious similarities to the situation in Germany, with similar influence on the development of Euro-Islam. The major difference, however, is the higher degree of freedom, combined with certain privileges, Muslims enjoy in Great Britain. This has led to a much more self-confident, and, in some limited cases, even more radical Muslim community in Britain. Thus, the question can be raised whether different integration policies actually matter. If not, what are the reasons for the current lack of integration? To answer this question would require further research, and maybe can only be answered in hindsight.

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[242] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 236–238.

[243] Ibid.

[244] "Islam Channel censured by Ofcom," Guardian (November 08, 2010), accessed May 03, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/nov/08/islam-channel-ofcom/print.

3. The Identity of Muslims in Great Britain

For the early immigrants to Britain in the 1960s, religion usually just provided an important personal and collective resource and a way of participating in communal life.[245] The performance of rituals, mosque attendance, and fasting during Ramadan established a semblance of community for the older generation, which provided a feeling of stability and support in an unfamiliar environment. Thus, the first generation of Muslims in Britain was actually less religious than often assumed.[246] But the identity of first-generation Muslims in Britain was not defined simply through adherence to a religion. For some, ethnicity was the important factor, and led to further division within the group of Muslim immigrants. Pakistanis, moreover, defined themselves not only as Pakistani, but as natives of the region they came from. This bond with their place of origin was underpinned with close family ties. The families "back home" had clear expectations that remittances would continue and substantially improve their standard of living.[247] Although the self-perception of Muslim residence has changed to permanent, ethnicity still plays an important role—not only from the perspective of the native British population, but within the Muslim community itself.

How do Muslims in Britain identity themselves today? Consistent with other surveys, an opinion poll conducted by ICM Research in February 2006 demonstrated that 91% of Muslims felt loyalty towards Britain.[248] In a survey by the Growth from Knowledge National Opinion Poll in 2005, 49% of the survey group responded to the question, "Britain: my country or their country?" that it was their country. In the same survey, the question whether they felt more belonging to Britain or to Islam often led to confusion because two in five stated that nation and religion were not mutually

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[245] Giliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 45.

[246] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices,* 4–5.

[247] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 45.

[248] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices*, 66–67.

exclusive but complementary.[249] Other surveys, in contrast, show that a significant number of young Muslims feel that Islam is "the more fundamental aspect of their identity."[250]

Considering the results of the polls and the analysis of Muslim social status and relationship with the state, it becomes clear that British Muslim identity is formed as a result of pressures from the outside and inside, as many scholars have indicated.[251] Especially the identities of young Muslims are unstable because influencing factors are continuously changing.

Some scholars argue that younger British Muslims are particularly prone to an identity conflict.[252] Islam as a source of identity for young Muslims, however, is not purely evidence for piety. Much more, it is "the logic of difference that makes people so passionate about recognition and support for their religious community."[253] It is a way to escape the deprivation and the conflict with the older generation of Muslims that is still dedicated to old traditions. Therefore, young Muslims in Britain turn to Islam as part of a wider strategy of empowerment.[254] But often they choose different ways to find their role and position in British society. Some become secular and westernized. Others turn to religion. A third group just struggles to find its way, caught in between these two positions.[255] What these young Muslims have in common is an appreciation of freedom in Western societies that they take for granted and want to utilize to negotiate the different ideas and values offered by their faith and British society.[256] But Muslims in Britain do not necessarily want to conform to what others perceive as the acceptable way of being British. As stated above, they want to find their way themselves. Many perceive

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[249] Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 15–16.

[250] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices*, 68.

[251] Tariq Modood, *Multiculturalism: A Civic Idea* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 137.

[252] Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 66–67.

[253] Modood, *Multiculturalism*, 122.

[254] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices*, 129.

[255] Ibid., 20

[256] Ibid., 29.

religion not as purely a private matter. "For them, being a Muslim is a public identity and it entails social, ethical, and political responsibilities."[257]

The fact that young British Muslims negotiate their understanding under the influence of the society they live in, shaped by its values and beliefs, makes it evident that British have to clearly define their identity, too. "Britishness," in this respect, has become the term of reference. In the aftermath of the London bombings in 2005, Britons turned their minds back to what it means to be British. "British" basically means three things: "commitment to Britain and its people, loyalty to its legal and political institutions (especially the monarchy, the Church of England and Parliament), and respect of values and norms that are central to its way of life."[258]

What does that mean for the development of Euro-Islam? Some scholars suggest that young Muslims are enthusiastic about finding an understanding and interpretation of Islam applicable to their specific situation in Britain. They argue that "young British Muslims are on the move—spiritually, intellectually, philosophically, culturally, ethically and politically—and there is a dynamism among them that is not being noticed by the wider society."[259]

This view into the development of identity, demographic development, and social status, as well as relationships with the British state, shows that this suggestion might be somewhat over-optimistic. Muslims in Britain, and not only the young ones, do not share a common *Weltanschauung* and attitude towards religion. Thus, to achieve a common understanding of the role of Islam in Britain seems to be more complex. With social deprivation, economic exclusion, and increasingly restrictive legislation, those Muslims who allegedly are so enthusiastic in finding their way as members of British society, could soon find themselves disappointed.

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[257] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices*, 183.

[258] Bikkuh Parekh, "Reasoned Identities: A Common Relationship," in Margaret Wetherell., Michelynn Lafleche and Robert Berkeley (eds.), *Identity, Ethnic Diversity and Community Cohesion* (London: Sage Publications, 2007), 134, in Kabir, *Young British Muslims*, 11.

[259] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices*, 182; Ahmed, *Seen and Not Heard*, 50.

C. THE NETHERLANDS

Several of the observations made for Germany and Great Britain also apply to the Netherlands. Thus, an analysis of the Muslim presence in this country can be abbreviated by drawing upon comparisons with Germany and Great Britain.

In one aspect, however, the Netherlands is fundamentally different from these two countries. In no other country are the changes in immigration and integration policies and public opinion so dramatic as in the Netherlands. This is a dangerous development for the promotion of Euro-Islam, because the common basis for the establishment of a Euro-Islam of shared values could crumble. This may strengthen identities that are based on perceptions of exclusion and discrimination.

1. National and Religious Roots of Muslims in the Netherlands and Their Situation in the Netherlands Today

It might be argued that the Netherlands role as a colonial power in the Muslim world defines the relationship between the Dutch and Muslims. However, the Netherlands was not so much a colonial power as a trade nation. The Dutch feared that any strong engagement in missionary work or other provocation of Islam might hinder their commercial activities.[260] Thus, business opportunities initially defined an almost benign relationship of the Dutch with Islam, although the Netherlands were still a colonial occupant. The benign attitude of the Dutch, however, prevailed when the first Indonesian Muslims came to the Netherlands after World War II.[261]

After World War II, as in Germany and Great Britain, a phase of significant Muslim settlement began. First, it was Muslim soldiers in the Dutch army who supported or fought for the Dutch in the colonies.[262] A large part of these former soldiers were Moluccans who left Indonesia with the Dutch in 1949. They did not plan to stay for long in the Netherlands, desiring an independent Moluccas to return to. This

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[260] Cherribi, *Dutch Islam*, 64.

[261] Ibid., 65.

[262] Lubeck, "The Challenge of Islamic Networks," 79.

never happened, and the Moluccans stayed.[263] In a second phase, Muslims from Turkey and Morocco came to the Netherlands as guest workers in the 1960s and 1970s. This timeframe marks a significant phase in the immigration of Muslims to all three countries of this case study, with very similar implications for the Muslims and their new states of residence. Moroccan as well as Turkish immigrants came mainly from rural areas. Most of the immigrants came with special working contracts, imported to do specific jobs. As in Germany and Great Britain, this led to concentration of these Muslim immigrants in Dutch cities: Rotterdam, The Hague, Amsterdam, but also Gouda and Enschede.[264] The first bilateral agreement to manage this guest worker "program" was signed by the Moroccan and Dutch government in 1969, at a time when guest-worker immigration from Morocco had long begun.[265]

Later on, additional workers came from Surinam and Indonesia. In contrast to Moroccan and Turkish guest workers, who were employed as blue-collar workers, Surinamese were mainly employed as nurses, civil servants, or teachers.[266] The case of Surinam in some regards is unique. The former Dutch colony became an independent state in 1975. Many Surinamese saw better opportunities for their future in the Netherlands. Thus, before the new state of Surinam signed transnational arrangements with the Netherlands in 1980, about 300,000 Surinamese, 10% of whom were Muslims, left for the Netherlands.[267]

In the most recent phase of immigration, Muslims came to the Netherlands as asylum seekers, especially from Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, and other countries of the Middle East.[268]

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[263] Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam*, 20.

[264] Cherribi, *Dutch Islam*, 67.

[265] Ibid., 68.

[266] Buruma, *Murder in Amsterdam*, 25.

[267] FORUM, The *Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 8.

[268] Martijn de Koning, "Netherlands," in *Yearbook of Muslims in Europe, Volume 2*, ed. Jorgen S. Nielsen et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 367.

Based on figures released by the government statistics office, Statistics Netherlands (BS), there were an estimated 907,000 Muslims in the Netherlands in early 2009, which accounts for approximately 6% of the total population and 45% of all non-Western Dutch migrants are Muslims.[269]


Figure 6.   Origin of Muslims in the Netherlands[270]

The majority of Muslims are Sunni, and approximately 40% of Turks have an Alevi background.[271] These data draw a picture of the Muslim presence in the Netherlands that is similar to the situation in Germany and Great Britain. The implications for the development of Euro-Islam are, therefore, identical. Overall, it seems, the development of Muslim communities in European countries followed a similar pattern.

Similarities can also be observed in the birthrate. With an average age of 25 years, Muslims are significant younger than the rest of the Dutch population, which averages 38 years. Moreover, about 300,000 Muslims are younger than 18 years, while only 11,000 are older than 65 years.[272] The same situation may already be observed in Germany and Great Britain.

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[269] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 9–10.

[270] Ibid.

[271] Thijl Sunier, "Islam in the Netherlands: Dutch Islam," in *Muslims in 21st Century Europe: Structural and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Anna Triandafyllidou (New York: Routledge, 2010), 124.

[272] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 11.

As in Germany and Great Britain, the performance of young Muslims in school and the labor market has been a concern. A significant percentage of young Muslims leave school without any qualifications. A promising development, however, is marked by the growing number of young Muslims entering higher education, but overall, the native Dutch labor force is considerably better educated. The major factor that determines the underperformance of Muslims in education and on the labor market is language deficiency. Almost 20% of Moroccans and Turks claim to often or always have problems with the Dutch language. This difficulty also translate into a lower level of participation in the labor market, which was 55% and 51%, respectively, for Turks and Moroccans, compared to 69% among native Dutch. The lower average net income of Muslims is another outcome.[273] Attempts by the Dutch government to overcome this situation were made in 1994 and 1997 through legislation that provided tax incentives to employers if they provided jobs to immigrants and tried to establish partnerships between the public and private sectors to reduce unemployment rates of immigrants.[274] Although these programs failed, it would be wrong to assume such programs irrelevant, but they have to be embedded in an overall integration policy that is bolstered with additional measures.

Another factor that hinders the integration of Muslims is their preference for marriage with partners from the same background. Only approximately 10% of Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands choose a native Dutch partner. The still-prevailing prejudice of arranged marriages among Muslims, however, does not apply to Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands, who view marriage as a matter of free choice and not of arrangement and enforcement.[275]

If, finally, the representation of Muslims in parliament and public office is considered an indicator of the potential for social mobility, the situation in the Netherlands is similar to that in Germany and Great Britain. So far, no Muslim has been appointed minister, while currently two state secretaries have taken office. In the house

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[273] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 14–17.

[274] Cherribi, *Dutch Islam*, 78.

[275] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 19.

of representatives, four Turks and three Moroccans can be found, and in the senate one out of the 75 senators is a Muslim. In the councils of the twelve provinces, about 3% are of Turkish or Moroccan origin, and in the 443 municipalities, Turks and Moroccans occupy about 230 seats out of more than 9,500.[276] These figures show that Muslims engage in politics. With just 2%, their representation on the municipal level, however, does not reflect their share of the entire population. Taking into account that Muslims can vote in municipal elections, these figures show a certain degree of reluctance to engage actively and constructively in politics. However, as they achieve more representation in politics, the discourse of some Muslim organizations is putting more emphasis on their role as citizens in the Netherlands.[277]

Overall, the analysis of the demographic structure of Muslims in the Netherlands and their current social and economic situation underlines the observations made for Germany and Great Britain.

2.   Muslims in the Netherlands and Their Relationship With the State

Among the three countries of this case study, Dutch public and political opinion towards Islam and the presence of Muslims in the Netherlands has undergone the most obvious changes. For a long time, the Netherlands perceived itself as a role model for a tolerant society capable of including cultural and religious diversity.[278] However, in a 2005 report by the Pew Global Project, 51% of Dutch participants had unfavorable opinions about Muslims, and in a more recent nationwide survey, half of the Dutch considered Western and Muslim ways of life as contradictory.[279] Several factors contributed to this development. The murder of Theo van Gogh, the subsequent burning

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[276] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 23.

[277] Cherribi, *Dutch Islam*, 77.

[278] Marcel Maussen, "The Netherlands," in *Securitization and Religious Divides in Europe – Muslims in Western Euorpe after 9/11: Why the term Islamophobia is more a Predicament than an Explanation*, ed. Jocelyne Cesari, Submission to the Changing Landscape of Citizenship and Security, 6th PCRD of European Commission (June 1, 2006), 103.

[279] Karina Velasco Gonzalez et al., "Prejudice towards Muslims in The Netherlands: Testing Integrated Threat Theory," *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 47 (2008): 667–668.

of mosques in 2004, the Wilders movie *Fitna,* and Wilder's anti-Islamic comments in 2008 are just a few, but very prominent, examples demonstrating that the relationship of the Dutch and their Muslim neighbors has changed.

But opinions on Dutch immigration policies differ. In contrast to how the Dutch may perceive it, Thijl Sunnier argues that, regardless of its political agenda, the goal of immigration and integration policies was always assimilation.[280] He views the Dutch policies as a "path individual migrants had to follow in order to take fully part in the central institutions of Dutch society, regardless of ethnic differences." This path was defined by educational programs and economic measures to overcome the inequality between migrants and native Dutch. Only in the 1980s, he continues, did the government adopt a political agenda that granted a certain degree of cultural autonomy."[281]

Nevertheless, as described above, the Dutch initially held a positive view of Muslims in their country. The Dutch did not consider themselves an immigration target, being already an overpopulated, small state with bigger neighbors with greater capacity to accommodate foreign immigrants. Initially, migration into the Netherlands was only minimally regulated.[282] When the first Muslim immigrants arrived, they faced a society with a form of organization that was starting to weaken in the 1960s, an organization of pillars (*zuilen*) based upon a composition of four prevailing ideological groups (*richtingen*), namely Catholics, Protestants, Socialists, and Liberals. These pillars formed a powerful civil society, consisting of organizations, schools and universities, unions, sports associations, and newspapers and broadcasting associations, all representing their own pillars, and the political arena was dominated by parties representing these pillars. The Muslims arriving in the Netherlands saw this system of pillarization (*verzuiling*) under pressure by various social and political processes, such as secularization.[283] Muslim immigrants, however, tried to utilize this system of pillarization and organized themselves within this tradition. Some even argue that the

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[280] Sunier, "Islam in the Netherlands," 125.

[281] Ibid., 124–125.

[282] Maussen, "The Netherlands," 120.

[283] Ibid., 108–109.

integration of Islamic and various other immigrant communities has brought about a kind of "repillarization."[284] Actually, Muslim immigration returned something to the Netherlands that the Dutch had already laid aside: a public role of religion.

Freedom of religion and a separation of church and state are the principles of the state–church relationship in the Netherlands. In contrast to Germany, and closer to the British system, all religious denominations in Netherlands enjoy formal and legal equality and the role of religion is not recognition based.[285] However, Christianity still plays a decisive and dominant role in Dutch society. Until the late 1970s, the Dutch state contributed financially to the establishment and maintenance of church buildings and even paid some of the pensions and salaries of religious personnel of Christian organizations. [286] In the constitutional reform of 1983, freedom of religion and equal treatment was defined more specifically, and privileges for the Christian church removed.

With the growing influx of immigrants into the Netherlands, the government sought to improve their legislative framework to accommodate them. Between 1967 and 1973, guest workers were officially given the status of temporary workers. In 1974, legislation intended to improve the social status of immigrants, treating them as members of a society that takes care (*zorgmaatschappij*), was passed. Additional immigration and integration legislation followed. In response, Muslims started to organize, which will be analyzed in Chapter IV.

In the 1980s, the shift to strengthen immigrants' position through integration policies continued. These policies focused mainly on welfare policy,[287] but additionally steps were also taken to give immigrants a voice. Since 1986, those immigrants who had legally lived in the Netherlands for at least five years got voting rights in municipal

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[284] Cherribi, *Dutch Islam*, 66.

[285] Sunier, "Islam in the Netherlands," 126.

[286] Maussen, "The Netherlands," 109.

[287] Ibid., 114.

elections.[288] Moreover, measures were taken to allow for Islamic practice and rituals, like ritual slaughtering, calls to prayer on a par with the ringing of church bells, and Muslim festivals and dietary rules.[289]

The 1990s marked a change of Dutch policies in a different direction. Although the provision of welfare still remained a major element, culturally, more emphasis was put on assimilation. In one consequential step, the Law on Civic Integration of Newcomers (*Wet Inburgering Nieukomers*) made civic-integration courses mandatory.[290] However, a comparative study in 1996 still viewed the situation of Muslims in the Netherlands as most favorable as compared to other Western states.[291] The debate became more intense in 2000 following a newspaper article by Paul Scheffer, a social-democrat intellectual, on what he labeled the "multicultural tragedy." He argued that the Netherlands had turned a blind eye on many problems.[292] In subsequent campaigns for the municipal and parliamentary elections in 2001 and 2002, the right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn built his political campaign on the failure of Dutch multiculturalism, which he claimed were based on naïve policies developed in a climate of political correctness. After Fortyn's assassination in May 2002, several members of his party, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn,* were elected to national parliament. As a consequence of this electoral success, politicians in the mainstream parties, such as Geert Wilders, Rita Verdonk, and Ayaan Hirsi Ali of the liberal-right party *Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democraties* (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, VVD), appealed to a more polemical discourse on multiculturalism. The position that Islam constitutes a major problem for integration and a threat to Western civilization is prevalent among many Dutch politicians.[293] Also asylum seeking became subject to discussion and, finally, the Aliens Act of 2000 made Dutch asylum law more restrictive by changing and reducing the possibilities for appeal and introducing an accelerated procedure for processing

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[288] De Koning, "Netherlands," 369–370.

[289] Maussen, "The Netherlands," 111.

[290] Ibid., 115.

[291] Ibid., 112.

[292] Ibid., 104.

[293] Ibid.*,* 105.

applications. Human Rights Watch concluded that the Dutch government had taken up the most restrictive approach among Western European Countries.[294] This did not, of course, affect Muslims only.

The murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh in November 2004 precipitated violent attacks on mosques and Islamic schools, marking a sad climax to national tensions.[295] Afterwards, Maussen argues, "the political debate went wild, asking for measures like forbidding Islam, deporting second-generation Moroccan youth, or closing down all mosques."[296] This is the situation in the Netherlands now.

What makes the Netherlands extremely important in the future of Euro-Islam is the dramatic change in governmental politics and public opinion. Although similar developments can be observed in Germany and the UK, the degree of change is much more significant and radical in the Netherlands. This significance has been identified not only in the country itself, but all over Europe. The fact that it is a change for the worse for Muslims can affect their willingness to become more cooperative. This could be a blow for Euro-Islam. But the Dutch government has not stopped conversation with the Muslim community. By contrast, they have established a system that grants Muslim organizations the role of recognized entities with a right to consultation at all relevant ministries. Moreover, these organizations function as service providers for governmental institutions like the military or judiciary. This is another important difference from Germany and Great Britain, a difference that supports the promotion of Euro-Islam and will be explained in Chapter IV.

a.   *Education*

Article 23 of the Dutch constitution defines freedom of choice in education. The Dutch education system consists of public and private schools, with private primary schools being financed from public funds according to the same

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[294] Maussen, "The Netherlands," 120.

[295] Ibid., 106.

[296] Ibid., 107.

standards as public-authority schools. While these schools are free to apply their own educational methods and to decide upon extracurricular activities, the core curriculum has to meet obligatory standards defined by the government.[297]

In the late 1980s, the first Muslim primary schools were opened in Rotterdam, The Hague, Eindhoven, and Amsterdam.[298] In 1990, the Islamic Schools Governing Board Organization (ISBO) was established as an umbrella organization for Islamic primary and secondary schools.[299] Today, 41 Islamic schools operate within the public education system and are state funded. Two of these schools are secondary, while the rest are primary. Non-Islamic schools in the Netherlands have to provide Islamic lessons on request.[300] Reports and studies on these schools found that they do not obstruct integration.[301] In the field of higher education, two Islamic universities can be found in the Netherlands: the Islamic University of Rotterdam, affiliated with the Gülen movement, and the Islamic University of Europe in Schiedam. Neither is recognized or funded by the government.[302]

The educational situation in the Netherlands is identical to that in Britain, offering Muslims many opportunities to meet their own demands for education. The core curriculum guarantees the commitment to common values. With a look at demographic developments, the importance of education has to be emphasized, again. Better education will not only benefit the promotion of Euro-Islam, it will be a gain for the entire society. With the increasing share of Muslim population in the future, the Netherlands, like other countries in Europe, will be dependent on their Muslim communities to constructively contribute to the countries' well-being.

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[297] Maussen, "The Netherlands," 109.

[298] Ibid., 112.

[299] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 38.

[300] De Koning, "Netherlands," 375.

[301] Maussen, "The Netherlands," 117.

[302] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands* 38.

b.   The Role of Imams

Imams in Dutch mosques are mainly recruited from the countries the first generation of Muslim immigrants came from, with the majority coming from Turkey and Morocco.[303] This is another characteristic the Netherlands share with Germany and Great Britain; but imam education in the Netherlands is already one step ahead. Two mainstream academic centers for imam training have operated since 2005: the Centre for Islamic Theology at the Free University of Amsterdam and the Theology Department of the University of Leiden. Both centers cooperate with the two largest Muslim umbrella organizations in the Netherlands, the Contact Organ Muslims and Government (*Contact Organ Moslims Overheid*, CMO) and the Contact Group Islam (*Contactgroep Islam*, CGI).[304] The Free University of Amsterdam offers bachelor's degrees in Islamic theology, and a master's program in Islamic spiritual care. Leiden University offers bachelor's and master's degrees in Islamic theology.[305] Additionally, imam-training courses are available at the InHolland College, designed in cooperation with a number of mosque organizations affiliated to the CMO.[306] Special civic integration courses that are mandatory for imams have been in place since 2002.[307]

The role of imam education in the Netherlands is controversial. While a majority support the programs, mainly following the rationale of the German government, Muslim organizations and imams have doubts. The main concern is that four years to study at a Dutch university would be not sufficient to educate a future imam up to a level where he can be an accepted imam by Muslim communities.[308] This criticism has to be taken seriously, but it should not restrain the Dutch government from further developing these programs. Imams can play a key role in the promotion of Euro-

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[303] Marcel Feith, *Imam in Amsterdam: Een Studie naar Beeldvorming, Beleid en Integratie* (Utrecht: Universiteit Utrecht, 2008), 29.

[304] De Koning, "Netherlands," 375.

[305] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 38.

[306] Ibid.

[307] Maussen, "The Netherlands", 116.

[308] Welmoet Boender, "Imams in the Netherlands: An Impression," accessed April 20, 2011. http://www.flw.ugent.be/cie/CIE/boender1.htm.

Islam. To be able to do that, they have to understand the requirements of the European context. What has to be avoided, is any impression of indoctrination and oppression of key Muslim values in the education of imams. This would discredit any attempt of promoting Euro-Islam.

c. The Influence of the Muslim Media

Muslims in the Netherland have installed an impressive media landscape. Until 2010, two antagonistic Muslim media companies broadcasted especially for Muslims in the Netherlands: the Dutch Muslim Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Moslim Omroep, NMO) and the Dutch Islamic Broadcasting Company (Nederlandse Islamitische Omroep, NIO). Their broadcasting licenses expired in 2010, and five organizations applied for broadcasting licenses for 2010 to 2015. The Netherlands Foundation for Muslim Broadcasting (Stichting Moslim Omroep Nederland, SMON) was licensed and later joined by the Broadcasting Company Universal Muslim Association (Omroep Universele Moslim Associatie OUMA). The SMON was an initiative of several Moroccan and Surinamese organizations in the Netherlands. OUMA appeared to wish to focus on Muslims as Dutch citizens and less on the migrant perspective, as they claim SMON did. Nevertheless, in order to benefit from the SMON's broadcasting license, they joined SMON and formed the Muslim Broadcasting Organization to address young Muslims. Other organizations that applied for the license are the Foundation Muslim Broadcasting Company, the Dutch Islamic Media, and the Foundation Cooperation Islamic Umbrella.[309]

Besides broadcasting stations there are also a variety of Muslim print media. The Al Nisa Maandblad, under the responsibility of the Muslim women's organization Al Nisa, publishes two magazines for children (Anti Wa Anta) and young women (As Siroata). The Zaman Nederland is a newspaper published by the Gülen affiliated Time Media Group. The Ahmadiyya Muslims' main newspaper is Al-Islaam,

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[309] De Koning, "Netherlands," 379–380.

while Expliciet is an Hizb ut Tahrir affiliated media. Momtazah Publishers is responsible for "Wij Moslims." Recently, Muslims make increase use of Internet blogs like "wij blijven hier" at www.wijblievenhier.nl.[310]

The importance of media in the promotion of Euro-Islam has already highlighted above, and the space the Dutch government offers for Muslim media is a valuable contribution to Euro-Islam. Licensing these media enables the Dutch government to avoid broadcasting of programs that contradict the overall aim of successful integration.

3.   The Identity of Muslims in the Netherlands

The similarities of Muslim communities in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands have almost identical implications for the development of Muslim identity in these countries. In 2006, for example, 60 to 70% of Muslim Moroccans and Turks claimed to feel at home in the Netherlands.[311] At the same time, two thirds of religious Turks and half of religious Moroccans identify more with their country of origin than with the Netherlands.[312]

A majority of Turks and Muslims believe that Dutch people's perceptions about Islam are too negative.[313] Although most Turks and Moroccans consider themselves Muslims, there are significant differences in religious behavior and attitudes, and the number of Turks and Muslims who describe themselves as Muslims but do not visit a mosque has increased.

The first Moroccan migrants became socially, religiously, and linguistically disoriented. With this came a feeling of alienation. While returning for summer leave to Morocco, the rest of the year was viewed as a "time when one was so forgotten, or

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[310] De Koning, "Netherlands," 380.

[311] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 28.

[312] Ibid., 30.

[313] Ibid., 31.

overlooked by the Europeans, that one forgot oneself, that one began to doubt one's very existence."[314] For the identity of first-generation guest workers, Islam played the same role as for Muslims in Germany and Great Britain.

With regard to young Muslims, the same conflict of identity can be observed as is evident in Germany and Great Britain. Surprisingly, however, the most integrated members of the Moroccan Muslim community in the Netherlands paradoxically have the most negative perception of Dutch society.[315]

In summary, the development of Muslim identity in the Netherlands followed, and still follows, the patterns of Muslim immigrants in Germany and Great Britain. For the establishment of Euro-Islam, that can be good news. The congruence in the development of identities based on similar experiences can facilitate conversation on the future of Islam in Europe. People that have experienced the same things might come to the same conclusions. An overemphasis of ethnic identity and nationality, however, could counteract this sameness of experiences and undermine the development of Euro-Islam. Moreover, an identity that is based on negative experiences will, most likely, not be supportive for the integration of Muslims in Europe.

D.   CONCLUSION

The analysis of the Muslim communities in the three studied countries shows significant similarities in the situation Muslims face. Perceived discrimination and social exclusion are the prevailing feelings among many Muslims in these countries.

One important observation is the fact that, despite their allegedly secular nature, these states generally offer religion the space it needs. Rohe even argues that these countries "open a broad space for religious belief and life regardless of whether the religion of the majority or of a minority is at stake."[316] This, as the analysis has shown,

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[314] Cherribi, *Dutch Islam*, 68.

[315] De Koning, "Netherlands," 384.

[316] Rohe, "Islam and the Democratic State," 231.

is not totally the case. While these states open their societies to all religions, the way these religions can make use of the space differs. Christianity is still the most privileged religion.

	Germany	Great Britain	Netherlands
Muslim population	4.3 mio	2.8 mio	907,000
% of total population	5	4.5	6
Main countries of origin	Turkey (63%)	Pakistan (42%)	Turkey (36%)
		Bangladesh (16%)	Morocco (34%)
Start of main immigration	1960s	1960s	1960s
Average age	30 years	28 years	30 years
Relation state-religion	Freedom of belief	Freedom of belief	Freedom of belief
	Recognized Faith	State Church	
Religious education	Project phase of Islam classes at public schools	Islam classes at public schools	Islam classes at public schools
	No Islamic schools	Islamic schools	Islamic schools
Education of imams	Abroad	Abroad	Abroad
	Muslim organizations in Germany	Muslim organizations in the UK	Muslim organizations in the Netherlands
	Courses at German universities starting in 2011		Courses at Dutch universities
Established dialogue	DIK	FCCC	CMO and CGI have specials status and privileges

Table 3.   Muslim Communities in Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands

The way government policies have developed in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands initially differed, but these differences have increasingly narrowed down. Great Britain and the Netherlands, from the beginning, offered Muslim communities more freedom and rights than Germany.

Hence, it is surprising that all three states currently face a very similar situation, which suggests that other factors—as scholars quoted in Chapter I have stated—might be more important for successful integration than the concepts and policies governments

seek to follow. This has important consequences for the development of an integrative Euro-Islam. The major implications of the Muslim presence in the three countries for the future of Euro-Islam can be summarized as follows:

- Muslim communities in Europe are not a homogenous entity. They are split based on ethnicity, nationality, language, sectarian beliefs, legal and social status, and age. These differences can hinder the required discourse of Muslims over the future role of their religion in their current country of residence and, even more, on the European level.

- Government policies become increasingly assimilative. As Monda says, "reform comes to stand in as a code for "become like us," which in turn expresses a desire for annihilation, for the outright victory of our ideas over theirs. If that is how the battle for hearts and minds comes across then it is no wonder that Muslims become defensive."[317] The imminent struggle Europeans themselves face with regard to their own identity plays an important role in this current process of changing policies towards immigrants and especially Muslims. If this tendency cannot be overcome, the mutual acceptance of core values and, thereby, the foundation of Euro-Islam can be endangered.

- The influence of foreign governments and organizations in mosques and over the media still binds many Muslims to their former home countries and discourages them from finding their own way in the new environment.

- Steps to facilitate the education and training of imams, to ensure religious education at schools, etc., send a positive signal to Muslims in Europe that their host societies accept them. However, close links of such initiatives to anti-terrorism programs raises concern amongst Muslim communities that what looks as acceptance, on the first view, is only a result of pure rationality and self-interest.

- Muslims have to overcome structural deficiencies, especially their concentration in specific city districts. This, of course, requires support by the host countries, too.

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[317] Mondal, *Young British Muslim Voices*, 184.

- That the Muslims in this case study are mainly young offers opportunities to invest in the future. Their current social status, their situation on the labor market, and the tendency to stay among themselves, however, can be a serious obstacle to integration and the development of Euro-Islam that facilitates the process of integration. Further exclusion from more active participation, as it is currently the case, can steer young Muslims in directions that will not benefit anybody. This, however, is not an observation solely applicable to Muslims. As especially German history shows, if people feel excluded, disappointed, and left alone, they might turn to alternative options that could have severe consequences.

A failure to overcome these shortfalls, described above, can finally put the possibility of constructing Euro-Islam, with its different pillars, at risk. Muslims cannot solve these problems individually, facing strong societies and institutions in their current countries of residency. They have to organize. Therefore, the following chapter will be devoted to analyze the role Muslim organizations could play to promote Euro-Islam.

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IV. MUSLIM ORGANIZATIONS IN GERMANY, GREAT BRITAIN, AND THE NETHERLANDS

The preceding analysis of Muslim communities, their relationship with the state, and the development of Muslim identity provided little evidence that the development of Euro-Islam is underway, and pointed out the difficulties this development faces. For any progress to occur, many scholars view the role of Muslim organizations as critical.[318] Muslim organization can channel the interests of Muslims to governments and wider society, facilitate discourse among Muslims and with society, and provide support for Muslims to escape their current social and economic exclusion. Therefore, the question arises of how representative Muslim organizations are and how supportive they can be in defining and establishing Euro-Islam, as defined in Chapter II.

Analysis of Muslim organizations in the countries studied draws an ambivalent picture. High diversity, the influence of foreign governments and movements, partial animosities between organizations, and differing perceptions of the future role of Islam in Europe characterize the landscape of Muslim organizations in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, suggesting that these organizations seek rather to utilize old patterns of identity than to shape a new one. Therefore, these organizations play a more separating than unifying role. Moreover, only a minority of Muslims feels represented by these organizations. Often, Muslims only use the facilities of organizations to fulfill their religious, ritual obligations. Finally, governments and societies view many Muslim organizations with suspicion, which is sometimes justified. In this respect, the role of the elder generation, which still obtains leading positions in many Muslim organizations, is of high importance. Fortunately, a new string of Muslim organizations and think tanks is coming to the forefront. Currently, however, the more conservative umbrella organizations seem to dominate the scene of Muslim organizations, promoting the definition of identity based on ethnicity, nationality, or ideology, and not on citizenship as a European Muslim.

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[318] Thil Sunier et al., *Diyanet: The Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs in a Changing Environment*, Report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 2011, 123.

On the European level, the organizing of Muslims is less significant. Especially those organizations that are founded on the ideology of Islamist movements, like the Muslim Brotherhood and *Milli Görüs*, seem to be more organized. The same applies to the organizations that fall under the regime of the Turkish *diyanet*—the Turkish governmental organization responsible for religious affairs. Otherwise, activities by a wider Muslim community are mainly limited to specific projects, for example to guaranteeing the right to *halal* food and ritual slaughtering. Thus, a mature institutionalization of Islam in Europe can, currently, not be observed.

In general, Muslim organizations can either evolve in a top-down approach, initiated by the government, or from the bottom up, as an outcome of a "strong civil society mobilization and social capital among Muslim communities." Here, the state takes a mainly supportive role. Often, however, organizations are formed in a mixed approach.[319] In German, Great Britain, and the Netherlands, the first Muslim organizations were mosque communities. These communities evolved from the bottom up, from the desire of immigrants for sanctuary in a foreign environment. Later, foreign governments sought to gain influence over their expatriates through organizations established in a top-down approach. Finally, umbrella organizations were established to facilitate the mutual demand for dialogue between Muslims and the governments. Though, governments often played the more demanding role, these umbrella organizations were formed in a mixed approach. The analysis of Muslim organizations in the studied countries will focus on these umbrella organizations. Starting with umbrella organizations, links to other organizations will be analyzed to shed light on the nature of the umbrella organization and its objectives. It must be mentioned that some scholars argue that these organizations tend to aim towards mobilizing the state to intervene in the community on their behalf—for example by funding educational and cultural activities that endorse their ideology—rather than being willing to bring the real

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[319] Silvestri, *Moderate Muslims in Europe*, 51.

interests of the Muslim grassroots forward.[320] Nevertheless, in the current landscape of Muslim organizations, these umbrella organizations have the widest outreach and are the most influential.

Clearly radical groups, however, will not be analyzed. Their role in the development and propagation of Euro-Islam is clear. Moreover, they represent an absolute minority and exercise very limited influence on the wider Muslim community. Unfortunately, they often dominate the public perception of Muslim organizations. Nevertheless, they do not require further consideration in the framework of this thesis.

A. GERMANY

Despite the large number of Turkish Muslims, the figures shown in Chapter III clearly show that the community of Muslims in Germany is a rather heterogeneous group. This heterogeneity becomes even clearer when it comes to the representation and organization of Muslims in Germany. Only 20% of Muslims in Germany participate in religious societies or communities and the largest umbrella organizations only partially represent the more than 2,400 local communities and mosques in Germany.[321]

This is the first indication that Muslim organizations in Germany lack the legitimacy to speak for all Muslims in the country. Moreover, analysis shows that some of the largest organizations oppose the policies of the German government and have stopped participating in institutional dialogue. On the other side, some organizations have established a wide and deep network of sub-organizations and associations for outreach into the grassroots level. This type of network could facilitate a wider discourse on Euro-Islam. Unfortunately, these networks are maintained by those organizations that have stopped their engagement with the DIK or promote an understanding of Islam that seems incompatible with Euro-Islam as understood in this thesis. Moreover, the strong influence of the Turkish, Iranian, and Saudi Arabian governments on some organizations

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[320] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 108.

[321] Hildegard Becker, "Der organisierte Islam in Deutschland und einige ideologische Hintergründe" (paper presented at the conference "Integration and Islam" at the Bundesanstalt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, Nürnberg, June 21–22, 2005), 67.

limits their role in defining a European–Muslim identity. The influence of the Turkish government, especially, strengthens the role of nationality as the basis of identity. Overall, the promotion of Euro-Islam in Germany is likely to stem more from individuals than organizations.

The largest Muslim organizations in Germany are the Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution of Religion (*Diyanet Isleri Türk Islam e.V.*, DITIB), the Central Council of Muslims in Germany (*Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland e.V.*, ZMD), the Islamic Council in Germany (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland e.V.*, IRD), and the Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (*Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren e.V.*, VIKZ).[322] Since 2007, these four organizations seek to coordinate their policies towards the German government in the Coordination Council of Muslims in Germany (*Koordinationsrat der Muslime in Deutschland*, KRMD). Under the umbrella of the KRMD, the four organizations initially engaged with the DIK, the forum for dialogue between Muslims and the German government. In 2010, however, the IRD was suspended from the DIK, due to investigations by German law-enforcement agencies on the IRD's member organization, *Milli Görüs*. The same year, the ZMD withdrew from the DIK and harshly criticized the DIK as totally ineffective.[323] The Muslim organizations that complete the DIK are the Alevi Communities Germany (*Alevitische Gemeine Deutschland e.V.*, AABF), the Islamic Community of Bosniaks in Germany (*Islamische Gemeinschaft der Bosniaken in Deutschland e.V.*, IGBD) and the Central Council of Moroccans in Germany (*Zentralrat der Marokkaner in Deutschland e.V.*, ZMaD).

The absence of the IRD and the ZMD in the DIK signals different messages, indicating a friction among Muslim organizations in Germany, but also suggesting that the form of dialogue in the DIK is lacking the necessary degree of openness and

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[322] Mark Chalil Bodenstein, "Muslimische Verbände: Neue Zahlen, aber kein Ende der Diskussion," (October 02, 2009), accessed November 13, 2010. http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/cln_117/nn_1318688/SubSites/DIK/DE/Magazin/MuslimOrganisationen/VerbaendeMLD/verbaende-mld-inhalt.html?__nnn=true.

[323] "Zentralrat der Muslime steigt aus Islamkonferenz aus," Zeit-online, (May 12, 2010), accessed April 05, 2011. http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2010-05/islam-konferenz-absage.

willingness. However, with the IGBD—affiliated with the IRD and ZMK—the two organizations have a kind of spokesperson in the DIK.

A closer look at some of these organizations will provide more insight into the role they might play for the promotion of Euro-Islam.

1. The Turkish-Islamic Union of the Institution for Religious Affairs (DITIB e.V.)

The DITIB is the largest Muslim organization in Germany and is sponsored by the Turkish diyanet. It is therefore often called the "spokesman of the Turkish government."[324] On the other side, the DITIB stands for the separation of state and religion as a principle of the Turkish state. The Turkish government provides support in order to maintain a close relationship with and influence on its expatriates, as well as to counteract the fundamentalist tendencies among some Turkish Islamist activists. The support comes mainly in the form of funding and imams for mosques.[325] The organization has 130,000 members and runs almost 900 mosques.[326] DITIB imams stay in Germany for three to five years. They often do not speak German and are unaware of the characteristics of German society, although DITIB recently has engaged with the German Goethe Institute and other organizations to improve this situation.[327]

Politically, the organization officially restraints from any activities, and political events are forbidden in the facilities of the DITIB.[328] Nevertheless, via the DITIB, the Turkish government appeals to the religious identity of Turkish immigrants but emphasizes even more the role of Turkish nationality.[329] Thus, the DITIB has a clear political role.

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[324] Ursula Spuler-Stegemann, *Muslime in Deutschland* (Freiburg: Herder Verlag, 2002), 104.

[325] Hussain, *The Holy Grail*, 233.

[326] Johannes Kandel, *Islamische Organisationen im Überblick* (Berlin: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2005), accessed April 03, 2011. http://www.bpb.de/themen/F9WKLB,0,0.

[327] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 80.

[328] "Grundsätze," DITIB, accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.ditib.de.

[329] Rohe, "Germany," 220.

Overall, the activities of the DITIB focus on a dialogue between Turkish Muslims and German society. The organization fully accepts the German constitution and the concept of democracy. In its publications it calls for tolerance and respect. Through its affiliated youth organization, the *DITIB Jugend*, it seeks to educate young Turkish Muslims to enhance their own identity and respect other cultures as well. To facilitate this process, the DITIB runs sports teams, music education, and support programs for students. Moreover, the DITIB has initiated a program of "envoys for dialogue" (*Dialogbeauftragte*). These envoys engage with wider German society and cooperate with schools, kindergartens, and the police.[330] Through the *Research Center for Religion and Society* (*Forschungszentrum für Religion und Gesellschaft*), the organization seeks to gain further insight into the perception of religion in society.[331] Controversial is the DITIB's attitude towards Alevi living in Germany, which will be analyzed later.

For the promotion of Euro-Islam, the DITIB currently cannot be considered as playing an active role. Although the organization propagates a moderate, secular form of Islam, the huge influence of the Turkish government seems to prevent the DITIB to obtaining a reformist role and emphasizes the importance of national identity. Only if empowered by the diyanet might the role of the DITIB change; then, however, it can play a major role, because Turks are the largest group among Muslims in Germany. Nevertheless, the DITIB's value lies in its attempts to improve the social status of Turkish Muslims, helping change the persistent feeling of being excluded and enabling young Turks to identify with their residence in Germany as German citizens. Only if their potential successes are linked solely to the DITIB, and consequently to the Turkish state, could the outcome be an even more nationalistic identity.

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[330] "Pro Dialog: Mitten im Leben," DITIB, accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.prodialog-ditib.de.

[331] "Forschungszentrum für Religion und Gesellschaft," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.forege.de.

2.   Association of Islamic Cultural Centers (VIKZ)

The VIKZ is a former member organization of the ZMD, with about 20,000 members. The VIKZ is linked to the Turkish Süleymanci movement—a Sufi movement that is supposed not to pursue any form of political Islam. The organization emphasizes its commitment to the German constitution and its support of democracy, respect, and tolerance. In its understanding as a Sufi organization, the VIKZ emphasizes the spiritual aspect of religion and relationship with God.[332]

Although the VIKZ engages with the DIK, its activities mainly look inwards, focusing on youth education in the Sufi school of thought. Thus, one of the main activities of the VIKZ is the operation of student hostels (*Schülerwohnheime*).[333] According to the VIKZ the organization represents some 300 mosques and so-called education groups (*Bildungsvereine*).

The education activities of the VIKZ have often been subject to criticism. Scholars like Ursula Spuler-Stegemann argue that education at the VIKZ student hostels focuses solely on Islamic education and the propagation of an extreme conservative understanding of Islam. Spuler-Stegemann argues that these hostels are a major obstacle to integration and promote the separation of young Muslims from German society, in contrast to the organization's own statements. Moreover, the VIKZ has tried repeatedly to operate hostels illegally, and teachers at public schools report of strong anti-Semitism and anti-Americanism among children living in VIKZ hostels.[334] Based on assessments like this, some conservatives in 2008 called for an observation of the VIKZ by the *Verfassungsschutz*.[335] The organization itself emphasizes that the hostels are to facilitate homework supervision and improve the future chances of young Muslims on the job market. The overall aim allegedly is integration rather than separation. The VIKZ points out that all personnel at their facilities speak German and many are ethnic Germans. A

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[332] VIKZ, accessed April 28, 2011, http://vikz.de.

[333] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 78.

[334] Andrea Brandt and Cordula Meyer, "Und nachts der Koran," *Der Spiegel* no. 46 (2006): 56, 59.

[335] Andrea Brandt, "Verfasungsschützer sollen VIKZ beobachten;" *Spiegel Online*, (April 16, 2008), accessed April 02, 2011. http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,547860,00.html.

2010 study by a German education scientist, on behalf of the VIKZ, emphasizes the value of the VIKZ, arguing that homework supervision and support in school performance is priority number one for the VIKZ, while religious objectives only come second.[336]

In summary, the VIKZ cannot be really called a promoter of Euro-Islam. The form of Islam promoted by the VIKZ has to be called rather conservative, totally dedicated to the school of thought of the Süleymanci movement. This will promote a rather ideology-based identity. Although allegations of indoctrination of young Muslims in the VIKZ's facilities exist, it has to be pointed out that the organization is still engaged in dialogue not only through the DIK, but also in local activities, although limited in number. Its allegedly inward orientation, nevertheless, suggests that the VIKZ seeks only to pursue its own way than to invest in a wider discourse on the role of Islam and possible reform. The allegations and suspicion concerning the VIKZ, moreover, illustrate that the role of Muslim organizations in the promotion of Euro-Islam might be limited. Euro-Islam will be accepted by Western society only if it can claim legitimacy. This might be endangered if Muslim organizations are not trusted. A lack of trust, however, can also result from a lack of knowledge on the side of Western societies.

3.   Alevi Communities Germany (Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Fedrasyonu, AABF)

The group of Alevi in Germany has to be regarded as an exception. First, Alevi view themselves not as Muslims but as a separate, independent religious community,[337] and many Sunni and Shi'a Muslims share this view. Second, in contrast to other Muslim organizations, the AABF has achieved the status of a religious corporation, KÖR, as defined by the German constitution.

The program of the AABF, which was founded in 1991, reads like the concept of Euro-Islam: full equality of men and women, rejection of shari'a, tolerance, and

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[336] "VIKZ Heime weder verfassungsfeindlich noch rückständig," islam.de, (July 11, 2010), accessed April 02, 2011. http://islam.de/16072.php.

[337] "Der Islam kennt keine Kirche," domradio.de, (April 27, 2011), accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.domradio.de/aktuell/73139/der-islam-kennt-keine-kirche.html.

pluralism are guiding principles. According to the AABF, the organization represents 130 member organizations and local Alevi communities with some 100,000 members.[338] Moreover, the AABF has women's and youth organizations.

An important issue for the AABF is the relationship of Alevi living in Turkey with the Turkish state. Although more than 20 million Alevi live in Turkey, the government does not officially recognize Alevi and, according to the AABF, seeks to force them into Sunni Islam. Also in Germany, the diaynet tries to influence the Alevi community through the Cem-Foundation, which aims at converting Alevi to Sunni belief.[339] This causes severe and harsh criticism of the Turkish government, as well as the DITIB, by Alevi living in Germany.

But Muslim organizations in Germany are also subject to criticism by the AABF. The IRD, for example, is regarded as an umbrella organization that represents organizations like Milli Görüs, which is under investigation by the *Verfassungsschutz*.[340] Therefore, the AABF rejects any cooperation with the IRD and criticizes any form of cooperation of German officials with this organization.

In conclusion, the AABF could be regarded as a role model of an organization that promotes an integrative Euro-Islam; some call them the "forgotten role model for integration."[341] Its objectives and values are fully compliant with the definition of Euro-Islam. However, the perception that they are an independent faith, minimizes their influence on the wider Muslim community.

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[338] "Offener Brief der Alevitischen Gemeinde Deutschland vom 25.02.2011 an den Ministerpräsidenten der Republik Türkei Recep Tayyip Erdogan," AABF, accessed April 02, 2011. http://www.alevi.com/de/content/offener-brief-der-alevitischen-gemeinde-deutschland-vom-25022011-den-ministerpräsidenten-der.

[339] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 81. The Cem-Foundation represents approximately ten local associations and 1.000 members.

[340] "Ganz unrecht hat Friedrich nicht," Focus online, (March 03, 2011), accessed April 02, 2011. http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/aleviten-vorstand-ali-toprak-ganz-unrecht-hat-friedrich-nicht_aid_613015.html. The *Verfassungsschutz* is a German organization comparable to the US FBI.

[341] "Deutschland: Integrationsdebatte – Aleviten wollen nicht "zwangsislamiert" werden," Die Evangelische Allianz in Deutschland, (March 06, 2011), accessed April 02, 2011. http://www.ead.de/nachrichten/nachrichten/einzelansicht/article/deutschland-integrationsdebatte-aleviten-wollen-nicht-zwangsislamisiert-werden.html.

4. The German Council of Muslims in Germany (ZMD)

The ZMD, founded in 1987, is an umbrella organization that currently represents nineteen member organizations and about 300 mosques.[342]

In 2002, the ZMD released an "Islamic Charta" to demonstrate the compatibility between Islamic principles, as understood by the ZMD, and German democracy. In this charter, the ZMD affirms its commitment to German law and human rights and rejection of theocracy.[343] Critics of the council, however, argued that some of the statements in the charter are ambiguous and vague.[344] With regard to elections, for example, the charter claims political neutrality, but at the same time states that Muslims will vote for those candidates that show the greatest comprehension of Islam.[345] For supporters of the council, that must sound like a directive. Other points of critique, however, seem rather exaggerated. To give the ZMD additional credit, it has to be noted that the organization has launched an initiative among young Muslims to promote the role and importance of the German constitution. This initiative has been highly welcomed by the German president and Muslim politicians like Cem Özdemir.[346]

In its publication and public statements, the ZMD propagates a role of Islam that is compatible with Euro-Islam. Even more important, the ZMD claims to promote the development of a European-Muslim identity, formed in the contemporary context of Muslims living in Europe.[347] The diversity of its member organizations, representing Sunni as well as Shi'a and Muslims from Turkey and the Middle East, gives additional hope that the ZMD could become a promoter of Euro-Islam. However, the ZMD's withdrawal from the DIK suggests that the ZMD might have a different understanding

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[342] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 74.

[343] ZMD, Islamic Charta, Articles 10-13, accessed December 02, 2010. http://zentralrat.de/3037.php.

[344] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 75; Michael Molthagen, "Die Islamische Charta des Zentralrates der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD)," Institut für Islamfragen, accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.islaminstitut.de/Artikelanzeige-41+M5046fe8695a.0.html.

[345] ZMD, Islamic Charta, Article 14, accessed December 02, 2010, http://zentralrat.de/3037.php.

[346] ZMD, "Das Grundgesetz im Vordergrund," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.islam.de.

[347] ZMD, Islamic Charta, Article 15, accessed December 02, 2010. http://zentralrat.de/3037.php.

of integration and the role of Islam in Europe. Moreover, the diversity of its member organizations makes the role of the ZMD more ambivalent, as the following analysis of two of its member organizations will show.

a.   The Islamic Society of Germany (*Islamische Gemeinschaft in Deutschland e.V., IGD*)

The IGD was founded in 1958 by Hassan al-Banna's personal secretary and son-in-law, Sa'id Ramadan, the father of Tariq Ramadan. After the oppression of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Ramadan moved to Germany. Thus, it is not surprising that the IGD is supposed to be the most important Brotherhood-affiliated organization in Germany,[348] allegedly with links to the Egyptian Brotherhood.

The IGD follows a strategy of political and social participation to create the required space for its supporters to follow a way of life that is in compliance with the Qur'an and Sunna. For this purpose, the IGD runs its own schools[349] and kindergartens and also keeps close links with the Muslim Youth in Germany (*Muslimische Jugend in Deutschland*, MJD).[350] Other IGD affiliated organizations are the Society of Muslim Arts and Social Scientists (*Gesellschaft Muslimischer Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftler,* GMGS), the Muslim Student Association in Germany (*Muslimische Studenten Vereinigung in Deutschland e.V., MSVD*) and the Islamic Council (*Islamisches Konzil*). The latter is thought to be funded and influenced by the Saudi government,[351] but has not been very active in public recently. The MSVD, through its 35 branches at German universities, offers the IGD access to young Muslims. Overall, the relations of the IGD with other Muslim organizations are highly complex and difficult to access. Besides the relationships described so far, the IGD is also supposed to be highly linked to the groups of Islamic Centers, like the Islamic Center Munich. These centers are frequently used by the IGD to host seminars, conferences and

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[348] Bundesministerium des Innern (BMI), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009* (Berlin: BMI, 2010), 260.

[349] These schools don't fulfill the requirements of state acknowledged schools and have to be seen as additional education facilities where Islam, its tradition and history are taught.

[350] BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009*, 262.

[351] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 75.

other events.[352] Moreover, the IGD is widely connected and interlinked with Islamist organizations on the European level through its membership in the Brotherhood-affiliated Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe (FIOE).

It is important to note that the IGD publicly denounces its relationship with the Muslim Brotherhood and even strongly rejects any affiliation with it. However, several factors strongly indicate that the IGD is a direct offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. First, several senior leaders of the Egyptian Brotherhood, including its former *murshid*, Mohammed Akef, have spent extensive time in the Munich mosque led by the IGD. The fact that Sa'id Ramadan founded the ISG speaks for itself.[353]

Another interesting person in this respect is the former IGD president Ibrahim El-Zayat. Vidino calls him "a quintessential New Western Brother."[354] El-Zayat, however, denies his membership in the Brotherhood, or any affiliation with this organization.[355] He admits that the IGD has "roots in the Muslim Brotherhood," but clearly states that the IGD is not led or dominated by the Brotherhood.[356] Even the official Brotherhood webpage, Ikhwanweb, called El-Zayat a "member of the Muslim Brotherhood" until El-Zayat requested that the statement be changed[357] Therefore, we should have enough indications that El-Zayat is at least a supporter of the Brotherhood. Interestingly, El-Zayat is also a board member of the company that controls and manages Milli Görüs mosques throughout Europe.[358] These links between the IGD and Milli Görüs indicate a wider network of Islamist organizations.

Members of the IGD such as El-Zayat play an important role in other ZMD membership organizations, too. Among these organizations are the GMGS, the

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[352] Justizministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, *Islamistische Organisationen in Nordrhein-Westfalen* (Düsseldorf: Justizministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2008), 42.

[353] Vidino, *The new Muslim Brotherhood*,153.

[354] Ibid.,152.

[355] IGD, Interview with Ibrahim El-Zayat by Moritz Schwartz, "Unter den Muslimen brodelt es," (January 13, 2009), accessed December 01, 2010. http://www.igd-online.de/interviews.html.

[356] Vidino, *The new Muslim Brotherhood*, 157.

[357] Ibid., 158.

[358] Ibid., 153.

Islamic Council, the MSVD, and the charity organizations *Muslime Helfen* (Muslims Help) and *Islamic Relief*.[359] This widespread linkage of the IGD, as well as its role in the FIOE, suggest that the organization actually strives for a wider common understanding of the role of Islam among Muslims in Europe. But is the IGD's understanding compatible with the definition of Euro-Islam?

The activities of the IGD draw an inconclusive picture. On the one hand, until 2010, the IGD was actively involved in the DIK though the ZMD. On the other hand, in 2009, members of the IGD were accused of supporting terrorism.[360] Moreover, the IGD-affiliated youth organization MJD has been harshly criticized by the Verfassungsschutz. In a manual for instructors, the aim of the courses is defined as teaching the students to identify the "falsehood of Western governments, which support tyrannical Muslim leaders. […] Therefore, the students should feel a need to change the current political status quo (in the West and Muslim countries)."[361] Based on statements like this, it is no surprise that the Verfassungsschutz views allegedly Brotherhood-affiliated organizations, including the IGD, as pursuing objectives that are not in compliance with the German constitution.[362]

Official statements on the IGD's webpage, however, draw a different picture. In a press declaration on 11 January 2010, Samir Falah, the new president of the IGD, confirmed the IGD's commitment to a dialogue between all groups of society and the integration of Muslims into the "society of the majority."[363] In the Friday prayers, which are also published on the IGD webpage, clear commitments are made to German national laws and the rejection of tradition-based behaviors like arranged marriages.[364]

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[359] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 76.

[360] BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009*, 261.

[361] Ibid., 262.

[362] Verfassungsschutz des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, *Thema im Fokus: Die Ideologie der Muslimbruderschaft* (Düsseldorf: Innenministerium des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2006), 8.

[363] IGD, "IGD hat neuen Präsidenten gewählt," trans. Author (December 11, 2010), accessed December 01, 2010. http://igd-online.de/ueber-uns.html.

[364] IGD, "Freitagspredigt: Zwangsheirat ist mit dem Islam nicht vereinbar," (April 10, 2009), accessed December 01, 2010. http://igd-online.de/zwangsheirat.html.

Overall, the IGD seems to be an Islamist organization that will not actively contribute to the development of Euro-Islam. The rhetoric used by some IGD-affiliated organizations and the role individuals play in the organization, at least, put question marks behind the IGD's possible commitment to a "new" form of Islam. Moreover, the influence of the FIOE, which will be analyzed later, makes the IGD's role as a promoter of Euro-Islam questionable. Identity, as propagated by the IGD, seems to be a matter of an Islamist ideology.

b. *Islamic Centre Hamburg (Islamisches Zentrum Hamburg, IZH)*

In the past, the IZH was assumed to be a centre of Iranian, Islamist thought, openly sponsored by the Iranian government. Publications of the organization allegedly praised the achievements of the Iranian Revolution.[365] The IZH is still an organization with direct and open links to the Iranian government and is viewed, along with the Iranian embassy, as the most important official Iranian representative body in Germany. The imam heading the IZH has to be a recognized Muslim scholar, appointed by the Iranian supreme leader.

With the appointment of Ayatollah Ghaemmaghami in 2004, the IZH chose an almost reformist way. Ghaemmaghami was praised as a reformist and a promoter of an "Islam of reason."[366] In his book "European Islam or Islam in Europe?," Ghaemmaghami gives evidence of his reformist approach. In the preface of this book, Udo Steinbach—the director of the German Orient Institute—appreciates Ghaemmaghami as an Islamic scholar who seeks to reestablish trust as a basis for peaceful coexistence and a European form of Islam.[367] The IZH, for example, hosts Christian–Islamic seminars.[368] Under the umbrella of the IZH, a youth and a women's

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[365] Institut für Islamfragen, "Islamische Organisationen in Deutschland," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.islaminstitut.de/uploads/media/IslamischeOrganizationen.pdf.

[366] Ghaemmaghami, *Europäischer Islam*, 220–221.

[367] Ibid., 12.

[368] IZH, accessed April 30, 2011. http://www.izhamburg.com/.

organization can be found. With the youth organization "*Schöne Aussicht*" the IZH also addresses young Muslims on Islamic education and the definition of group identity.[369]

The current head of the IZH, Ayatollah Ramezani, is thought to have turned back to a less reformist path. Ramezani allegedly views his role as an official representative of the Iranian Republic as his first priority.[370] Therefore, it seems the support of Euro-Islam by the IZH has come to an end. Ghaemmaghami, however, until recently was head of the newly formed Islamic Society of Shi'a Communities in Germany (*Islamische Gemeinschaft der schiitischen Gemeinden in Deutschland e.V.*, IGS). The IGS has now become the legitimate representative umbrella organization of all Shi'a communities in Germany.[371] However, with Ghaemmaghami leaving and Ramezani becoming an influential person, it seems that this organization also follows the path of the IZH.

The role of the IZH under Ghaemmaghami shows that even an organization that is clearly controlled by a foreign government can play a key role in the promotion of Euro-Islam. It is speculation, but under Ghaemmaghami, it might have been possible to promote a new identity of Shi'a Muslims in Germany. Whether this chance has been missed has to be subject to future analysis.

This brief analysis shows the variety of positions represented by the member organizations of the ZMD. Thus, despite its supposed intent, the ZMD might face some hard times in achieving its objective of developing a special European form of Islam—at least, a Euro-Islam that is compatible with the definition in this thesis. The nature of the ZMD as an umbrella organization of totally different organizations seems to be ideal approach to Euro-Islam, especially if the intra-organizational discourse on the future role of Islam in Europe is embedded in a dialogue with the wider German society. With its decision to leave the DIK, the ZMD, unfortunately, has taken a decision that is less promising.

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[369] IZH, accessed April 30, 2011. http://www.izhamburg.com/.

[370] "Machtkampf an der Außenalster," TAZ, (September 10, 2010), accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.taz.de/1/nord/artikel/1/machtkampf-an-der aussenalster/.

[371] BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009*, 275.

5. The Islamic Council in Germany (*Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, IRD)

The IRD represents about 30 member organizations[372] with some 40,000 to 60,000 members. The largest organization of the IRD is the *Islamic Community Milli Görüs* (*Islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Görüs*, IGMG), which has between 30,000 and 57,000 members. Not surprisingly, the IRD is considered a *Milli Görüs*-dominated organization, and many of the other organizations represented by the IRD are thought to be heavily influenced by the IGMG.[373]

In public, the IRD follows the path of all major Muslim organizations in Germany, espousing a commitment to the German constitution, pluralism, and secularism. What the IRD emphasizes in its program is its commitment to protecting Islam against false accusations and discrediting. In the perception of the IRD, discrimination against Islam is the predominant attitude in Germany.[374]

The fact that the IGMG is the dominant organization in the IRD invites more insight into the aims and objectives of this organization.

a. Milli Görüs

Although Milli Görüs is not a direct offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, it can be considered closely linked to the ideology of the Brotherhood and, in Germany, has formed a quasi-alliance with the IGD. Milli Görüs was founded in the 1960s by the former Turkish prime minister Necmettin Erbakan. The movement's main message is one of "social justice" and strong Turkish identity, both linked to strict adherence to the vision of Islam as a comprehensive system.[375]

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[372] The number of member organizations is frequently changing.

[373] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 68.

[374] IRD, "Selbstdarstellung," accessed April 22, 2011. http://www.islamrat.de/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=45&Itemid=54 .

[375] Vidino, *The new Muslim Brotherhood*, 150.

In the understanding of Milli Görüs, a state based on democracy seems to have only a metaphorical meaning.[376] The Verfassungsschutz estimates that more than 300 mosques and local associations in Germany are controlled by Milli Görüs and considers the organization anti-democratic.[377] However, not everybody who visits an IGMG mosque sympathizes with the political goals of the organization, and imams of IGMG mosques often constructively engage in dialogue with the local non-Muslim community.[378] As will be shown later, activities of the IGMG are not limited to Turkey and Germany, and the perception of the IGMG in other countries differs from its perception in Germany.

Through a network of mosques and organizations the IGMG is able to exercise its influence on Muslims in Germany without becoming visible. Organizations like the Institute for International Pedagogy and Didactic (*Institut für Internationale Pädagogik und Didaktik*) and the Center for Islamic Women's Studies and Promotion of Women (*Zentrum für Islamische Frauenforschung und Frauenförderung*) claim to be independent. However, the family relationships of members of this organizations and members of the IGMG suggest that these organizations belong to the same umbrella organization.[379] Also most of the Islamic Federations are presumed to center around the IGMG.[380]

The IGMG follows a path similar to the IGD. This does not make it a promising candidate for the promotion of Euro-Islam. More important, the German branch of IGMG seems to promote an identity that is based on Islamist ideology. This, again, makes its role very similar to the IGD.

This analysis of Muslim organizations in Germany is but a small impression. The results as applied to the potential of promoting Euro-Islam are ambivalent, for different reasons. Analyzing a larger number of Muslim organizations

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[376] Milli Gazete, (July 13, 2009) in BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009*, 265.

[377] BMI, *Verfassungsschutzbericht 2009*, 264–265.

[378] Becker, "Der organisierte Islam," 69–70.

[379] Ibid., 68.

[380] Ibid., 69.

would not add much to answering the overall question of this thesis, but would only underline the high degree of diversity among Muslim organizations, such as the *Islamic Society of Shia Muslim Communities in Germany* or the *Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat*, the *Fettah Gülen Movement*, the *Ahmadiyya Muslim Jamaat* and *Jama'at al-Adl wal-Ishan*.

What is missing in Germany is an organization with significant outreach that could promote a new understanding of the role of Islam in Germany. The AABF looks like an ideal candidate, but its acceptance by the larger Muslim community in Germany seems to be limited. The question will be whether the landscape of Muslim organizations in Great Britain and the Netherlands will be as diverse, and its support for Euro-Islam as ambivalent, as in Germany.

B.   GREAT BRITAIN

In general, the landscape of Muslim organizations in Britain is as diverse and inconclusive as it is in Germany, making the development of a new, widely accepted Euro-Islam difficult. By contrast to Germany, Muslim organizations in the UK are mainly influenced by Muslims from Southeast Asia and the Middle East. Turkish organizations, like Milli Görüs and diyanet-affiliated organizations are active in the UK, but less influential. Moreover, "liberal" Muslim organizations are more influential in Britain than in Germany.[381] The increasing influence of liberal organizations occurred as the British government began to understand the differences among Islamist and Islamic organizations and consequently shifted policies.[382] Since 2005, the British government has distanced itself from Islamist groups like the MCB, and started to cooperate with non-Islamist groups. While this is good news for Euro-Islam, unfortunately, less promising observations can be made in Britain, too. The number of radical groups and those willing to use violence is significantly higher in the UK.[383] The role of Muslim

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[381] Angel Rabasa et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011), 129. The term "liberal," in this respect, means secular and open to Western values of democracy, pluralism, gender equality, etc.

[382] Ibid., 123.

[383] Isaac Kfir, "Islamic Radicalism in Britain," *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 6, no. 3&4 (Fall & Winter 2007): 100.

youth, in this respect, has been analyzed in Chapter III. But, there are additional differences from the situation in Germany. Islamist organizations have shown a higher degree of flexibility than their German counterparts and, in one case, even participated in national elections. Moreover, foreign policy plays a more important role in the goals of Muslim organizations in the UK. The overall influence on the development of Euro-Islam, however, is similar. Umbrella organizations, led by older-generation Muslims, dominate the landscape of Muslim organizations, promoting an understanding of Islam that varies from conservatism to Islamism.

As in Germany, most of the time umbrella organizations have played the dominant role in dialogue with the state. Thus, this analysis will focus on these umbrella organizations as well as on some UK-wide organizations. The most relevant of these are the MCB, the BMF and the SMC. Analogous to the assessment of German Muslim organizations, analysis of these umbrella organizations will serve as a starting point with analysis of their member organizations if necessary. Additionally, some of the liberal Muslim organizations that recently have come more influential will be analyzed.

The organization of Muslims in the UK started in the 1960s. As in Germany, mosques have been the most important institutions. Thus, organization at that time evolved mainly locally, around ethnic groups, and was often intended to provide practical help and support in terms of housing, employment, immigration, or welfare. Leaders of these local communities were largely self-appointed, with limited legitimacy in reflecting the real needs and interests of local Muslim communities. Thus, their role in these communities was a matter of influence rather than actual power.[384]

With the Muslim presence in Britain becoming permanent, the government started supporting un-elected Muslim bodies such as councils of mosques and, thereby, provided these groups with some form of legitimacy through consultation and the channeling of resources.[385] In 1970, the Union of Muslim Organizations of the UK and Eire (UMO) emerged as the first umbrella organization of Muslims on the national level,

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[384] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 106–107.

[385] McLoughlin, "From Race to Faith Relations," 130–131.

but essentially remained irrelevant. Subsequently, the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) as a more moderate, and the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain as a more confrontational, organization took up the objective of establishing a representation of Muslims in Britain on the national level.[386] The initial objective of the UKACIA, established in 1988, was to coordinate a response to the publication of Salmon Rushdie's "Satanic Verses." The members of this committee were then supported by the government in establishing a more representative body of Muslims in Britain. This led to the foundation of the MCB in 1997. In the period immediately following the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the government expected the MCB to manage British Muslim anger at the "war on terror," but instead the MCB eventually opposed British foreign policy. As a result, the government turned to the new BMF and SMC because "they were regarded as less openly critical of government for foreign policy."[387]

1.   The Muslim Council of Britain

Since its establishment in 1997, the MCB emerged as the dominant Muslim organization in response to the government's demand for a single point of contact among Muslims in the UK.[388] With the establishment of the MCB, for the first time, a large number of Muslims were represented by an umbrella organization covering a variety of different Muslim strains, but mainly *Deobandi* and *Jama'at-I Islami* -related organizations, including the UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), the Islamic Foundation (IF), Young Muslims UK (YMUK) and the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB).[389] The leadership has traditionally been dominated by individuals from *Mawdudist* networks.[390]

However, the MCB cannot be regarded as an organization representing all Muslims in Britain. Even more important, its representative function is rather limited.

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[386] McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 548.

[387] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 108–110.

[388] David Rich, "The very Model of a British Muslim Brotherhood," in *The Muslim Brotherhood: The Organization and Policies of a Global Islamist Movement*, ed. Barry Rubin (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 122.

[389] McLoughlin, "From Race to Faith Relations," 135–136.

[390] Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood*, 122.

According to recent surveys, less than 10% of Muslims in Britain feel represented by the MCB.[391] This puts the MCB in position similar to Muslim umbrella organizations in Germany. Other Muslim organizations also frequently criticized the MCB's tendency to dominate the landscape of Muslim organizations in Britain and to utilize this dominance for its organizational interests, rather than the interests of Muslims in Britain.[392] Despite this criticism, the support of the MCB—which comprises approximately 500 local, regional and national Muslim organizations—increased on the national level.[393] McLoughlin argues that it was the MCB that created "a space for multiethnic, cross-sectarian alliances which prioritized an overarching Muslim politics of identity."[394]

The initial objectives of the MCB were a more enlightened appreciation of Islam and Muslims in the wider society and better community relations.[395] The main aim and objective of the MCB, as defined in the organization's constitution,[396] are to "promote cooperation, consensus, and unity on Muslim affairs in the UK." The MCB views itself as a nonsectarian body that bases its decisions and policies on consensus and the largest practicable measure of common agreement."[397] This, however, sounds contradictory and offers at least some room for speculation whether specific, affiliated, member organizations can actually dominate the MCB. One of the main points of interest for the MCB is the opportunity for Islam to conform to education in the UK. Stopping swimming lessons at school, determining appropriate school uniforms for girls, and the

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[391] Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood*,127.

[392] McLoughlin, "From Race to Faith Relations," 139–140.

[393] McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 549.

[394] McLoughlin, "From Race to Faith Relations," 137.

[395] Ibid., 134.

[396] The Muslim Council of Britain, *Constitution*, (April 28, 2002), 7, accessed May 06, 2011. http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/MCBCON2002.pdf.

[397] The Muslim Council of Britain, *Constitution*, (April 28, 2002), 6, accessed May 06, 2011. http://www.mcb.org.uk/downloads/MCBCON2002.pdf.

suspension of vaccination programs for children repeatedly were on the agenda of the MCB.[398] Furthermore, the MCB seeks to counter a perceived discrimination against Islam and Muslims, especially by the media.[399]

After 9/11, however, the MCB, which had become the preferred partner for the British government, failed in meeting the expectation that it would back the "war on terror." The British government assumed that it was more likely to reach violent Islamists through nonviolent Islamist organizations that enjoyed some form of respect among potential terrorists.[400] The Islamist heritage of some MCB activists, however, added to growing suspicion among government officials. In 2009, the government suspended its formal relations with the MCB after senior members of the MCB endorsed attacks on foreign troops intercepting arms destined for Gaza.[401]

Although Muslim organizations in Germany frequently criticize Israel, the role of foreign policy is much more visible in the policies and objectives of Muslim organizations in Britain. In 2006, the British government was repeatedly criticized by the MCB for its foreign policy, which allegedly would contribute to the radicalization of Muslims in Britain and abroad.[402] While this criticism cannot be totally rejected, it also shows that tensions exist between the British government and the MCB. The reaction by the MCB on Prime Minister Cameron's recent speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2011, allegedly focusing on security rather than on real integration, gives further evidence for this tension.[403]

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[398] Ulfkotte, *S.O.S. Abendland*, 79.

[399] Kfir, "Islamic Radicalism in Britain," 102.

[400] Rabasa et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 128.

[401] McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 549.

[402] Muhammad Abdul Bari, "I yearn for a foreign policy of which we can be proud," The Guardian, (August 17, 2006), accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.mcb.org.uk/library/article_17-08-06.php; Inayat Bunglawala, "It's undeniable: British Foreign Policy is Endangering All of Us," The Times (August 12, 2006), accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.mcb.org.uk/library/article_18-08-06.php.

[403] MCB, "Shared National Identity Should Not Be Seen Through the Lens of Security – MCB Responds to Prime Minister's Munich Speech," (Feb 05, 2011), accessed May 06, 2011. http://www.mcb.org.uk/media/presstext.php?ann_id=43.

Thus, besides strong criticism from British foreign policymakers, there are almost no indications concerning the MCB's view of Euro-Islam—which requires a closer look at some of its affiliated organizations.

a. The Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) and the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB)

The ISB was founded in 1990. It was the first Islamist organization in the UK that was heavily influenced by Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim Brother activists.[404] The similarity in the name to the IGD in Germany is just one indicator of the common roots both organizations share and their linkage on the European level. Kemal el-Helbawy, a former member of the *Central Guidance Bureau* of Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood, was the first leader of the ISB. He understood the opportunities available to Islamists in the open societies of the West. After Helbawy clashed with the Muslim Brotherhood's leadership in Egypt in 1997 he, together with other Brothers in Britain, founded the MAB, which has come to be regarded as the British branch of the Brotherhood.[405]

The ISB, nevertheless, is still in existence with fourteen branches all over the UK and its own youth wing, the "Young Muslims." On its home page[406] the ISB expresses a clear commitment to values that are in line with the definition of Euro-Islam: democracy, the rejection of violence, equality of men and women, no polygamy or forced marriage, adherence to the British legal system, and a notion of shari'a that rejects tradition-based punishment. Over time, the ISB has successfully developed a number of innovative projects to try to engage both Muslims and others. These include the *Islamic Scouts of Britain* and *Islam Awareness Week*.[407] With these activities and the organization "The Young Muslims," the ISB has some valuable tools to reach young Muslims. Organizations and projects like this can be of high importance in the

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[404] Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 120.

[405] Ibid. 121.

[406] ISB, "Islamic Society of Britain – Statements," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.isb.org.uk/pages06/statements.asp#1 .

[407] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain,* 103.

development of young Muslims' identity as European or British citizens. Thus, approaches as chosen by the ISB could be utilized. Its understanding of Islam, by contrast, follows a more conservative path and it might be unenthusiastic about the establishment of a more liberal form of Islam.

After its split from the ISB, the MAB became the more publicly visible organization. There are currently about eleven MAB branches around the UK. The MAB's aim is to "project and convey the message of Islam in its pure and unblemished form."[408] Although this does not necessarily contradict the elements of Euro-Islam, such as democracy, pluralism etc., it is a clear indicator that the MAB does not seek to develop a new form of Euro-Islam that addresses the life of Muslims in a secular, European context.

After 9/11 and the consequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, the MAB was able to extend its influence on the MCB.[409] While the MCB wanted to keep its good relationship with the British government, the MAB seized the initiative, opposing the war in Afghanistan and taking the lead in organizing Muslim opposition to Israel. Subsequently, however, they took the MCB with them. The first time the MAB attracted public interest was in 2002, when it organized a large pro-Palestinian rally in London.[410] In 2003 they entered a kind of partnership with the leftist "Stop the War Coalition," a new organization formed to oppose the war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite the differences of emphasis, anti-Zionism and opposition to Western foreign policy were the founding principles of the leftist–Islamist alliance.[411] MAB leaders openly acknowledged the ideological differences between the two parties but referred to the "greater objectives" to be achieved.[412]

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[408] MAB, accessed October 25, 2010. http://www.mabonline.net.

[409] Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 122.

[410] Michael Whine, "The Advance of the Muslim Brotherhood in the UK," in *Current Trends in Islamist Theology Vol. 2*, ed. Hillel Fradkin, Hussain Haqqani, and Eric Brown (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2005), 35.

[411] Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 122–123.

[412] Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood*, 142.

The MAB's role as the Muslim organizer of anti-war demonstrations pushed it into a leading position in the Muslim community in Britain without enlarging its grassroots base. Although the MAB's position with regard to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq reflected that of many Muslims, by 2003 the MAB still counted only about 1,000 members.[413]

Over time, the MAB shifted to a more and more anti-Western, anti-Israeli, anti-Semitic outlook.[414] The MAB, for example, promoted support for Palestinian suicide bombings, and its leadership repeatedly echoed the views of al-Qaradawi that Israeli civilians are different from the civilians of other countries because all Israelis are past, current, or future soldiers; and that suicide bombings in Israel should not, therefore, be thought of as terrorism.[415] While opposition to the foreign policy of Great Britain in general cannot be taken as evidence of a rejection of Western values, the justification of suicide bombings against Israeli civilian targets cannot be accepted by any European political leader and strongly rejects the spirit of Euro-Islam. Therefore, it is not the MAB's opposition to Israel that matters, but its justification of any means that promise success.

Despite these anti-governmental and anti-Israeli positions and activities, the MAB became increasingly involved in cooperation with the government. This was the result of a change in governmental policies in Britain to shift from dealing with the MCB as a kind of monopoly to dealing with a wider range of Muslim organizations.[416] In December 2005, for example, the MAB was drawn into efforts to secure the release of a British hostage in Iraq.[417] Also, the police used the MAB in its efforts to take control of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, which, under the leadership of al-Masri, supported several convicted and suspected terrorists. The Muslim Contact Unit of

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[413] Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 122. Vidino, in contrast, only talks about 400 members; Vidino, *The New Muslim Brotherhood*, 141.

[414] Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 122.

[415] "How to deal with Britain's Muslim Extremist? An interview with Kamal Helbawy," Spotlight on Terror, no. 7 (August 5, 2005) in Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 124.

[416] Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 131.

[417] Ibid., 127.

the Metropolitan Police in London valued this cooperation and claimed that it had helped to reduce the threat of terrorist recruitment. In return, the MAB derived a level of acceptance and recognition from the cooperation with the police.[418]

Due to divergent opinions about the degree to which the organization should engage in high-profile political activities, by February 2006 the British Muslim Initiative separated from the MAB to maintain the political activities of the anti-war campaigns. Other initiatives that sprang from the MAB were the Cordoba Foundation and Islamicpeace.org.uk, which seeks to improve perceptions of Islam among the general public. A theme that still unites these organizations is their opposition to current Western policies and military operations in Muslim countries.[419] Although the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are on the agenda of Muslim organizations in Germany, they play a less prominent role than they play in the UK.

The fact that former leaders of the MAB like el-Helbawy do not deny their membership in the Muslim Brotherhood leaves no doubt that the MAB represents a British branch.[420] To analyze whether the MAB's aims and objectives are in line with Euro-Islam, however, is more complicated. A view of the organization's webpage provides a rather vague definition of its goals and objectives.[421] Here, the MAB states that it is "dedicated to serving society through promoting Islam in its spiritual teachings, ideological and civilizing concepts, and moral and human values." The overarching objective, thereby, is "to achieve the positive integration of Muslims in the wider British society." Most important issues to tackle are drug addiction, rising crime, failure in education, the spread of racism, and Islamophobia. Moreover, the MAB states, it wants to encourage dialogue and cooperation between religions. This sounds promising.

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[418] Rich, "The British Muslim Brotherhood," 130.

[419] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 75–77.

[420] Mahan Abedin, "How to deal with Britain's Muslim Extremist? An interview with Kamal Helbawy," Spotlight on Terror 3, no. 7 (August 5, 2005), accessed December 01, 2010. http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=539.

[421] MAB, "The Threat from "Radical Islam": Fact and Fiction," (September 06, 2010), accessed December 01, 2010. http://mabonline.net/?p=3478.

On the other hand, certain statements by MAB officials raise doubts about the MAB's objectives. In this respect, the positions of Sheik al Qaradawi are of high importance. The MAB warmly welcomes and supports the teachings and fatwas of al Qaradawi.[422] This, in general, does not sound threatening, taking al Qaradawi's presumably moderate stance into account. In an article on the MAB's webpage, al Qaradawi praises democracy as "the simplest and proper way to achieve the aims of a noble life." At the same time, he clearly states that democracy may be only adopted if it benefits Muslims' purpose and only as long as it does not contradict clear Islamic edicts and the rules of shari'a. His statement that "we do not relinquish or compromise what is ordained or compulsory,"[423] moreover, cannot be considered a full-hearted commitment to the concept of Western democracy and the principle of one law for all. His position on Israel has already been mentioned above.

In summary, this analysis shows that the MAB is not a radical Islamist organization trying to overthrow the current system. Much more, the MAB has proven to be a valuable partner for state officials when it comes to countering recruitment of terrorists or to de-radicalizing Muslims in Britain. Also the MAB's engagement in the 2004 and 2005 elections as partners in the Islamist-leftist formation RESPECT show the flexibility the MAB shows when it serves its interests.[424] However, the MAB pursues a very conservative understanding of Islam, if not to say an Islamist understanding. The prominent role of al Qaradawi and the MAB's membership in the FIOE provide some evidence for the organization's Islamist nature. Therefore, at least, some doubts might be justified as to whether the MAB might be a reliable partner in the promotion of Euro-Islam, and the British government's decision to choose other partners among Muslim organizations seems reasonable.

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[422] Robert S. Leiken and Steven Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 2 (March/ April 2007): 119.

[423] Yusuf al Qaradawi, "Understanding Politics in Islam – Fiqh al Siyasah," (April 26, 2010), accessed December 01, 2010. http://www.mabonline.net/?p=2658.

[424] Vidino, *The new Muslim Brotherhood*, 143.

b.   The UK Islamic Mission (UKIM)

While the UKIM was praised for its valuable multicultural activities by Tony Blair when he was prime minister, recent reports have called it an organization that supports the ideas of the Afghan Taliban and calls for armed jihad.[425] The UKIM, founded in 1962, has over forty branches around Britain. Most of these branches administer a mosque, usually staffed by imams recruited from overseas. The UKIM works in the fields of education and welfare. Its educational work includes seminars, exhibitions, and courses about Islam for young people and community groups.[426]

The UKIM views itself as an ideological movement with the aim of reviving Islam "in its comprehensive form," meaning that all dimensions of human life must be guided by appealing to Islam. The Qur'an offers the required guidance. In its publications, the UKIM proclaims a rather missionary approach. Statements like "developing an outreach to the society at large in order to share Islam," and "taking a lead in changing individuals and society with all its dimensions" are just two examples that suggest the missionary motivation of the UKIM, although it denies such intentions.[427]

Even if a peaceful struggle over ideas is at the core of modern democracies, the statements by the UKIM do not allow one to conclude that the UKIM can become a promoter of Euro-Islam. Much more, it seems, the UKIM's understanding of Euro-Islam is one of Islamization, although through ideas and discussion.

c.   The Islamic Sharia Council (ISC)

The organizations that have been analyzed so far have to be viewed as interest groups that represent the interests and objectives of their constituencies. The role of the ISC is different. The ISC considers itself a stabilizing influence within the UK

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[425] CNN.com, World, http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/01/17/warwithin.overview/index.html in Ulfkotte, *SOS Abendland*, 47.

[426] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 101.

[427] UKIM, accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.ukim.org.

Muslim community, an institution that is essential for the survival of Muslim communities.[428] The ISC claims to be accepted by the UK Muslim community as an authoritative body, issuing fatwas, especially in the field of family law, but also more general aspects of life. The council is composed of Sunni Muslim scholars, often members of MCB affiliated organizations.[429]

If the claim of the ISH to be an accepted and its role as an authoritative institution among Muslims in Britain is correct, the ISH could play a crucial role in the promotion of Euro-Islam. If the ISH interprets Islamic law in the temporal context of modern Europe, it could convince Muslims of the compatibility of Islam and modern, secular, European societies and contribute thereby to the development of Euro-Islam. A look at the ISH's fatwas, unfortunately, is rather disappointing. Fatwas on homosexuality,[430] Muslim women who want to convert and marry a Christian,[431] or the consequences of education in co-educational curricula[432] express a worldview dominated by a hardline interpretation of Islam rather than an enlightened, modern one. In these fatwas, homosexuality is condemned as diabolical, women working in male-dominated jobs are assessed as unlawful, and Muslims, in general, are forced to adhere to Western rules. An institution promoting such an understanding of Islam has to be regarded an obstacle for Euro-Islam.

This is only a small extract of the MCB-affiliated organizations. The nature of member organizations varies widely and includes nationwide as well as more regional organizations. Moreover the MCB includes Sunni, as well as Shi'a organizations. The analysis of the Sunni organizations, however, has shown a rather

[428] ISC, "About us," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.islamic-sharia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&ltemid=28.

[429] ISC, "Who we represent," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.islamic-sharia.org/about-us/about-us-3.html.

[430] ISC, "Advice for Gays & Lesbians," accessed May 03, 2011. http://www.islamic-sharia.org/general/advice-for-gays-lesbians-2.html.

[431] ISC, "Want to leave Islam and marry a Christian," accessed May 03, 2011. http://www.islamic-sharia.org/general/want-to-leave-islam-and-marry-a-christian-2.html.

[432] ISC, "Daughter not wishing to become a dentist because it involves free mixing," accessed May 06, 2011. http://www.islamic-sharia.org/general/daughter-not-wishing-to-become-a-dentist-because-it-involves-free-m-3.html.

Islamist interpretation prevailing among these groups. Moreover, MSB affiliated Shia'a organizations frequently complain about anti-Shia resentments of the MCB leadership.[433] This clearly violates the acceptance of pluralism as an essential element of Euro-Islam. Therefore, overall, the MCB does not seem to be a valuable partner in promoting Euro-Islam.

However, as a study by the RAND Corporation points out, "Britain is also home to moderate Muslim organizations […] supportive of liberal Western values and institutions."[434] This, again, is good news for the promotion of Euro-Islam. In contrary to the organizations described above, these moderate or even liberal organizations are often not representative bodies, but think tanks that seek to advise British government organizations and initiate discussion among Muslim intellectuals. Their influence on the wider Muslim community in the UK, currently, is limited, but seeming to grow.

2. The Progressive British Muslims (PBM)

The PBM, founded in 2005, is supposed to be the most liberal group among Muslim organizations in Britain. The group aims at combating violent extremism, promoting Muslim integration, and advancing liberal values, such as gender equality, freedom of speech, respect for all faiths, human rights, and democracy.[435] Thus, the PBM seems to be a potential candidate for promoting Euro-Islam.

The organization evolved from a feeling of misrepresentation by then-existing Muslim organizations. The PBM views itself not as a representative body, but as a body whose members' views reflect those of a significant number of Muslims in Britain.[436]

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[433] "British Shia Organisations Attack the MCB for Sectarianism," The Spittoon (July 02, 2010), accessed May 03, 2011. http://www.spittoon.org/archives/6965.

[434] Rabasa et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 129.

[435] Ibid., 129–130.

[436] Progressive British Muslims, "About us," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.pbm.org.uk/about.htm.

The members of the PBM consider themselves to be "British, integrated into mainstream society, and to have a cultural identity as Muslims." The PBM does not claim to have any religious scholarship and declines to judge others.[437]

The PBM stands for a variety of rather new Muslim groups that feel unrepresented by organizations like the MCB and seek to channel a liberal understanding of Islam to the British public. These organizations could play a very supportive role in the development of Euro-Islam. The members of these organizations could lead the respective development process by example: they are integrated, successful in business, feel British, respect democracy and pluralism, and still embrace a Muslim identity. Whether the message of these groups is received and understood by the broader Muslim community in Britain is hard to assess. A lack of interest by the media in organizations like the PBM and the limited access that members of the PBM have to mosques limits, to a certain extent, the effectiveness of PBM ideas and messages. Nevertheless, there are clear indications that liberal Muslims in Britain also organize.

3.   The Sufi Muslim Council (SMC)

The SMC is another example of a new Muslim organization resulting from disappointment with established organizations. In 2006, the SMC was launched with government support to challenge the dominance of the MCB among British Muslim organizations. [438] The organization strives to promote an interpretation of traditional Islamic thought in the context of contemporary Britain.[439] It claims to provide a voice for the 80% of UK Muslims who are Sufis[440] and sees itself as a representative of the silent majority of moderate Muslims in Britain.

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[437] Progresse British Muslims, "Launch of Progressive British Muslim Group," (November 15, 2005), accessed April 23, 2011. http://www.pbm.org.uk/press/20051115.htm .

[438] McLoughlin and Abbas, "United Kingdom," 550.

[439] Rabasa et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 130.

[440] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 9.

From its very beginning, the SMC was criticized by the MCB as unrepresentative and divisive.[441] Members of the SMC rejected the MCB critique and pointed to the SMC's partnership with the BMF as evidence for the importance of the SMC. The BMF was established a year earlier to give Barelwi Muslims a voice. Recently, the organization has been mainly inactive in public, and its website shows no evidence of new activities, too.

As an organization in the tradition of Sufi thought, the SMC can be regarded as largely apolitical.[442] Whether the SMC would support an interpretation of Islam as defined in the concept of Euro-Islam is hard to assess. By contrast with organizations like PBM, the SMC and BMF have control over mosques, which provides them with an opportunity to reach a larger group of Muslims. Despite its apolitical nature, the SMC seems to stick to the roots of its school of thought, which would leave only limited space to engage in a discourse on a Euro-Islam that would accommodate the majority of Muslims, not only in Britain, but also in Europe.

This analysis of Muslim organizations has proven the diversity of Muslim organizations that is just a reflection of Muslims living in the UK. This is similar to the situation in Germany. What makes the UK different is that Muslims who reject the notion of Islam as represented by the established organizations (MCB, MAB, etc.) have come to the forefront, seeking to inform Muslims, as well as others, and to promote integration into the self-perception of British Muslims. In addition to organizations like the BPM, Islamic think tanks—for example the Quilliam Foundation (QF)—have been established. QF not only invests in research, but also in media activities, training of government personnel, community events, and outreach activities at universities and schools.[443] In this role, QF and alike have replaced the MCB and MAB as the primary partner in cooperation with government officials and also become credible partners for young Muslims. Even the MCB has meanwhile recognized that it has to engage in

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[441] "Criticism for new Muslim organization," Guardian.co.uk (July 19, 2006), accessed April 02, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/jul/19/immigrationpolicy.religion.

[442] "Criticism for new Muslim organization," Guardian.co.uk (July 19, 2006), accessed April 02, 2011. http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2006/jul/19/immigrationpolicy.religion.

[443] Rabasa et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 131–133.

dialogue with organizations like the QF to avoid becoming irrelevant.[444] This fear of the MCB might not be without reason, taking into account that especially young Muslims think that the MCB is dominated by older men who cannot speak for the young.[445]

All this gives hope for a new form of Islam developing in Great Britain. Unfortunately, there are still organizations at work with contradicting intentions. Also individuals, like Anjem Choudary, repeatedly seek to publicly promote their radical interpretation of Islam.[446]

C.   THE NETHERLANDS

The landscape of Muslim organizations in the Netherlands is similar to that in Germany and Britain. Thus, the analysis of Muslim organizations in the Netherlands will focus on the major differences. This is not to undervalue the importance of Muslim organizations in the development of Euro-Islam. However, due to the fact that Turkish Muslims are the majority Muslim group in the Netherlands, the structure of Muslim organizations—as in Germany—can be observed. The strong influence of the Turkish and Moroccan government, a definition of identity along national and ethnic lines, and a certain degree of separation among the organizations are characteristics of the landscape of Muslim organizations that have already been observed in the countries analyzed above. In general, these characteristics have a rather hindering influence on the development of Euro-Islam.

What makes the Netherlands different is the degree of recognition and responsibility the Dutch government has offered to leading umbrella organizations. Giving these organizations a more prominent status and specific rights clearly makes these organizations feel superior to other groups. This can be an important step in

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[444] Rabasa et al., *Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists*, 133.

[445] Munira Mirza and Abi Senthilkumaran, *Living Apart Together: British Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism* (London: Policy Exchange, 2007), 80.

[446] "Mixed Muslim Reaction to Osama Bin Laden's death," BBC Mobile (May 03, 2011), accessed May 07, 2011. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-13275882.

leveraging the identification Muslims have with their country of residence, and can also be a valuable way to leverage the development of the new form of Muslim identity that is so essential to establish Euro-Islam.

Traditionally, organizations have played an important role in Dutch society. A widespread network of nongovernmental organizations serves as a layer between government and citizens. These organizations engage in consultation and cooperation with the government and, thereby, have become powerful institutions. This is a leftover of the former system of pillarization. When it comes to religious, non-Christian organizations, however, Dutch authorities have been reluctant to grant a role in such negotiations, because this would presumably infringe upon the separation of Church and State.[447]

The mosque is the focal point of Muslim communities in the Netherlands, and mosques are still attended along ethnic lines, although the number of nonethnic mosques is growing.[448] About 500 mosques can be found in the Netherlands. Approximately half of them are Turkish influenced and another 100 to 150 can be called Moroccan dominated.[449] A hundred and forty of the Turkish mosques are controlled by the diyanet, 35 by Milli Görüs and 38 by Suleymancis. The 25 Surinamese mosques are controlled by the World Islamic Mission, which is located in Great Britain but of less influence than the organizations analyzed before.[450]

Initially Muslims of different nationalities molded together, but later cooperation among Muslim evolved mainly among national entities. This was mainly a consequence of language barriers, but also of identity and loyalty, which, as pointed out in Chapter III, was mainly based on nationality and ethnicity. Until recently, the desire to form nationwide organizations as representative bodies in the dialogue with the Dutch government was hindered by national, ideological, ethnic differences.

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[447] Sunier, "Islam in the Netherlands," 128.

[448] Sunier et al., *Diyanet*, 123.

[449] Sunier, "Islam in the Netherlands," 124.

[450] De Koning, "Netherlands," 374.

As in Germany and Great Britain, there is no single representative Muslim body in the Netherlands, despite strong Muslim and Dutch attempts.[451] Currently, the Muslim Contact Organ Muslims and Government (*Contact Orgaan Moslims Overheid*, CMO) and the Contact Group Islam (*Contactgroep Islam*, CGI) function as representative bodies and take part in regular meetings with the Dutch Ministry of Housing, Neighborhoods and Integration, which has recognized both organizations as official contact platforms.[452] As will be laid out later, these organizations have also been granted official status by other ministries, which makes the legal status of the CMO and CGI superior to other Muslim organizations, not only in the Netherlands, but also in Germany and the UK. However, these organizations share a lack of wide acceptance and credibility among young Muslims with their counterparts in Germany and the UK. First, they are regarded as cliques of first-generation men, out of touch with youth. Second, they are accused of being too compliant with the Dutch government and anti-Islamic politicians.[453]

The specific status the CMO and CGI enjoy, however, make them a valid starting point for an analysis of the role that Dutch Muslim organizations can play in the promotion of Euro-Islam.

1.   Contact Organ Muslims and Government

The CMO represents five Turkish, a Moroccan, a Surinamese and a Shi'a organization. The Turkish organizations are the Islamic Foundation Netherlands (*Islamitische Stichting Nederland*, ISN) the Turkish Islamic Cultural Foundation (*Stichting Turks Islamitische Culturele Federatie*, STICF), two sections of Milli Görüs affiliated organizations and the Foundation of Islamic Centre the Netherlands (*Stichting Islamitisch Centrum Netherlands*, SICN). Also Surinami Muslims are represented through the World Islamic Mission (WIM). The CMO claims to represent 500,000 Muslims and 369 mainly Sunni mosques.[454]

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[451] De Koning, "Netherlands," 370.

[452] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 39.

[453] De Koning, "Netherlands," 371–372.

[454] Ibid.*,* 371.

In 2007 and 2008, the CMO gained additional importance after the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of Defense temporarily appointed the CMO as a so-called missionary organization (*zendende instantie)*, which has the right to provide spiritual counselors for the justice department and the military.[455] In March 2011, the Ministry of Security and Justice granted the CMO a permanent status as zendende instantie.[456] This special status seems to make the CMO also a promising candidate for the promotion of Euro-Islam. However, as the analysis of umbrella organizations in Germany and Great Britain has shown, the affiliated member organizations often have an agenda that does not keep up with the promises the parent organization makes. Therefore, some of the CMO affiliated organizations have to be analyzed.

a.   The Islamic Foundation Netherlands (Islamitische Stichting Nederland, ISN)

With more than 140 mosques and founded in 1982, the ISN is the largest Muslim organization in the Netherlands. This organization, like the DITIB in Germany, is linked to the Turkish diyanet. As in Germany, this makes the organization, for many, an extended arm of the Turkish government.[457] But, the activities of the organization are manifold, ranging from issuing fatwas to the arrangement of sports and youth activities.[458] Like his counterpart in Germany, the president of the ISN is associated with the Turkish embassy. He holds the position for a maximum of four years.[459] Comparable to the DITIB, the staff and imams of the ISN are Turkish civil servants.

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[455] CMO, "Zendende Instantie," accessed May 02, 2011. http://www.cmoweb.nl.

[456] Ministry of Security and Justice, "Muslims and the Government Liaison Committee (CMO) Officially Recognized," (March 25, 2011), accessed May 3, 2011. http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/venj/documenten-en-publicaties/persberichten/2011/03/25/erkenning-contactorgaan-moslims-en-overheid-cmo.html.

[457] Claude DeWitt, "Islamitische Stichting Nederland en de lange Arm van Ankara," Artikel7.nu (August 06, 2010), accessed April 30, 2011. http://www.artikel7.nu/?p=26169.

[458] Sunier et al., *Diyanet,* 7, 59.

[459] Ibid., 58.

Due to its governmental character, the ISN has a special relationship with other Turkish-Islamic organizations. Besides the STICF—an organization with close ties to the ISN—the relationship between these organizations in the Netherlands is less tense than in Germany. On certain occasions the ISN cooperated with the Alevi organization *HAK-DER*, but kept this kind of activity in low profile because of the situation Alevi face in Turkey and the position of the Turkish government.[460]

Overall, however, an analysis of the ISN's possible role in the promotion of Euro-Islam has to come to the same result as for the DITIB in Germany. The control by the Turkish governments is most likely a guarantee against radical Islamist trends, but it is also an obstacle to establishing Euro-Islam.

b.   *The Foundation of the Turkish Islamic Cultural Federation (Stichting Turks-Islamitische Culturele Federatie, STICF)*

The STICF was founded in 1979. Originally, the ISN and STICF sought to operate under a division of labor, although the STICF has no formal relationship with the Turkish state. While the ISN was supposed to be responsible for theological issues, the STICF would organize cultural and social events at the grassroots level. The STICF shares mosques with the ISN as a consequence of the division of labor. The ISN manages the facility and runs the religious services. The STICF organizes community activities.[461] This relationship between the ISN and the STICF also limited the activities of the STICF on the national level, which is more or less the sole arena of the ISN.[462] A report for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs even argues that the STICF "has gradually been brought under the control of the ISN."[463] Therefore, its role in the development of Euro-Islam is determined by the ISN.

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[460] Sunier et al., *Diyanet,* 127.

[461] Ibid., 61.

[462] Ibid., 62.

[463] Ibid., 63.

c.   *Milli Görüs*

Outside the scope of diyanet-dominated Turkish Muslim organizations, Milli Görüs has become the major organization in the Netherlands. The Dutch Milli Görüs is part of a European network controlled from the headquarters in Cologne. In the Netherlands, Milli Görüs is divided into a northern part (*Milli Görüs [Noord] Nederland*) and a southern part (*Nederlandse Islamitische Federatie*). Especially the northern group has chosen an approach of dialogue and pluralism and intensively engaged in discussion over the role of Islam in the Netherlands. Thus, the Dutch branch of Milli Görüs is, in general, thought to be more moderate than its German counterpart, and some argue that nowadays, modernist tendencies can be observed within Milli Görüs.[464]

Which role Milli Görüs will finally take in the development of Euro-Islam is hard to assess. Currently, it seems that it has chosen a path consistent with the ideal of Euro-Islam. However, the ideas and objectives of the Milli Görüs headquarters may still prevail. The approach of the Dutch government, to grant the Christian churches and Muslim organizations equal rights, could ensure that Milli Görüs in the Netherlands will follow its current path.

d.   *The Union of Moroccan Mosque Organizations in the Netherlands*

The Union of Moroccan Mosques Organizations in the Netherlands (*Unie van Marokkaanse Organisaties Nederland*, UMMON) is the largest organization of Moroccan Muslims in the Netherlands and also a member organization of the CMO. The UMMON was founded in 1978. Its initial objectives included the uniformity of the time of Ramadan, the establishment of abattoirs under Islamic law, and the creation of Muslim cemeteries, and its main objective was to build new mosques. Today it is

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[464] Anja van Heelsum, Meindert Fennema and Jean Tillie, *Moslim in Nederland: Islamitische Organisaties in Nederland. Een onderzoek in opdracht van de minister voor Vreemelingenzaaken en Integratie* (Den Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 2004), 10.

responsible for more than a hundred mosques.[465] The UMMON is supposed to represent the "official Moroccan Islam."[466] This position of the UMMON has provoked the establishment of opposing organizations. With the inauguration of King Mohammed VI in 1999 and changes in the political situation in Morocco, criticism of the UMMON by other Morroccan organizations, moreover, vanished.[467] The education of imams at UMMON mosques has often been subject to criticism. Turkish organizations criticize the low level of education of imams in Moroccan mosques and in the Netherlands in general.[468] Here, it is important to note that these imams, unlike the imams in the mosques of the ISN, are not provided by a Moroccan governmental organization. Imams in UMMON mosques are often recruited through informal networks. Some are even educated in the institutes of other Muslim organizations, for example the WIM.[469]

The role of the UMMON in the development of Euro-Islam is an interesting subject for future research. While the UMMON, so far, has promoted the preservation of the national identity of Moroccans in the Netherlands, the current changes in the Middle East might change Middle-Eastern governments' outreach to expatriates and immigrants.

2.   Contact Group Islam

Contact Group Islam (CGI) has evolved as a matter of protest against the exclusion of Shi'a in the CMO. The CGI consists of Shi'a, Sunni, Ahmadiyya and Alevi organizations, as well as a Turkish umbrella organization.[470] When the CGI was formed in 2004, it criticized the CMO for being intolerant and unwilling to accept liberal trends

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[465] Cherribi, *Dutch Islam*, 72.

[466] Heelsum, Fennema and Tillie, *Moslim in Nederland*, 13.

[467] Ibid., 14.

[468] Kerem Öktem, "How Turks in the Netherlands see Moroccans," Gateways to Radicalisation (June 30, 2010), accessed May 01, 2011. http://www.keremoktem.com/papers/REPORT-NL-WEB.pdf.

[469] Adviescommissie Imamopleidingen, "Imams in Nederland: wie leidt ze op?" (December 2003), Report for the Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 16.

[470] FORUM, *The Position of Muslims in the Netherlands*, 39.

within Islam.[471] Today, the CGI has about 115,000 members. In the media, the CGI, however, is less visible than the CMO, which makes an assessment of their objectives and aims without inside knowledge difficult.

In summary, the situation of Muslim organizations in the Netherlands is not significantly different from that in Germany and Great Britain. Turkish Muslims are much better organized and represented than other entities. Some groups, like Moluccans and Indonesians, show only a very low degree of organization.[472] Additionally, organizations like Al Nisa (an organization of Muslim women) and Muslim student organizations address very specific interests among Muslims in the Netherlands. The World Islamic Mission (WIM) in the Netherlands is part of the wider network of the WIM, representing Hindustanie Sunni Muslims, and a variety of other smaller organizations addressing very specific groups and issues.

Despite their different objectives and characteristics, these organizations unanimously condemn radical Islamists like Hizb ut-Tahrir. In 2010, UMMON and other Muslim organizations condemned an initiative of Hiz ut-Tahrir members in the Netherlands, calling Muslims to boycott the elections in 2009.[473] Thus, despite the current tensions between Muslims and others in the Netherlands, as described in Chapter III, there is also some reason for hope.

Overall, the role Muslim organizations in the Netherlands can play in the promotion of Euro-Islam is totally comparable to the situation in Germany and the UK, despite the fact that the CMO and CGI are much more privileged than other Muslim organizations in Europe.

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[471] "Contactgroep Islam:'Goed Gessprek' met Verdonk," *Nieuws.nl* (November 23, 2004), accessed April 23, 2011. http://binnenland.nieuws.nl/55177.

[472] W. A. Shadid and P. S. van Koningsveld, "Institutionalization and Integration of Islam in the Netherlands," Interculturele Communicatie (1991), accessed May 03, 2011. http://www.interculturelecommunicatie.com/download/islam.html.

[473] "Oproep aan moslims: niet stemmen," Volkskrant (June 02, 2010), accessed April 23, 2011. http://www.volkskrant.nl/vk/nl/2664/Nieuws/article/detail/998676/2010/06/02/Oproep-ann-moslims-niet-stemmen.dhtml.

D. MUSLIM ORGANIZING ON THE EUROPEAN LEVEL

The analysis of Muslim organizations on the national level has shown that organizing is in an early stage and that, so far, no country has seen an organization that speaks for all Muslims in the country. Therefore, it is no surprise that organizing Muslims on the European level is less visible. The analysis, however, has also shown that, for now, it might be more important for Muslim organizations to focus on the national level. National governments are still the main source of the rights they demand. Thus, Euro-Islam is currently not about institutionalization on the European level, but the promotion of core European values. As discussions in Europe show, this might be where the discourse on Euro-Islam can also significantly benefit Europeans themselves.

Organizations that facilitate a European conversation on the role of Islam are almost absent. Those organizations that form a European network belong to Islamist networks, like the Muslim Brotherhood and Milli Görüs. Their aims and objectives, as the analysis shows, will not contribute to the development of Euro-Islam as understood in this thesis. Other organizations like the European Muslim Network (EMN) suggest a wider representation of Muslims in Europe and already have signaled their willingness to facilitate a European-wide discussion. However, the EMN views itself as a think tank and its influence is limited. Among the members of the EMN, El-Zayat and Tariq Ramadan can be found, which suggests a rather Islamist orientation of the EMN.[474] The European Muslim Union (EMU) and the European Muslim Initiative for Social Cohesion are some other organizations that are active on the European level, but have only minor influence. The latter even views itself as a nonreligious group.[475] Another type of European-wide coordination of Muslim organizations comes in the forms of government-sponsored organizations. Here, Turkey maintains the best-developed network of Muslim organizations. But, as the analysis of the respective organizations on the national level has shown, this network will not necessarily be supportive in the development of Euro-Islam.

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[474] EMN, accessed April 29, 2011. http://www.euro-muslims.eu.

[475] EMISCO, accessed May 6, 2011. http://www.emisco.com.

The Alevi community in Europe maintains its own network. The Confederation of Alevi Communities in Europe (*Arrupa Alevi Birliklevi Konfederasyona*, AABK) was founded in 2002 as an Alevi umbrella organization and was legally registered in 2006. It defines itself as a democratic faith organization and calls for dissociation from the diyanet in Turkey. Moreover, the organization seeks to utilize the EU-Turkish association process to leverage change in Turkey in their favor. The similarity in the name with the AABF suggests a close relationship between both organizations, and, indeed, the AABF forms the organizational core of the AABK.[476] Taking the moderate and liberal nature of the AABF into account, the AABK could become a valuable partner to promote Euro-Islam throughout Europe. Its specific role as an organization of Alevi, however, limits its influence on the wider Muslim community in Europe.

Otherwise, cooperation of Muslims on the European level is limited to specific projects. Currently, for example, Muslim organizations have launched an initiative to establish a European standard for halal food and the right to ritual slaughtering.[477] Initiatives by the European Union itself are hard to find. It seems that the responsibility for dialogue lies exclusively with national governments.

Under these circumstances, an in-depth analysis of Muslim organizing on the European level will add little value to this thesis. However, to illustrate the kind of networks that have been established, the role of the FIOE—one of the more prominent Muslim organizations on the European level—will be analyzed in some more detail.

1.   The Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe

In 1989 an international forum, the FIOE, was created in order to maintain links between immigrated Brotherhood leaders. Leading members of the German IGD as well as of the British MAB and MIB, have been founding members of the FIOE and ECFR, and the IGD and the MAB are still members of the FIOE. Dutch organizations cannot

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[476] Massicard, "Alevi Communities," 588–589.

[477] "CMO wil komen tot een Europese HALAL standard," accessed May 7, 2011. http://www.lokum.nl/turkije/2011/04/09/cmo-will-komen-tot-een-europese-halal-standaard.

currently be found among the FIOE-affiliated organizations. The FIOE claims to be the largest Islamic organization on the European level, which, as the previous analysis has shown, and a recent study confirms, does not mean much.[478]

Central to the efforts of the FIOE is Sheikh al Qaradawi, who is also the main driving force behind the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR).[479] Another FIOE-linked organization is the Forum of European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO). Consequently, the IGD- and MAB-affiliated youth organizations, Muslimische Jugend in Germany and Young Muslims in the UK, are member organizations of the FEMYSO.

In addition to the agenda and objectives of FIOE member organizations, a reflection on the previous mentioned statements of Qaradawi suggests an Islamist nature of the ECFR and FIOE. The official statements of the FIOE, however, come in a moderate tone,[480] but the statements of the FIOE-affiliated ECFR shed more light on the ideology of both organizations.

The ECFR center seeks to provide guidance to Muslims in Europe in order to enable them to live their lives according to the Qur'an and sunna in a European context. The language of the fatwas issued by the ECFR is composed in the same form of moderate language used by the FIOE. As a recent study points out, the fatwas often reflect fundamentalist intolerance and represent a "dangerously separatist attitude."[481]

Despite its membership in the FIOE and adherence to an ostensibly same ideological basis, Leiken and Brooke argue that the Brotherhood in Europe is a collection of national groups with different outlooks, and the various factions disagree about how best to advance the Brotherhood's mission.[482] As Sarah Silvestri argues, the FIOE is primarily a public relations and political organization concerned with raising the

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[478] Al-Alawi et al., *A Guide to Sharia Law*, 130.

[479] Whine, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK," 32.

[480] FIOE, "Our Mission," accessed February 12, 2011. http://www.euro-muslim.com/eu_our-mission.aspx.

[481] Al-Alawi et al., *A Guide to Sharia Law*, 127.

[482] Leiken and Brooke, "The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood," 108.

profile and enhancing the participation of Muslims in Europe.[483] The FIOE is thus a kind of forum rather than a central authority. This opinion is shared by the Pew Research Center. In a recent study, it is argued that the national entities of the Brotherhood are best understood as loose affiliates rather than as formal branches of the Muslim Brotherhood. That not all representatives of the Brotherhood are satisfied with this situation shows in a statement by Helbawi. In an interview with Le Monde Diplomatique, he complained, "the international organization is not an organization at all. It is just a coordinating body […] We need to create a global forum for dialogue and to increase our activities."[484]   This sounds like a call for deeper integration. Deeper integration and cooperation of Muslim organizations on the European level, however, is still to come and, as stated above, it might be more important for Muslim organizations to focus on the national level to facilitate the discourse on the role of Islam.

E.   CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of Muslim organizations in the studied countries emphasizes the proposition that the development of Euro-Islam is mainly an exercise of a small group rather than an effort supported by a wide group of Muslim organizations. The landscape of Muslim organization can be characterized as follows:

- A high degree of diversity

- Influence of foreign governments and foreign movements

- Partial animosities between organizations

- Differing perceptions of the future role of Islam in Europe

- Only limited representative function

The high degree of diversity does not surprise, taking the diversity of the Muslim communities in the studied countries into account. Moreover, it is an expression of the

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[483] Silvestri, "Moderate Islamist Groups in Europe," 4–7.

[484] "A row in the family," Le Monde Diplomatique, April 2000, in Whine, "The Muslim Brotherhood in the UK," 37.

diversity that lies implicit in the decentralized nature of Islam. With a specific form of Euro-Islam not existing, Muslims consequently will organize along their ethnic, national, and ideological lines.

Overall, the majority of Muslim organizations seek rather to utilize existing identities and to maintain their traditional and conservative understanding of Islam. Often their aims and objectives meet the definition of Islamist organizations as defined in Chapter II. Sometimes, they follow nationalist lines. Therefore, they play a more separating than unifying role. In this respect, the role of the elder generation, which still obtains leading positions in many Muslim organizations, is of high importance. The analysis of Muslim organizations in the UK, however, has shown that a new string of Muslim organizations and think tanks is coming to the forefront and gaining more and more influence, even within the established umbrella organizations.

The case of the Netherlands will be interesting to observe in order to determine the influence equal treatment of religious groups and the provision of a certain status for Muslim organizations can play. Here, the Netherlands is a step ahead of the governments in Germany and the UK.

On the European level, the organizing of Muslims is currently less significant and does not contribute to the promotion of Euro-Islam. Those organizations founded on the ideology of Islamist movements or controlled by foreign governments are best organized. Otherwise, activities by a wider Muslim community are mainly limited to specific projects. Thus, Euro-Islam is more about the discussion of values that are compatible with core European values than about an institutionalization of Islam through organizations on the European level.

It seems that the most promising option for Euro-Islam to become mature lies in the daily struggle for equality, social inclusion and political participation of Muslim individuals rather than in concerted action of Muslim organizations. This concerted action, currently, seems to be nothing more than wishful thinking.

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V.   CONCLUSION

This thesis sheds light on the potential of Euro-Islam as a new concept that is sought to contribute to successful integration of Muslims in Western Europe, by reference to the cases of Germany, Great Britain and the Netherlands.

The way European Muslims might take is unclear. It can vary from integration, which would benefit all, to assimilation, or—in an extreme, but not very likely case Islamization. If the aim of Western European societies is to respect religious freedom and ensure equality, integration has to be understood as a process of accommodating immigrant minorities and enabling them to participate equally in the social, political, cultural, and economic processes of society, while simultaneously enabling them to preserve their cultural and religious identity as European Muslims. Euro-Islam could contribute to this form of integration.

The concept of Euro-Islam is not mature. It is under negotiation, and the proposals vary from a pure embrace of secularism to new forms of Islamism. Many Muslim scholars—like Bassam Tibi and Tariq Ramadan—agree on the need to reform Islam in a European context, but their proposed ways forward and their definition of Euro-Islam differ. For Europeans, the acceptance of core European values like democracy, tolerance, and pluralism must be an essential prerequisite if Euro-Islam is to play a successful integrative role. But, Europeans have to overcome their prejudices and stereotypes of Muslims and Islam. The aim is to enable Muslims to maintain a Muslim identity, which has to be developed in the specific context of secular, Western countries. The necessary debate among Muslims, however, occurs only within an intellectual minority. The involvement of a wider group is missing, though it is of high importance in achieving wide acceptance.

The construct of an identity based more on common values and less on national, religious, and ethnic roots is a key objective. Identity in Europe, however, is still predominantly based on ethnicity, history, and tradition, whether for Muslims or others. Thus, the development of Euro-Islam has to go in hand with all groups redefining their identities.

The chances of Euro-Islam evolving as a new form of Islam that facilitates the integration of Muslim citizens and immigrants into Europe's civic and political fabric, are partly determined by the Muslim communities and organizations themselves. Opportunities to define their role, however, are determined by the policies and attitudes of their countries—in this case, Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Many Muslims view themselves as victims of exclusion, characterized by poor education, high unemployment, and societal and religious discrimination. They form their identity mainly along national, ethnic, and ideological lines and find themselves caught between the country they live in and the country of their forefathers. Young Muslims are of especial importance because they are the future, and their identity is still in flux. For the young, religion serves as a compensation for being excluded. It is a public identity that differentiates them from the rest of society—a society they perceive as discriminatory. This observation can be made equally in Germany, Great Britain, and the Netherlands. Perceived discrimination and exclusion can be a significant obstacle to Euro-Islam. So long as the feeling of discrimination prevails, anything new that may change their identity in any way may be perceived as attempted assimilation, and rejected.

Integration policies and legislation concerning religious groups often reinforce the feeling of discrimination. German legislation gives a perfect example. If the right to teach classes in Islam in German public schools is denied because Muslim communities do not show the necessary degree of organizational structure that is common in Christian communities and requested by German law, Muslim feelings of discrimination will be intensified. To force a religious minority into the bureaucratic framework preferred by a special set of legislation is an act of assimilation, while real integration would suggest a change in legislation in order to retain the state's credibility in dialog with Muslims.

The dialogue all three studied countries have initiated is a valuable tool for exchanging experiences, ideas, and concepts of future coexistence and cooperation. The high diversity among Muslim communities in Europe makes this dialogue more complicated. However, to enforce uniform structures upon a heterogeneous construct only causes resistance.

What is surprising is that Muslims find themselves in very similar situations in the countries studied, although immigration and integration policies initially differed significantly. Over time, immigration and integration policies have become more and more alike. One might expect that those countries that offered more space and equal rights would find their Muslim communities more integrated. But this is not the case, and therefore other factors must be more important. To identify these factors could serve as basis for future research, which findings would be of high importance for the promotion of Euro-Islam.

Other fields of government policies, however, seem of less importance to Muslims in building up their perception of themselves as discriminated against because they are Muslims. A look at the Internet home pages of Muslim organizations shows that the situation of the Palestinian people and the military engagement of the West in the Islamic world are of interest, but do not dominate. The only exception might be in Great Britain, perhaps as a consequence of British integration policies, which granted Muslims more freedoms and rights, and the UK's special alliance with the U.S.

In general, however, Muslim organizations that could leverage the situation of their constituencies have only limited influence. These organizations naturally reflect the diversity of the community they represent. While mosques and other local organizations serve as forums in Muslim community life, national organizations evolved mainly as umbrella groups in response to the need to organize government—Muslim interaction and institutionalize a forum for dialogue. These umbrellas, however, often suffer from a lack of support by the wider Muslim community and cannot be assumed to speak for all. Even more important, these organizations tend to be more willing to mobilize the state to intervene on their behalf—for example, by funding educational and cultural activities that endorse their ideology—than they are willing to bring the real interests of Muslim grassroots forward.[485] Although their representative role is limited, the majority of these organizations has an influence on the wider Muslim community through the education and provision of imams, who often come from abroad and stay for a limited time.

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[485] Gilliat-Ray, *Muslims in Britain*, 108.

Without knowledge and experience in a foreign environment, their role in the promotion of Euro-Islam is counterproductive. National initiatives to establish imam education in public universities may be the right approach to ensure the distribution of a reformed Islam. The acceptance of these new imams by Muslim communities, however, remains in doubt and should be the subject of future research.

In general, the majority of Muslim organizations propagate a more rigid, sometimes Islamist, understanding of Islam. The analysis of a distinct selection of organizations has shown that their agenda is defined mainly by the interests of the organizational leadership and the ideology of foreign movements and governments. Networks of Muslim organizations exist mainly along these ideological lines or in the form of a government-sponsored network, like the Turkish diyanet. These networks have more than national reach-out, but organizing Muslims on the European level, in general, is less advanced. Taking the current situation into account, the focus of Muslims organizing should be put on the national level. Despite the legislative power of the European Union, national governments are responsible and empowered to change the situation of Muslims in their country of residence. Only in the second instance might it be useful for Muslim organizations to organize throughout Europe and appeal to the European Union when a government obviously violates the rights of minorities.

Overall, Muslim organizations seem to play only a limited role in the development of Euro-Islam. But recently new, more liberal, Muslim organizations and think tanks have come to the forefront, which is a good sign. To make the concept of Euro-Islam a success, rethinking by all involved is required:

- Governments have to reconsider their immigration and integration policies. While the demand that residents learn the native language is legitimate, other requests look exaggerated. The banning of headscarves, for example, is an example of inconsequential secularism, although it has to be pointed out that none of the countries studied has implemented a nationwide ban on headscarves.

- Governments have to ensure that Muslims enjoy the same rights as other religious groups. Discrimination against Muslims because they are a diverse religion

without clear hierarchical structures and central authority contradicts the European claim of supporting pluralism. Europeans have to accept the diverse nature of Islam and adapt their legal system accordingly.

- Muslims have to intensify their discussion of Euro-Islam, and this discussion needs to be taken out of the obscurity of intellectual debates into the wider Muslim community. Muslims born, educated, and living in Europe should lead the process and push back the influence of foreign governments and movements.

- The entire process requires increased dialogue between Muslims and others. No one should be excluded from the conversation because of prejudice or unfounded reservation on either side. Just because someone's opinion is critical or promotes ideas that do not reflect the mainstream does not disqualify him. On the contrary, to make the dialogue open to all voices to the greatest extent possible will increase credibility.

- A mainly theoretical discourse over Euro-Islam, however, will not automatically improve the economic and social situation of Muslims in Europe. Here, youth education and job programs are required. Only if young Muslims feel accepted and included might they be open to the changes in identity that are essential to internalizing Euro-Islam.

While this thesis has focused on the identity of Muslims, the role of European identity—whether German, British or Dutch—has only been touched upon. But European identity is subject to change as well. The fact that the issue of Islamophobia, the integration of Muslims, and the definition of a future role for Islam have come up at a time when Europeans themselves are searching for identity might be an additional obstacle to successful integration. It is incumbent upon Western Europeans to define their own identity and the role they want religion to play in this definition and in their society.

It seems that the most promising option for Euro-Islam to become mature lies in the daily struggle for equality, social inclusion and political participation of Muslim individuals rather than in concerted action of Muslim organizations. This concerted action, currently, seems to be nothing else than wishful thinking. If the daily struggle

comes in the form of an open and fair dialogue between Muslims and others, Muslim individuals will play a much more powerful role in the promotion of Euro-Islam than Muslim organizations currently do.

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